Dirk Baltzly

PLATO'S AUTHORITY AND THE FORMATION OF TEXTUAL COMMUNITIES

Copyright

Knowing freedom: Epicurean philosophy beyond atomism and the swerve

This paper argues that Epicurus held a non-reductionist view of mental states that is in the spirit of Davidsons anomalous monism.1 We argue for this conclusion by considering the role that normative descriptions play in the peritropē argument from On Nature 25. However, we also argue that Epicurus was an indeterminist. We can know that atoms swerve because we can know that we make choices that are up to us and this is incompatible with the ancestral causal determination of mental states by atomic processes. Epicurus escapes the traditional criticism of indeterminist libertarians because the swerve is not meant to explain how choices may be free. The anti-reductionist stance on the mental means that nothing about atomic processes could possibly explain any particular mental event. Moreover, because of the practical and therapeutic nature of Epicurean philosophy, it is not necessary that Epicurus provide an explanation of how the swerve subserves freedom of choice. We know all that we need to know for eudaimonia when we know that some choices are up to us.

What Goes Up: Proclus Against Aristotle on the Fifth Element

The Athenian neoplatonist Proclus (c. 410–485) is not regarded by most analytically inclined philosophers as one of antiquity’s better minds. After all, the work of Proclus with which most people are acquainted is the Elements of Theology. While one might admire its attempt at rigour in the 211 numbered propositions and their proofs, most contemporary philosophers will find the premises in these proofs pretty unlikely. Moreover, the resulting metaphysical edifice—with its various levels of entities from transcendent One to unqualified matter—is fairly alien to our more naturalist ontologies. I barrack for the St Kilda Football Club, so it should come as no surprise that I like to see the rehabilitation of the downtrodden and underappreciated. In what follows, I’ll argue that some of Proclus’ arguments are at least as worthy of our attention as one of Aristotle’s most celebrated arguments in natural philosophy. Part of what we admire about Aristotle is the methodology and cleverness. He proceeds in a way we approve of, first identifying the problems that arise when we survey the ‘platitudes’ about a topic and then clearing away many of these by drawing distinctions among the various senses of words. He typically offers a theory and tries to justify it by showing that it is better than its competitors at saving the appearances. Even when Aristotle gets to the wrong conclusion, we still find that he does things that we regard as methodologically virtuous in the process.

Intimate Relations: Friends and Lovers

If this were an advice column, it is easy to imagine the answer to the first question. The focus would be on typical cases and the answer would be banal: our loved ones are special to us, so we have reasons to spend time with them in preference to others, catering for their needs in particular, and seeing to it that they enjoy themselves, even when this comes at some cost to ourselves; we have reasons to do whats required to maintain our relationship with them, reasons that are important to remember when we find ourselves lacking the spontaneous feelings of affection that generally undergird our relationship; and we have reasons to let our loved ones do all of these same things for us in return. Though it is much harder to imagine what an advice columnist might answer in response to the second question, my guess is that something analytic or constitutive would be offered. Since our loved ones are special to us, taking ourselves to have reasons like those mentioned is what it is to love someone.

Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, edited by Nails, Debra, and Harold Tarrant

The twenty papers in this volume honour the work of Holger Thesleff on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday. The title alludes to the famous passage at Phaedo 99d where Socrates’ notion that ther...

Two Aristotelian puzzles about planets and their Neoplatonic reception

Abstract The longevity of Aristotelian natural science consists not so much in the fact that Aristotle’s solutions to puzzles were accepted by generations of philosophers, but by the fact that the presuppositions that made these puzzles look puzzling were. In what follows I consider some Neoplatonic responses to two puzzles that Aristotle poses in De Caelo Book 2, Chapter 12. Both Proclus and Simplicius rejected Aristotle’s solutions to the puzzles he posed. In one case, but not in the other, they also reassessed the relative importance of the presuppositions that created the puzzle.

Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation

Book Information Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xi + 499. Hardback, £30.