Dirk Leuffen

A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)

We present a new dataset on decision-making in the European Union (DEUII) that revises and expands a previous dataset. Researchers are using this new dataset to address a range of research questions regarding the inputs, processes and outputs of the EUs legislative system. The dataset contains information on 331 controversial issues raised by 125 legislative proposals that were introduced between 1996 and 2008. For each of these controversial issues, the dataset identifies the policy alternative favoured most by each of the main political actors: the European Commission; the European Parliament; and each of the member states representatives in the Council of Ministers. This information was assembled during 349 semi-structured interviews with key informants. This article describes the dataset and identifies its relevance to several research agendas in EU studies.

The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation

ABSTRACT This contribution conceptualizes the European Union (EU) as a system of differentiated integration characterized by both variation in levels of centralization (vertical differentiation) and variation in territorial extension (horizontal differentiation) across policy areas. Differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening and has increased and consolidated as the EUs powers, policy scope and membership have grown. Turning to explanation, the contribution attributes the pattern of differentiated integration in the EU to the interaction of interdependence and politicization. Differentiation among the member states (internal differentiation) results from supranational integration under conditions of high interdependence and politicization. By contrast, external differentiation (the selective policy integration of non-member states) occurs in highly interdependent but weakly politicized policy areas. These constellations are illustrated in case studies of differentiation in the internal market, monetary union and defence.

Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making

The article analyses how enlargements affect the speed of European Union (EU) decision-making. In line with rationalist theories of group choice, we argue that enlargements increase the costs of organizing decisions, i.e. transaction costs. Increasing transaction costs, in turn, slow down EU law-making. We test this theory by estimating Cox regression models that incorporate time-varying covariates on all directives, regulations and decisions submitted by the European Commission between 1976 and 2006. In contrast to previous analyses, we show that an increase in group size indeed slows down EU law-making.

Forecasting European Union politics: Real-time forecasts in political time series analysis

Forecasting plays an increasingly important role in the scientific study of European Union politics and in political science in general. This is because forecasts are not only indispensable for (political) actors who need to form expectations about future events, but can also be used to judge the validity of (competing) theoretical models. While the debate about whether political science should engage in forecasting is largely over, many questions about how this should be done in everyday research are still open. One of these is how forecasts of political time series can be derived from theoretical models. Using a practical example from European Union research, we start to address this question. We first show how forecasts of political time series can be derived from both theoretical and atheoretical models. Subsequently, we use an atheoretical time series (ARMA) imputation approach to demonstrate how they can be fruitfully integrated in order to overcome some of the limitations to making forecasts of political time series which are based on theoretical models.

Divided We Stand – Unified We Govern? Cohabitation and Regime Voting in the 2002 French Elections

In this article the impact of voters’ regime preferences, i.e. their preferences for either divided or unified government, on their voting behaviour, is analysed. The theory expounded, combining behavioural as well as institutional approaches, predicts that voters weigh their regime against their partisan preferences to derive their vote choice. This theory and its implications are tested on the 2002 French legislative elections using a multinomial logit set-up. The results indicate that regime voting adds to the explanatory power of traditional vote-choice models. Statistical simulations provide further evidence that regime preferences play a decisive role in the voting booth, especially for voters who are not politically ‘anchored’.

Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision‐Making

Salience as the intensity of interest is a key explanatory factor of European Union decision-making. In this article, the ability of three explanatory models to explain the realized values of Member States’ salience is hypothesized and tested. On the basis of the DEU II data, the analysis shows that a mixture of national interest group heterogeneity and membership length has the highest predictive power. The results support the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that domestic interests determine European decision-making.

Oligarchization, formalization, adaptation? Linking Sociological Theory and EU Enlargement Research

This article reviews emergent literature on the effects of Eastern enlargement on EU decision-making. After recalling pre-enlargement hypotheses we inspect empirical findings on that issue. Whereas some authors stress a ‘business as usual’ reading of post-enlargement decision-making, others point out changes. In order to better understand the processes of post-enlargement governance we draw on three sociological group theories – oligarchization, formalization and adaptation – and assess their applicability to the case of the EU. While we present only preliminary evidence for each of these theories, our secondary literature analysis underlines that the complexity of enlargement demands a widening of the theoretical scope. In such a perspective enlargement research can contribute to more general debates about decision-making in the EU.

Enhanced cooperation in practice. An analysis of differentiated integration in EU secondary law

ABSTRACT The article offers a first comprehensive overview of the workings of enhanced cooperation in the European Union (EU). Although this form of secondary law differentiation exists since the Amsterdam Treaty, it has only rarely been used so far. In the article, we formulate a theory of when and why enhanced cooperation is used in EU decision-making. Our theory builds on rationalist institutionalism focussing on institutions, preference constellations and the externality structure of policies. We test the plausibility of our theoretical claims by combining comparative and within-case analyses of nine cases. The empirical findings underline that the usage of enhanced cooperation depends to large degrees on the externality structure of the goods under consideration. The article ends with a short normative evaluation of the enhanced cooperation procedure.

Business as Usual? Analyzing the Effects of Enlargement on EU Legislative Output

This paper analyzes the effects of enlargement on European Union (EU) legislative output. Building on veto player theory we use computer simulations to derive hypotheses about group size, heterogeneity and law production. We test this theory by estimating negative binomial regression models on a dataset covering the legislative process for all binding secondary EU legislation from 1976 to 2007. Our analysis does not corroborate all of veto player theory’s expectations. No significant reduction of legislation goes along with an increase in the number of member states. In the outlook we discuss these findings and generate a set of possible explanations for our unexpected results.

Ties that bind, can also strangle: the Brexit threat and the hardships of reforming the EU

ABSTRACT This article links insights from research on European Union (EU) decision-making and on differentiated integration to the recent negotiations about the future United Kingdom (UK)–EU relationship. We argue that since a Brexit would overturn well-established statics of EU decision-making, EU member states reacted differently to the British demands. States that feared a weakening of their position after a Brexit were more willing to grant concessions to the UK. This largely applies to most northern member states. In contrast, most other member states appeared more reluctant to meet the British expectations. First, these states hoped to improve their standing inside the EU after a Brexit. Second, reflecting deeper structural tensions, the British demands would have entailed higher prices for these member states. Anticipating heterogeneity between the other member states, and thus the stability enhancing mechanisms of the joint decision trap, the UK downscaled its demands before the European Council of February 2016. In consequence, the negotiations on the terms of Britain’s EU membership did not result in a grand overhaul of the EU, but rather in symbolic concessions aimed at pleasing British domestic politics without severely harming other member states’ interests.