Djamel Kirat

Non-linear Pass-Through of the CO2 Emission-Allowance Price onto Wholesale Electricity Prices

This article considers the evidence for threshold effects in the relationship between electricity and emission-permit prices in France and Germany during the second phase of the EU ETS. Specifically, we compare linear and non-linear threshold models of electricity prices using the sample-splitting and threshold estimation approach in Hansen (Econometrica, 64 575–603 2000). We find evidence of non-linear threshold effects in both countries. The estimated carbon-price thresholds are 14.94€ and 12.57€ in France and Germany respectively. The carbon-price threshold in France perfectly matches the well-known carbon spot-price structural break of October 2008. This is not the case for the carbon-price threshold in Germany. Further analysis reveals that carbon prices before October 2008 were not reflected in electricity prices in either country. This is mainly due to uncertainty about the future of the EU ETS that led electricity producers to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. After October 2008, French electricity producers passed the price of emission permits through to electricity prices in a linear way, while their German counterparts did so non-linearly. Finally, we suggest improvements to the design of the EU ETS. Our recommendations are to strengthen the price signal to make it more clear and reliable and provide sufficient incentives for energy transition.

Flexibility in the Market for International Carbon Credits and Price. Dynamics Difference with European Allowances

We analyze the price dynamics of European allowances and international carbon credits in the second phase of the European carbon market. We develop and use a model combining fundamental drivers associated with the demand for quotas by installations and risk-return considerations related to the financial nature of carbon permits. We estimate it with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models. Although carbon permits present some characteristics of financial assets, we find that an increased volatility is not associated with an increased return. The price of allowances and credits are explained by similar factors. However, whereas the corresponding returns present comparable dynamics, the long-term relationships between the price of these two types of permits and their drivers differ significantly. While the price of allowances is demand-driven, we suggest the existence of a supply-side effect for credits, and explain it by the flexibility in the related market. The impact of the European economic activity is less visible on credits than on allowances. The price elasticity of allowances with regards to the coal and gas prices is negative in time periods of low economic activity while it is positive in the rest of the time. We suggest an explanation for this dynamics difference.

Flexibility in the Market for International Carbon Credits and Price Dynamics Difference with European Allowances

The Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism to allow a Party to benefit from greenhouse gases emissions reductions conducted in a host Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution. In this context, the objective of this paper is to improve the understanding of carbon offsets price dynamics, in comparison with regular carbon markets allowances. We combine a cointegration approach with risk premium considerations to compare the price dynamics of European Union Allowances (EUA) and Certified Emission Reductions (CER) in the second phase of the European carbon market. By taking account of breaks identified in the series, we find that, while the EUA and CER returns present comparable dynamics, the long-term relationships between the price of these two types of permits and their drivers differ significantly. Given the impact of energy prices (positive for coal and negative for gas) on the CER price, we suggest the existence of a supply-side effect for credits. We find that the price elasticity of allowances with regard to the coal and gas prices is negative in time periods of low economic activity and positive in the rest of the time. We explain the latter by the fact that the market is not tight and the former by the effect of the economic activity on the price of commodities and energy.