Dmitri Vinogradov

A Framework for Extracting the Probability of Default from Stock Option Prices

This paper develops a framework to estimate the probability of default (PD) implied in listed stock options. The underlying option pricing model measures PD as the intensity of a jump diffusion process, in which the underlying stock price jumps to zero at default. We adopt a two-stage calibration algorithm to obtain the precise estimator of PD. In the calibration procedure, we improve the fitness of the option pricing model via the implementation of the time inhomogeneous term structure model in the option pricing model. Since the term structure model perfectly fits the actual term structure, we resolve the estimation bias caused by the poor fitness of the time homogeneous term structure model. It is demonstrated that the PD estimator from listed stock options can provide meaningful insights on the pricing of credit derivatives like credit default swap.

Public procurement mechanisms for public-private partnerships

Why do some countries (often developing and emerging economies) adopt special laws on PPP, whilst in others PPPs are governed by the legislation on public procurement and related bylaws? This paper explains the above global discrepancies from an institutional perspective. In a contract-theoretical framework we demonstrate how PPPs can enable projects that are not feasible through standard public procurement arrangements. Incentives for private partners are created through extra benefits (often non-contractible) from their collaboration with the government (e.g. risk reduction, reputational gains, access to additional resources, lower bureaucratic burden, etc.). In a well-developed institutional environment these benefits are implicitly guaranteed, suggesting no need in a specialized PPP-enabling legislation. Otherwise, a PPP law should establish an institutional architecture to provide the above benefits.

KIBS for Public Needs

Knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) are a rapidly developing sector of modern economies. Numerous studies suggest that KIBS facilitate knowledge exchange between providers and consumers, and improve the innovativeness of the latter. However, because KIBS are strongly reliant on service co-production by the customer and provider working in partnership, intensive cooperation between the two parties is essential. Public procurement may offer supporting mechanisms for this sector, both directly (by purchasing services) and indirectly (by demonstrating the benefits of KIBS consumption, which may stimulate a demand for them from the private sector). Yet, legislative constraints on the types of admissible public procurement mechanisms may have an undesirable effect on the provider selection, meaning that services may not be purchased from the most efficient or the most suitable provider. Alongside this, public bodies are known to be managerially less efficient than private firms, partly due to their distorted system of incentives. These key differences between the public and private sectors motivated us to study the efficiency of publicly procuring KIBS. In particular, we find that consumers of KIBS in the public sector report lower satisfaction from KIBS and admit a lower level of co-production than the private sector. Our main recommendations refer to the optimal choice of procurement mechanisms and the system of incentives in public institutions

Public-Private Partnerships as Collaborative Projects: Testing the Theory on Cases from EU and Russia

ABSTRACT How do public-private partnerships (PPPs) differ from traditional public procurement and what role should governments play in them? This article views PPPs as collaborative projects with imperfect information between parties. Typical public procurement contracts tackle asymmetric information problems yet limit feasibility of projects: some are not profitable enough to ensure private party participation. Partnership improves feasibility; this justifies PPPs as a form of public good provision and demonstrates how they differ from procurement. Four UK and Russian cases of PPP projects are analyzed within the above framework, focusing on types of contracts, contributions of both partners, and specific partnership elements.

Banks, Credibility and Macroeconomic Evolution after a Production Shock

One of the important functions of financial intermediation is intertemporal risk smoothing. In this paper we study the effects of a production shock in a closed economy and compare the abilities of market-based and bank-based financial systems in processing the shock. The analysis of the shock propagation indicates that a competitive banking system may collapse in the absence of a proper regulation. Paradoxically, it is the credibility of banks that makes bank-based economies fragile. A necessary and sufficient condition for successful bailout schemes is proposed.

Do CDS Spreads Reflect Credit Risks? Evidence from UK Bank Bailouts

CDS spreads are believed to reflect credit risks but remained stable for major UK banks during the subprime crisis. To explain this gap, we employ probabilities of default (PD) from stock options. These may differ from those obtained from debt instruments but are useful for practical reasons and deliver meaningful results: bailed-out banks demonstrate a significant decrease in loss given default (LGD) embedded in their CDS spreads, unlike non-bailed-out banks and non-financials. Bailout announcements effectively counteract the LGD-PD co-movement suggested by the credit cycle view. A comparison is made with US banks where government action appears less pronounced on LGD.