Dolf Rami

On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names

The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for the predicate view on proper names, which is still used by several current philosophers in defence of this view. I have called this argument the unification argument. I will present a stepwise interpretation and reconstruction of this argument, consider several possible responses to it and defend a specific response to it in detail.

Imagination, Psychologistic Semantics, and the Paradox of Fictional Names

The main goal of Maier’s article is to provide a new solution to what he calls the paradox of fictional names. This new solution combines two different already classic proposals: (a) Walton’s (1990) anti-realist analysis of fictional discourse and (b) Kamp’s (2015) psychologistic version of the formal semantic framework of Discourse Representation Theory. Before evaluating Maier’s solution in more detail, let us first indicate what we take to be the depth and multiple dimensions of the problem he aims to solve. According to Maier the paradox of fictional names can be stated by focusing on the following two sentences, which are paradigm examples of two different aspects of fictional discourse:

Drei Varianten des Paradoxons der Nicht-Existenz

Abstract The original version of the philosophical paradox of non-existence can be found in Plato’s dialog Sophist. Different ancient and medieval philosophers discussed this problem and proposed their own solutions to it. As far as I know, the problem had no important impact on the discussions about the notion of existence in the early modern period between Descartes and Frege. Philosophical interest in the notion of existence in this period was mainly driven by discussions on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Meinong and Russell are responsible for a renaissance of this paradox in the 20th century. Russell shaped two new semantic versions of the paradox. In this paper, I will discuss and introduce three different versions of it. Firstly, the original version, which can be found in the Sophist. Secondly, the two more recent and sophisticated semantic versions that concern the semantics of (a) general negative existential sentences like “Unicorns do not exist” and (b) singular negative existential sentences like “Pegasus does not exist”. Philosophical discussion of the paradox in the Analytic Tradition has mainly focused in the last decades on the version related to (b). Concerning the version related to (a), there is a general consensus that Russell convincingly solved it. However, I will show that Russell’s solution of this version of the paradox is problematic, and I will argue for an alternative uniform solution to both semantic versions of the paradox based on free logic.

van Inwagen’s Argument for the Existence of Fictional Characters. An Evaluation and Critique

Abstract This essay will be concerned with an evaluation, modification and critique of van Inwagen’s famous argument for the existence of fictional characters. Firstly, a reconstruction of the original argument will be provided and three different challenges for the original version of the argument will be pointed out. Secondly, there will be a more detailed investigation of the weaknesses pointed out. It will be shown how they can be cleared, and a modified, less problematic, alternative version of the argument will be proposed. Thirdly and finally, three different possible options that an irrealist concerning fictional characters has to respond to our modified argument will be evaluated. The view will be defended that the irrealist can make use of a substitutional interpretation of specific fictional generalisations based on a negative free logic to undermine the modified argument in a plausible way.

Apparent Generalisations about Fictional Characters

Abstract This essay will be concerned with an evaluation, modification, and critique of van Inwagen’s famous argument for the existence of fictional characters. In the first section a reconstruction of the original argument will be provided, and three different challenges for this version of the argument will be pointed out. The first challenge concerns van Inwagen’s commitment to first-order predicate logic as a canonical language for the formal representation of truth-conditions of assertoric sentences in natural languages, and the problematic semantic complexity of van Inwagen’s original example sentences of quantifications about fictional objects. The second challenge concerns his commitment to a Quinean conception of ordinary language quantifications that conceives of first-order quantifiers as existentially loaded. The third challenge concerns van Inwagen’s tendency to interpret our ordinary intuitions about the truth-values of specific sentences as intuitions about the truth-values of the literal contents of these sentences. In the second section, a more detailed investigation of these three challenges will be provided; and a modified, and less problematic, alternative version of the argument will be proposed. It will be shown that the truth-conditions of van Inwagen’s original example sentences cannot be adequately represented on the basis of first-order predicate logic. I will propose alternative and less complex example sentences that are sufficient for the required purpose. Additionally, a reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids a commitment to a specific sort of formal framework. After that, it will be shown why the assumption of a Quinean conception of quantification unnecessarily increases the burden of proof. A reformulation of the argument will be proposed that avoids the commitment to a Quinean conception of quantification. Furthermore, I will make a third and final adjustment of the argument that allows us to remain neutral concerning the specific status of our truth-value intuitions concerning the proposed example sentences of generalisations about fictional objects. In the third and final section, three possible responses of an irrealist concerning fictional objects will be evaluated. The first option makes use of a recent semantic analysis of the modifying adjective ›fictional‹ proposed by Sainsbury. According to this analysis, a sentence like ›There are fictional mice that talk‹ is semantically equivalent with the claim ›There are fictional works according to which it is the case that at least one mouse talks‹. The second option additionally makes use of Sainsbury’s conception of spotty scope for ordinary language quantifiers and other related sentential operators. It will be shown why both options cannot account for the desired true readings of our example sentences. Finally, a third solution will be proposed and defended. This solution makes use of a substitutional interpretation of specific fictional generalisations based on a negative free logic to undermine the modified argument. It will be shown how this solution allows us to provide a correct analysis of the desired readings of our example sentences of generalisations about fictional characters. After that, two problems of this account will be discussed. The first problem concerns the extension of the proposed strategy to more complicated and sophisticated example sentences. The second problem concerns the independent motivation of a substitutional treatment of at least certain natural language quantificational expressions.