Dominic Heesang Chai

Empirical Analysis of Legal Institutions and Institutional Change: Multiple-Methods Approaches and Their Application to Corporate Governance Research

The claim that institutions matter for economic growth and development has so far received a more extensive theoretical treatment than an empirical or methodological one. Basing our approach on a coevolutionary conception of relations between law and the economy, we link theory to method and explore three techniques for analysing legal institutions empirically: ‘leximetric’ measurement of legal rules, time-series econometrics, and interview-based fieldwork. We argue that while robust measurement of institutions is possible, quantitative techniques have their limits, and should be combined with fieldwork in a multiple-methods approach.

Agency Theory in Practice: A Qualitative Study of Hedge Fund Activism in Japan

We look at the reaction to hedge fund activism of managers and shareholders in Japanese firms and explore the implications of our findings for agency theory. We use a qualitative research design which treats the standard agency-theoretical model of the firm as only one possible approach to understanding corporate governance, to be tested through empirical research, rather than as an assumption built into the analysis. We find that Japanese managers do not generally regard themselves as the shareholders’ agents and that, conversely, shareholders in Japanese firms do not generally behave as principals. Our findings suggest that the standard principal-agent model may be a weak fit for firms in certain national contexts.

Agency Theory in Practice: a Qualitative Study of Hedge Fund Activism in Japan: Agency Theory in Practice

We look at the reaction to hedge fund activism of managers and shareholders in Japanese firms and explore the implications of our findings for agency theory. We use a qualitative research design which treats the standard agency-theoretical model of the firm as only one possible approach to understanding corporate governance, to be tested through empirical research, rather than as an assumption built into the analysis. We find that Japanese managers do not generally regard themselves as the shareholders’ agents and that, conversely, shareholders in Japanese firms do not generally behave as principals. Our findings suggest that the standard principal-agent model may be a weak fit for firms in certain national contexts.

Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Fund Activism in Japan

Hedge fund activism has been identified in the USA as a driver of enduring corporate governance change and market perception. We investigate this claim in an empirical study to see whether activism produced similar results in Japan in four representative areas: management effectiveness, managerial decisions, labour management, and market perception. Experience from the USA would predict positive changes at Japanese target companies in these four areas. However, analysis of financial data shows that no enduring changes were apparent in the first three areas, and that market perception was consistently unfavourable. Our findings demonstrate that the same pressures need not produce the same results in different markets. Moreover, while the effects of the global financial crisis should not be ignored, we conclude that the country-level differences in corporate governance identified in the varieties of capitalism literature are robust, at least in the short term.

Unexpected corporate outcomes to hedge fund activism in Japan

We also gratefully acknowledge funding from the ESRC’s Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures Research Programme, Project ‘Law, Development and Finance in Rising Powers’, Grant No. ES/J012491/1, and the Omron Fund at Doshisha University, Kyoto.

Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin

Using the persistence of corporate profits as a measure of the intensity of product market competition in 19 countries for the period 1995-2005, we find that civil law systems are more competitive, in this sense, than common law ones. Greater shareholder protection increases competition between firms in common law countries, but reduces it in civil law ones. We conclude that shareholder rights act as complements to product market competition in the common law world but not in the civil law world, and explain this result by reference to the common-law origins of shareholder-orientated corporate governance.