Dominic J. Packer

The Neural Substrates of In-Group Bias A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation

Classic minimal-group studies found that people arbitrarily assigned to a novel group quickly display a range of perceptual, affective, and behavioral in-group biases. We randomly assigned participants to a mixed-race team and used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain regions involved in processing novel in-group and out-group members independently of preexisting attitudes, stereotypes, or familiarity. Whereas previous research on intergroup perception found amygdala activity—typically interpreted as negativity—in response to stigmatized social groups, we found greater activity in the amygdala, fusiform gyri, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsal striatum when participants viewed novel in-group faces than when they viewed novel out-group faces. Moreover, activity in orbitofrontal cortex mediated the in-group bias in self-reported liking for the faces. These in-group biases in neural activity were not moderated by race or by whether participants explicitly attended to team membership or race, a finding suggesting that they may occur automatically. This study helps clarify the role of neural substrates involved in perceptual and affective in-group biases.

Increasing Implicit Self-Esteem Through Classical Conditioning

Implicit self-esteem is the automatic, nonconscious aspect of self-esteem. This study demonstrated that implicit self-esteem can be increased using a computer game that repeatedly pairs self-relevant information with smiling faces. These findings, which are consistent with principles of classical conditioning, establish the associative and interpersonal nature of implicit self-esteem and demonstrate the potential benefit of applying basic learning principles in this domain.

The Neural Substrates of In-Group Bias

Classic minimal-group studies found that people arbitrarily assigned to a novel group quickly display a range of perceptual, affective, and behavioral in-group biases. We randomly assigned participants to a mixed-race team and used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain regions involved in processing novel in-group and out-group members independently of preexisting attitudes, stereotypes, or familiarity. Whereas previous research on intergroup perception found amygdala activity—typically interpreted as negativity—in response to stigmatized social groups, we found greater activity in the amygdala, fusiform gyri, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsal striatum when participants viewed novel in-group faces than when they viewed novel out-group faces. Moreover, activity in orbitofrontal cortex mediated the in-group bias in self-reported liking for the faces. These in-group biases in neural activity were not moderated by race or by whether participants explicitly attended to team membership or race, a finding suggesting that they may occur automatically. This study helps clarify the role of neural substrates involved in perceptual and affective in-group biases.

On Being Both With Us and Against Us: A Normative Conflict Model of Dissent in Social Groups

Although past research has demonstrated a positive relationship between collective identification and normative conformity, there may be circumstances in which strongly identified members do not conform but instead choose to challenge group norms. This article proposes a normative conflict model, which distinguishes between nonconformity due to dissent (challenging norms to change them) and nonconformity due to disengagement (distancing oneself from the group). The normative conflict model predicts that strongly identified members are likely to challenge group norms when they experience conflict between norms and important alternate standards for behavior, in particular when they perceive norms as being harmful to the group. Data in support of the model are reviewed, mechanisms by which external variables may influence dissent in social groups are elaborated, and the model is linked to contemporary perspectives on collective identity.

Loyal Deviance: Testing the Normative Conflict Model of Dissent in Social Groups:

The normative conflict model predicts that expressions of dissent within groups can be motivated by the collective interest and that strongly identified members may dissent from group norms if and when they are perceived to be harmful to the collective. We present convergent evidence from four studies in support of the model. Study 1 investigated retrospective reports of disagreements and found that strongly identified members reported collectively oriented motives for expressing disagreement within their groups. Studies 2a and 2b provided experimental tests of the prediction that strongly identified group members are willing to dissent when they reflect on how a norm could harm their group but not when they reflect on negative individualistic consequences of the same norm. Finally, Study 3 replicated these effects using a correlational design that measured actual opinion expression in an ostensible online chat room.

Identifying Systematic Disobedience in Milgram's Obedience Experiments: A Meta-Analytic Review

A meta-analysis of data from eight of Mil-grams obedience experiments reveals previously undocumented systematicity in the behavior of disobedient participants. In all studies, disobedience was most likely at 150 v, the point at which the shocked “learner” first requested to be released. Further illustrating the importance of the 150-v point, obedience rates across studies covaried with rates of disobedience at 150 v, but not at any other point; as obedience decreased, disobedience at 150 v increased. In contrast, disobedience was not associated with the learners escalating expressions of pain. This analysis identifies a critical decision point in the obedience paradigm and suggests that disobedient participants perceived the learners right to terminate the experiment as overriding the experimenters orders, a finding with potential implications for the treatment of prisoners.

Avoiding Groupthink Whereas Weakly Identified Members Remain Silent, Strongly Identified Members Dissent About Collective Problems

Collective decision-making failures are often attributed to group members’ unwillingness to express unpopular opinions, and incident investigations frequently name lack of dissent as a causal factor (Sunstein, 2006). The investigation following the Columbia space-shuttle explosion, for instance, cited a culture at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in which ‘‘it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the agency’s hierarchy’’ (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003, p. 183). Long-standing psychological explanations refer to ‘‘groupthink’’ (Janis, 1972) and a ‘‘spiral of silence’’ (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), positing that group members are reluctant to publicly express private concerns about collective problems if they believe that other members are likely to disagree with them. Combined with social identity research that finds positive relationships between members’ identification with groups and conformity to collective norms (e.g., Terry & Hogg, 1996), these accounts paint a pessimistic picture: Fearing the social costs of dissent, group members with alternative opinions are expected to remain silent, and when dissent is expressed, it is expected to come from those who care the least. However, recent research highlights a second perspective suggesting that such pessimism may not be fully warranted. The normative conflict model (Packer, 2008) posits that strongly identified members are attentive to group-related problems, and perceptions that the status quo is harmful to the collective may trigger expression of dissenting opinions. Strongly identified members may be willing to bear social costs associated with dissent in order to improve group outcomes. Initial studies have shown that strongly identified members do challenge group norms when they are perceived as collectively harmful (Packer & Chasteen, 2008). METHOD

16. Implicit measurement of attitudes: a physiological approach

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Intergenerational Contact Predicts Attitudes Toward Older Adults Through Inclusion of the Outgroup in the Self

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THE ITERATIVE REPROCESSING MODEL: A MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK FOR ATTITUDES AND EVALUATION

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