Dominic Tierney

The Rubicon Theory of War How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return

A major paradox in international relations is the widespread fear and anxiety that underlies the security dilemma in times of peace and the prevalence of overconfidence or “false optimism” on the eve of war. A new theory of the causes of war—the Rubicon theory of war—can account for this paradox and explain important historical puzzles. The “Rubicon model of action phases,” which was developed in experimental psychology, describes a significant shift in peoples susceptibility to psychological biases before and after making a decision. Prior to making decisions, people tend to maintain a “deliberative” mind-set, weighing the costs, benefits, and risks of different options in a relatively impartial manner. By contrast, after making a decision, people tend to switch into an “implemental” mind-set that triggers a set of powerful psychological biases, including closed-mindedness, biased information processing, cognitive dissonance, self-serving evaluations, the illusion of control, and optimism. Together, these biases lead to significant overconfidence. The Rubicon theory of war applies this model to the realm of international conflict, where implemental mind-sets can narrow the range of bargaining options, promote overambitious war plans, and elevate the probability of war.

Pearl Harbor in Reverse: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis

During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the argument that U.S. air strikes against Soviet missile sites in Cuba would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had a major impact on policymaking. The invocation of this analogy contributed to President John F. Kennedys decision to forgo an immediate attack on the missiles and to start instead with a naval blockade of the island. The Pearl Harbor in reverse argument is an example of an important phenomenon that has received little attention in foreign policy analysisthe moral analogy. Fusing together elements of moral and analogical thinking, the moral analogy can be a powerful force in shaping policy preferences, as it was in October 1962.

Multilateralism: America's insurance policy against loss

When the United States faces loss or defeat in war, it is often loath to negotiate, make concessions to its adversary, and cut its losses. But the presence of allies and international organizations in the US coalition can help to correct this bias against compromise through a combination of simple bargaining, complex bargaining, and political cover. The costs of multilateralism can be considered a premium that is paid when operations are successful, so that the United States has an insurance policy to minimize loss in times of failure. The article contributes to a number of major debates over the costs and benefits of multilateralism and the impact of less powerful allies and international organizations on US foreign policy.

America's Quagmire Mentality

Since the end of the American Civil War, the United States has engaged in cycles of nation-building followed by disillusionment. In 1865 federal troops occupied much of the South and attempted to reconstruct its social, economic and political system. A decade later federal troops began to pull out, with northern opinion disheartened by the slow rate of progress, worn down by the terrorism of southern whites, and sceptical about the suitability of former slaves for government. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States initiated a second wave of nation-building in the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and elsewhere. Again there was dissatisfaction at the results, with Franklin Roosevelt promising an end to these interventions in his ‘good neighbor’ policy of the 1930s. A third wave of nation-building began during the early Cold War, when Americans self-confidently set about reconstructing and developing states such as West Germany, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. In the wake of the Vietnam War, however, American opinion turned against such interventions, and nation-building was curtailed in the 1970s and 1980s. The wheel turned yet again after the Cold War ended, and the United States launched a fourth wave of nation-building missions during the 1990s in Somalia, America’s Quagmire Mentality

Accidental Primacy: Balancing And The Path To Power

Why did states fail to balance against the United States after the end of the Cold War? Scholars have neglected an important dynamic: the accidental nature of America’s rise to primacy. The United States became the sole superpower not by deliberately increasing its capabilities but due to the unexpected collapse of its rival, the USSR. The case illustrates that a state’s responsibility for its gains in power can vary significantly, with important consequences for subsequent balancing. Active or deliberate power increases tend to produce more balancing than passive power increases because they signal aggressive intentions, alter the dyadic power balance between the rising state and potential balancers, and trigger loss aversion.

The Arsenal Of Insurrection: Explaining Rising Support For Rebels

ABSTRACT Recent scholarship has established several key dynamics in civil wars: since the nineteenth century, rebel victories have increased in likelihood; external support is one of the most significant predictors of rebel victory; and rebel groups have become increasingly likely to receive foreign backing. What is missing is an explanation of why patterns of third-party aid to rebels changed over time. Data on foreign assistance to rebels over the last two centuries reveals the odds of groups receiving aid increased from about one in five to about four in five. The nature of the patron also altered significantly, from great powers, to lesser states, and then nonstate actors. We explain these patterns using three variables: (1) great-power competition; (2) norms of national self-determination; and (3) globalization. This paper explores this theory with a case study of aid to rebel groups in Algeria since the 1830s.

Mastering the Endgame of War

When fighting looms, leaders often focus on the opening rounds rather than ultimate strategic success. The US may be particularly prone to neglect the conflict endgame.

Prisoner Dilemmas: The American Obsession With POWs And Hostages

Abstract For centuries, the issue of American hostages and POWs has had incredible emotional and political resonance. Driven by a combination of idealism, wrath, and concerns over reputation, the status of captive Americans can become a national obsession. While deeply moral in many respects, this intense focus can encourage risky rescue operations, deepen conflicts, and lead to more Americans being captured abroad. Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan both suffered grave political damage from hostage crises, and the recent capture of an American by Somali pirates highlights the continued danger that a hostage crisis could overshadow the presidency of Barack Obama. U.S. officials should publicly downplay the issue of hostages and POWs, and work quietly behind the scenes to free the men and women concerned.