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Dive into the research topics where Dominik Herrmann is active.

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Featured researches published by Dominik Herrmann.


ieee international conference on cloud computing technology and science | 2009

Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier

Dominik Herrmann; Rolf Wendolsky; Hannes Federrath

Privacy enhancing technologies like OpenSSL, OpenVPN or Tor establish an encrypted tunnel that enables users to hide content and addresses of requested websites from external observers This protection is endangered by local traffic analysis attacks that allow an external, passive attacker between the PET system and the user to uncover the identity of the requested sites. However, existing proposals for such attacks are not practicable yet. We present a novel method that applies common text mining techniques to the normalised frequency distribution of observable IP packet sizes. Our classifier correctly identifies up to 97% of requests on a sample of 775 sites and over 300,000 real-world traffic dumps recorded over a two-month period. It outperforms previously known methods like Jaccards classifier and Naïve Bayes that neglect packet frequencies altogether or rely on absolute frequency values, respectively. Our method is system-agnostic: it can be used against any PET without alteration. Closed-world results indicate that many popular single-hop and even multi-hop systems like Tor and JonDonym are vulnerable against this general fingerprinting attack. Furthermore, we discuss important real-world issues, namely false alarms and the influence of the browser cache on accuracy.


privacy enhancing technologies | 2007

Performance comparison of low-latency anonymisation services from a user perspective

Rolf Wendolsky; Dominik Herrmann; Hannes Federrath

Neither of the two anonymisation services Tor and AN.ON clearly outperforms the other one. AN.ONs user-perceived QoS is generally more consistent over time than Tors. While AN.ONs network latencies are low compared to Tor, it suffers from limitations in bandwidth. Interestingly, Tors performance seems to depend on the time of day: it increases in the European morning hours. Utilising AN.ONs reporting of concurrently logged-in users, we show a correlation between load and performance. The reported number of users should be adjusted, though, so that it serves as a better indicator for security and performance. Finally, the results indicate the existence of an overall tolerance level for acceptable latencies of approximately 4 seconds, which should be kept in mind when designing low-latency anonymisation services.


nordic conference on secure it systems | 2010

Analyzing characteristic host access patterns for re-identification of web user sessions

Dominik Herrmann; Christoph Gerber; Christian Banse; Hannes Federrath

An attacker, who is able to observe a web user over a long period of time, learns a lot about his interests. It may be difficult to track users with regularly changing IP addresses, though. We show how patterns mined from web traffic can be used to re-identify a majority of users, i. e. link multiple sessions of them. We implement the web user re-identification attack using a Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier and evaluate it using a real-world dataset from 28 users. Our evaluation setup complies with the limited knowledge of an attacker on a malicious web proxy server, who is only able to observe the host names visited by its users. The results suggest that consecutive sessions can be linked with high probability for session durations from 5 minutes to 48 hours and that user profiles degrade only slowly over time. We also propose basic countermeasures and evaluate their efficacy.


information security conference | 2012

Tracking Users on the Internet with Behavioral Patterns: Evaluation of Its Practical Feasibility

Christian Banse; Dominik Herrmann; Hannes Federrath

Traditionally, service providers, who want to track the activities of Internet users, rely on explicit tracking techniques like HTTP cookies. From a privacy perspective behavior-based tracking is even more dangerous, because it allows service providers to track users passively, i. e., without cookies. In this case multiple sessions of a user are linked by exploiting characteristic patterns mined from network traffic.


information security conference | 2014

Evaluating the Security of a DNS Query Obfuscation Scheme for Private Web Surfing

Dominik Herrmann; Max Maaß; Hannes Federrath

The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.


european symposium on research in computer security | 2014

EncDNS: A Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Name Resolution Service

Dominik Herrmann; Karl-Peter Fuchs; Jens Lindemann; Hannes Federrath

Users are increasingly switching to third party DNS resolvers (e. g., Google Public DNS and OpenDNS). The resulting monitoring capabilities constitute an emerging threat to online privacy. In this paper we present EncDNS, a novel lightweight privacy-preserving name resolution service as a replacement for conventional third-party resolvers. The EncDNS protocol, which is based on DNSCurve, encapsulates encrypted messages in standards-compliant DNS messages. User privacy is protected by exploiting the fact that a conventional DNS resolver provides sender anonymity against the EncDNS server. Unlike traditional privacy-preserving techniques like mixes or onion routing, which introduce considerable delays due to routing messages over multiple hops, the EncDNS architecture introduces only one additional server in order to achieve a sufficient level of protection against realistic adversaries. EncDNS is open source software. An initial test deployment is available for public use.


Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security | 2016

Tracked Without a Trace: Linking Sessions of Users by Unsupervised Learning of Patterns in Their DNS Traffic

Matthias Kirchler; Dominik Herrmann; Jens Lindemann; Marius Kloft

Behavior-based tracking is an unobtrusive technique that allows observers to monitor user activities on the Internet over long periods of time -- in spite of changing IP addresses. Previous work has employed supervised classifiers in order to link the sessions of individual users. However, classifiers need labeled training sessions, which are difficult to obtain for observers. In this paper we show how this limitation can be overcome with an unsupervised learning technique. We present a modified k-means algorithm and evaluate it on a realistic dataset that contains the Domain Name System (DNS) queries of 3,862 users. For this purpose, we simulate an observer that tries to track all users, and an Internet Service Provider that assigns a different IP address to every user on every day. The highest tracking accuracy is achieved within the subgroup of highly active users. Almost all sessions of 73% of the users in this subgroup can be linked over a period of 56 days. 19% of the highly active users can be traced completely, i.e., all their sessions are assigned to a single cluster. This fraction increases to 40% for shorter periods of seven days. As service providers may engage in behavior-based tracking to complement their existing profiling efforts, it constitutes a severe privacy threat for users of online services. Users can defend against behavior-based tracking by changing their IP address frequently, but this is cumbersome at the moment.


high performance computing systems and applications | 2014

VANETsim: An open source simulator for security and privacy concepts in VANETs

Andreas Tomandl; Dominik Herrmann; Karl-Peter Fuchs; Hannes Federrath; Florian Scheuer

Aside from massive advantages in safety and convenience on the road, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) introduce security risks to the users. Proposals of new security concepts to counter these risks are challenging to verify because of missing real world implementations of VANETs. To fill this gap, we introduce VANETsim, an event-driven simulation platform, specifically designed to investigate application-level privacy and security implications in vehicular communications. VANETsim focuses on realistic vehicular movement on real road networks and communication between the moving nodes. A powerful graphical user interface and an experimentation environment supports the user when setting up or carrying out experiments.


european symposium on research in computer security | 2012

Introducing the gMix Open Source Framework for Mix Implementations

Karl-Peter Fuchs; Dominik Herrmann; Hannes Federrath

In this paper we introduce the open source software framework gMix which aims to simplify the implementation and evaluation of mix-based systems. gMix is targeted at researchers who want to evaluate new ideas and developers interested in building practical mix systems. The framework consists of a generic architecture structured in logical layers with a clear separation of concerns. Implementations of mix variants and supportive components are organized as plug-ins that can easily be exchanged and extended. We provide reference implementations for several well-known mix concepts.


Datenschutz Und Datensicherheit - Dud | 2011

Grenzen des „digitalen Radiergummis“

Hannes Federrath; Karl-Peter Fuchs; Dominik Herrmann; Daniel Maier; Florian Scheuer; Kai Wagner

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag zeigt die prinzipiellen und technischen Untauglichkeiten der Durchsetzung des Konzepts eines „digitalen Radiergummis“ auf, mit dem Inhalte im Internet mit einem Verfallsdatum versehen und somit zeitlich begrenzt zugänglich gemacht werden sollen.

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Rolf Wendolsky

University of Regensburg

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Max Maass

Technische Universität Darmstadt

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