Donald A. Gross

A Systems Approach To Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections

Previous research on campaign financing has been hampered by the persistence of the simultaneity problem. In this article the authors attempt to overcome this problem by specifying a comprehensive simultaneous model of congressional elections. Specifically, equations determining challenger political quality, candidate expenditures, and electoral outcomes are theoretically derived and then estimated as a single equation system. Overall, this comprehensive simultaneous model fits the data relatively well. More importantly, the authors find that incumbent expenditures exert a significant impact on electoral outcomes. The marginal impact of incumbent spending is not, however, the same for all incumbents. Specifically, first-term incumbents receive a much larger marginal return on their expenditures than do multiterm incumbents. In fact, the marginal return on spending by first-term incumbents rivals the marginal return on spending by challengers.

State Campaign Finance Regulations and Electoral Competition

In the following analysis, we provide an assessment of the effect of campaign finance reform on campaign spending and electoral competition in gubernatorial campaigns. The work improves on prior research by considering a longer, more comprehensive time frame (1978-1997) and by examining the effects of several different components of reform (contribution limits, public financing, and spending limits) within a single analytic framework. We find that spending limits reduce candidate spending and have an indirect and negative effect on electoral competition. The negative effects of spending limits, however, are heavily contingent on the level at which the limit is set. Contribution limits are associated with increased disparities in candidate spending and increased incumbent spending but have no direct effects on electoral competition. Overall, whether campaign finance reform enhances or inhibits electoral competition depends very much on the combination of spending limits, contribution limits, and public financing enacted in a given state.

The Impact of State Campaign Finance Laws

We compare spending in concurrent senate and gubernatorial elections to determine if campaign finance laws influence candidate campaign spending. We find that candidate-based public financing combined with spending limits influence candidate spending, but the effect is largely dependent on the level of the limits. We find that contribution limits do not influence candidate spending. If the goal of reform is to reduce candidate spending—or to affect electoral competition or voter turnout by reducing candidate spending—our results suggest that state public financing is more likely to be successful than contributions limits.

Reconsidering the 'Myths and Realities' of Campaign Finance Reform

Our analysis uses simulations to consider the likely impact of campaign finance reform on electoral outcomes and electoral competitiveness. The analysis improves upon previous research by both utilizing more than a single econometric model as a basis for the simulations and utilizing a wide range of campaign finance scenarios. Conclusions as to the likely impact campaign finance reform has on electoral competitiveness rely on the model employed and the type of campaign finance reform considered.

Influence over State Agency Activities: A Test of Two Survey-Based Measures

The valid and reliable measurement of perceived influence over executive agencies is vital to understanding bureaucratic behavior. Using a survey of 540 state agency heads in 15 states, we evaluate two such measures—a standard free-standing measure and a paired-comparison measure—in terms of conceptual clarity, theoretical utility, and susceptibility to systematic measurement error. Our results indicate that while a paired-comparison measure may be theoretically superior to a free-standing measure, missing responses, intransitivities, and respondent fatigue make the paired-comparison method less practical.

Units of Analysis and Rae's Fractionalization Index

This article examines the relationship between Raes fractionalization index and the units of analysis on which it is based. It is shown that as one increases the size of the unit of analysis, the value of the index will increase. An exact mathematical relationship between the mean level of fractionalization for a given set of units and a fractionalization index based upon the aggregate voting totals for the units is established. This relationship shows that the aggregate fractionalization index overestimates the level of interparty competition in a system as measured by the mean level of fractionalization. U.S. congressional elections from 1824 to 1978 are used to indicate the importance of the overestimation by the aggregate fractionalization index.