Donald F. Turner

Antitrust law : an analysis of antitrust principles and their application

Recognized by antitrust practitioners and the courts as the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on antitrust principles and practice, Antitrust Law explains the interplay of judicial, statutory, public policy, and economic forces that shape the world of antitrust. Its thorough analysis and criticism of U.S. Supreme Court, appellate court and major lower court antitrust decisions will help you truly understand the underpinnings of the law and frame successful arguments in litigation. The most recently revised volumes contain greatly expanded coverage of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; state action, implied, and statutory immunity; and the international and extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Author Herbert Hovenkamp is recognized as one of the foremost experts on antitrust law in the country and has consulted extensively for both the government and the private sector.

Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Interdependence and Effects On Interindustry Competition as Grounds for Condemnation

Some mergers will merely substitute a new owner for the acquired firm, without thereby affecting the performance or conduct of either of the two merging firms, or changing the market structure. Other mergers will bring about each of these effects, even though the merging parties neither compete directly nor deal vertically with each other. A firms improper or anticompetitive conduct, or its rivals fear of such conduct, can diminish the willingness and ability of rivals to compete and of outsiders to enter the affected market. Thus, such conduct can create or fortify barriers to new entry or affect rivals competitiveness and thereby become a factor in appraising market structure and its effect upon competition. However, this Article does not address the ways in which a conglomerate merger might facilitate such conduct as reciprocity or predatory pricing. Nor do we consider the cost savings or other benefits that might accrue to the merged firm as a result of the merger, thereby entrenching the merged firm in its new market position. Here we consider only the structural and performance implications that may arise from a merger of firms not in a close horizontal or vertical relationship. The most frequently discussed structural change is the entry via merger of a firm into a market that it might otherwise have entered at the grass roots. But this type of merger, which eliminates a potential competitor, will not be discussed here. Instead, this Article will examine two other ways in which conglomerate mergers may alter market relationships. First, they may bring multi-product firms into contact with each other in more than one market; this wider exposure to competitive retaliation may create an interdependence that discourages aggressive price cuts or other