Donald Wilson Jackson

Presidential leadership and civil rights policy

Introductory Comments by James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., and Donald W. Jackson The Public, the President, and Civil Rights Presidents, Public Opinion, and Civil Rights: An Agenda-Setting Perspective by Jeffrey E. Cohen Presidential Rhetoric in Civil Rights Policymaking, 1953-1992 by Steven A. Shull and Albert C. Ringelstein Moving with the Grain of History: An Examination of Presidential Action in the Civil Rights Domain from 1892 to 1968 by Ronald E. Brown Institutions, the President, and Civil Rights Presidential Leadership Style and Civil Rights Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by James D. King and James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. Affirmative Action and Business Deregulation: On the Reagan Administrations Failure to Revise Executive Order No. 11246 by Robert R. Detlefsen A Transformed Triangle: Court, Congress and Presidency in Civil Rights by Stephen L. Wasby Policy Arenas, the President, and Civil Rights Presidential Decision-Making in Two Desegregation Crises: Little Rock Central High School and the University of Mississippi by Mark Stern John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civil Rights by Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. Decentralizing Fair Housing Enforcement During the Reagan Presidency by Charles M. Lamb and Jim Twombly Modeling Presidential Influence in the Civil Rights Policymaking Process by Steven A. Shull and Dennis W. Gleiber Bibliography Index

Human Rights or Trade Protection? US Politics and the World Trade Organization

This paper explores the paradox of why the US serves as a principal supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but withdrew from the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and strongly opposed creation of the International Criminal Court. After surveying the 171 cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) from 1995–2005, in which the US was a party, the paradox can be explained by the findings that: (1) the overwhelming number of cases to which the US was party reached mutually acceptable settlements; (2) even though the US and the European Union (EU) dominate the WTO, the DSU serves as a mechanism to resolve otherwise possibly intractable trade conflicts between the two; (3) where the US lost before the WTO, domestic policies, not trade, were the driving forces; and (4) membership to the WTO is essential for any nation if it is not to subject both its imports and its exports to significant handicaps. The US also retains a gate-keeping function within the WTO framework that it would not be able to preserve before the International Criminal Court nor the International Court of Justice.