Dorothea Kübler

Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher wages to workers who have invested. However, separation of workers is incomplete and wages do not converge to equilibrium levels. In the signaling treatment, we observe significantly more separating outcomes compared to the screening treatment. Increasing the number of employers leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions but not in the screening sessions.

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany

Abstract Matching university places to students is not as clear cut or as straightforward as it ought to be. By investigating the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions in medicine and related subjects, we show that a procedure designed to give an advantage to students with excellent school grades actually harms them. The reason is that the three-step process employed by the clearinghouse is a complicated mechanism in which many students fail to grasp the strategic aspects involved. The mechanism is based on quotas and consists of three procedures that are administered sequentially, one for each quota. Using the complete data set of the central clearinghouse, we show that the matching can be improved for around 20% of the excellent students while making a relatively small percentage of all other students worse off.

Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: Experimental evidence

We investigate simultaneous and sequential price competition in duopoly markets with differentiated products. In both markets symmetric firms are repeatedly and randomly matched. The strategy method is used to elicit behavior in the sequential market. We find that average leader prices in the sequential market are higher than average prices in the simultaneous market, just as predicted by the theory, whereas average follower prices are not above average prices in the simultaneous market, in contrast to the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, second movers gain from the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous-move markets whereas first movers do not. As in theory, there is a significant first-mover disadvantage when firms decide sequentially. Finally, to assess the robustness of our findings, we report the results of control treatments varying the matching scheme and the mode of eliciting choices (strategy method vs. standard sequential play).(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Are Longer Cascades More Stable

Yes, they are. We consider data from experimental cascade games that were run in different laboratories, and find uniformly that subjects are more willing to follow the crowd, the bigger the crowd is-although the decision makers who are added to the crowd should in theory simply follow suit and hence reveal no information. This correlation of length and strength of cascades appears consistently across games with different parameters and different choice sets for the subjects. It is also observed in games where it runs counter to the theoretical prediction, so behavior moves away from equilibrium play over the stages of the games. (JEL: C72, C92, D82) Copyright (c) 2005 The European Economic Association.

Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback about choices in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments (i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the opponent’s payoffs, and (iii) without feedback about previous play. Using Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. In the treatments with feedback and full information about the game, we observe more strategic play, more best-responses to beliefs and more accurate beliefs over time. While feedback is the main driving force of learning to play strategically and for forming beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent, both incomplete information about the opponent’s payoffs or lack of feedback lead to a stagnation of best-response rates over time. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Information und Erwartungen in einem wiederholten Normalformspiel) Wir untersuchen die Entwicklung von den Erwartungen uber das Verhalten des anderen Spielers und den Entscheidungen in einem wiederholten Normalformspiel. Zusatzlich zum Haupttreatment mit common knowledge uber das Spiel, Feedback uber das Ergebnis in der vorigen Runde und zufalliger Zuordnung der Spieler, gibt es Kontrolltreatments mit (i) festen paarweisen Zuordnungen der Spieler, (ii) ohne Information uber die Auszahlungen des anderen Spielers und (iii) ohne Feedback uber das Ergebnis der vorigen Runde. Mit Hilfe von Stahl und Wilsons (1995) Modell begrenzten strategischen Verhaltens klassifizieren wir das Verhalten der Teilnehmer im Hinblick auf die strategische Sophistikation. In den Treatments mit Feedback und vollstandiger Information uber das Spiel nehmen strategisches Verhalten, beste Antworten auf die eigenen Erwartungen und die Akkuratheit der Erwartungen uber die Zeit zu. Wahrend Feedback der Hauptgrund dafur ist, dass die Teilnehmer lernen, sich strategisch zu verhalten und korrekte Erwartungen uber das Verhalten des anderen Spielers zu bilden, fuhren sowohl unvollstandige Information uber die Auszahlungen des Gegenspielers als auch fehlendes Feedback zu einer Stagnation der Rate der besten Antworten uber die Zeit.

Price versus privacy: an experiment into the competitive advantage of collecting less personal information

In previous privacy studies, consumers have reported their unease with online retailers that collect a lot of personal data. Consumers claim they will switch to alternative providers or cancel transactions if data collection is deemed excessive. Therefore, privacy appears to be a competitive factor in electronic commerce.This paper describes a study which quantifies the degree to which privacy is a competitive advantage for online retailers. In an experiment, we offered 225 participants the option to purchase one DVD from one of two online stores. Throughout the study, one online shop asked for more invasive personal data—as confirmed by an exit-questionnaire. In the test treatment, the privacy-invasive store sold DVDs for one Euro less than the other, and in the control treatment, both stores sold DVDs for the same price. Across both treatments, 74 participants made a purchase and had the DVD they bought delivered.In our study we found that, when the price of DVDs was the same between both stores, the shop asking for less personal data did not amass the entire market. When consumers were offered a trade-off between price and privacy, the vast majority of customers chose to buy from the cheaper, more privacy-invasive, firm; this firm got both a larger market share and higher revenue. The cheaper shop generated strong dissatisfaction with their privacy practises; in contrast, consumers of the more expensive store displayed only weak dissatisfaction with price. We established the validity of our analysis by checking users made informed choices, and did not select one firm over the other due to hasty decision-making or ordering effects. We found no support for either a materialistic lifestyle nor the quest for immediate gratification as to why customers chose the cheaper but privacy-unfriendly store.

Coexistence of public and private job agencies: Screening with heterogeneous institutions

In response to the analysis of bureaucracies and the finding of inherent inefficiencies, public choice theory argues for an increase in competition by contracting out government services and deregulation. The paper explores the effect of coexisting public and private employment services in a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice. The employers use of an efficient unemployment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best contracts. This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch. In contrast to standard screening contracts, a bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is inefficient, but the employer chooses not to use the private agency for good types.

Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instrumental reasons to vote and form correct beliefs. Yet, we find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can only be accounted for if some subjects either overestimate their pivotality or do not pay attention to pivotality at all. A model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of others, is consistent with results from treatments that make the issue of pivotality salient to experimental subjects.

Why Votes have a Value

We perform an experiment where subjects bid for the right to participate in a vote and where the theoretical value of the voting right is zero if subjects are fully rational. We find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the right to vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. A model of instrumental voting behavior is consistent with our results if individuals are overconfident, overestimate the errors of other players, and also overestimate how often they themselves are pivotal for the outcome. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality shows that individuals value the right to vote more, the more they overestimate their probability of being pivotal. Eliciting beliefs about pivotality reduces the willingness to pay for the right to vote.

Auctioning off labor contracts: Legal restrictions reconsidered

Abstract The paper analyzes the effects of various non-discrimination rules when the employer uses an optimal screening mechanism in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. The optimal contracting mechanism for heterogeneous workers (with different probability distributions over types) exhibits third-degree wage discrimination, which is beneficial for on average less productive workers. Imposing non-discrimination restrictions on wages and hiring decisions may harm the on average less productive group and reduces efficiency. Affirmative action programs are neutral with respect to rent distribution and efficiency.