Dorothy Edgington

Possible knowledge of unknown truth

Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.

Mellor on Chance and Causation

Mellors subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if ∼C: chc(E)>ch∼c(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to the standard calculus has wider application than the causal instances to which Mellors notion is restricted (Section 8). Other topics discussed may be gleaned from the headings below.

Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.

Williamson on Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law

I refer to an object, say a ship, at a time, t 1. Call the ship ‘S1’. I can see it, touch it, go for a sail in it. I know what I am talking and thinking about. The same kind of thing happens at a later time, t 2, when I refer to a ship — call it ‘S2’. But, because of transformations which have taken place, it is, it seems, indeterminate whether or not S1 is the same ship as S2.

Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles

The puzzles I shall discuss belong to the subject names (by Richard Jeffrey’) “Probability Kinematics,” that is, the question of how probability judgments should change in the light of new information. But I start with a bit of the pre-history of this subject as I see it.