Douglas Frye

Early development of executive function: A problem-solving framework

Executive function (EF) accounts have now been offered for several disorders with childhood onset (e.g., attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism, early-treated phenylketonuria), and EF has been linked to the development of numerous abilities (e.g., attention, rule use, theory of mind). However, efforts to explain behavior in terms of EF have been hampered by an inadequate characterization of EF itself. What is the function that is accomplished by EF? The present analysis attempts to ground the construct of EF in an account of problem solving and thereby to integrate temporally and functionally distinct aspects of EF within a coherent framework. According to this problem-solving framework, EF is a macroconstruct that spans 4 phases of problem solving (representation, planning, execution, and evaluation). When analyzed into subfunctions, macroconstructs such as EF permit the integration of findings from disparate content domains, which are often studied in isolation from the broader context of reasoning and action. A review of the literature on the early development of EF reveals converging evidence for domain-general changes in all aspects of EF.

Cognitive Complexity and Control: II. The Development of Executive Function in Childhood

Developing theories of mind (pp. 244-267). Cam bridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Frye, D. (in press). Theory of mind, domain speci ficity, and reasoning. In P. Mitchell & K.J. Riggs (Eds.), Childrens reasoning and the mind. Hove, England: Psychology Press Frye, D., Zelazo, P.D., Brooks, P.J., & Samuels, MC. (1996). Inference and action in early cau sal reasoning. Developmental Psychology, 32, 120-131.

Children’s Theory of Mind: Understanding of Desire, Belief and Emotion with Social Referents

Preschooler’s understanding of belief, desire, and emotion was assessed in a new false belief task that explored childen’s mental state reasoning about social situations. The social analog task presented a change in a partner’s play activity rather than a change in the location of a physical object. Two main differences from the usual pattern of theory of mind results were obtained. Five-year-olds had more difficulty understanding a false belief about another’s current social activity compared to a false belief about a physical situation. The understanding of desire exhibited a 3- to 5-year age change that may have been shown because the social situation involved conflicting desires. When there was a conflict, the younger children tended to disregard the stated desire and exhibited ‘social opportunism’ by misattributing desires to permit a social interaction. The new results give a more varied picture of the development of theory of mind, and argue for expanding its study into social frames of reference.

Relations between the Development of Teaching and Theory of Mind in Early Childhood.

The relations among children’s theory of mind (ToM), their understanding of the intentionality of teaching, and their own peer teaching strategies were tested. Seventy-five 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed 11 ToM and understanding-of-teaching tasks. Subsequently, 30 of the children were randomly chosen to teach a peer how to play a board game, and their teaching strategies and levels of contingent teaching were recorded. There were developmental changes in the children’s understanding of teaching as an intentional activity. When teaching their peers, 3-year-olds used demonstration, whereas 4- and 5-year-olds added verbal explanations and began to adapt contingently to the learners’ changing knowledge level. Relations among ToM, understanding of teaching, and teaching level were found. The results suggest that the development of children’s teaching strategies and their contingency are closely tied to the development of ToM.

Not just numeracy and literacy: Theory of mind development and school readiness among low-income children.

The current study investigated the role of theory of mind development in school readiness among 120 low-income preschool and kindergarten children. A short-term longitudinal design was used to examine relations among theory of mind, the understanding of teaching, and learning behaviors and their collective role in children’s literacy and numeracy skills at school entry. Results replicate differences in theory of mind development among low-income children as compared to typically studied, higher-income samples. Theory of mind and the combination of several sociocognitive variables successfully predicted concurrent relations with academic outcomes. Children’s understanding of teaching predicted changes in literacy scores over time. Results are discussed in the context of what is known about theory of mind and sociocognitive development in school readiness.

Cognitive universals and cultural variation in teaching

We address three issues: (1) There is a need for a comprehensive multidisciplinary understanding of teaching; (2) teaching is a natural cognitive ability for humans; and (3) there is a need to incorporate the mentalistic and cultural approaches to teaching. We suggest certain research studies that can help deepen our understanding of the cognition of teaching.

When preferences are in the way: Children’s predictions of goal-directed behaviors.

Across three studies, we examined 4- to 7-year-olds’ predictions of goal-directed behaviors when goals conflict with preferences. In Study 1, when presented with stories in which a character had to act against basic preferences to achieve an interpersonal goal (e.g., playing with a partner), 6- and 7-year-olds were more likely than 4- and 5-year-olds to predict the actor would act in accordance with the goal to play with the partner, instead of fulfilling the basic preference of playing a favored activity. Similar results were obtained in Study 2 with scenarios that each involved a single individual pursuing intrapersonal goals that conflicted with his or her basic preferences. In Study 3, younger children’s predictions of goal-directed behaviors did not increase for novel goals and preferences, when the influences of their own preferences, future thinking, or a lack of impulse control were minimized. The results suggest that between ages 4 and 7, children increasingly integrate and give more weight to other sources of motivational information (e.g., goals) in addition to preferences when predicting people’s behaviors. This increasing awareness may have implications for children’s self-regulatory and goal pursuit behaviors.