Douglas G. Anglin

Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment

It is commonly claimed by critics both within Nigeria and outside that, while the present Government preaches political non-alignment, it does not practise it, and indeed cannot because of Nigerias economic alignment with the west. The present article seeks to assess the validity of this thesis. Three separate propositions are involved: first, that Nigeria professes but does not pursue a policy of non-alignment; secondly, that Nigeria is economically tied to the west; and finally, and most important, that there is a causal connexion between the two.

Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments

MUCH has been written and said concerning the implications for Soviet policy towards Southern African of President Gorbachevs novoye myshlenie or new thinking,1 and its repercussions throughout Eastern Europe. On the other hand, comparatively little attention has been paid to the governmental and societal responses to these developments within Southern Africa. In part, this neglect reflects the fact that, until recently, the reaction has been rather muted, especially in comparison with the eruptions in francophone Africa, notably in Algeria, Benin, and Gabon, but also C6te dIvoire, Madagascar, and even Zaire.2 The reluctance to recognise the relevance for the region of the astonishing changes in Eastern Europe can largely be explained by an understandable preoccupation with more pressing domestic problems. That has now changed. There is clear evidence of a marked upsurge of interest and concern. It several of the countries, the issues highlighted by events in Eastern Europe have moved to the forefront of political controversy, and are the subject of lively public discussion and dispute. Admittedly, not all the political ferment that Southern Africa is currently experiencing is attributable to the fallout from Eastern Europe. To see developments there as the sole stimulus to regional

The Life and Death of South Africa's National Peacekeeping Force

THE National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was designed to meet a serious security challenge anticipated in the run-up to South Africas first democratic elections in April I994. Its establishment was an imaginative and constructive, but ultimately disastrous initiative. Its failure however inevitable in retrospect constituted a major tragedy, less as it proved for the free and fair conduct of the elections than for the longer-term prospects of forging a truly national army. This study seeks to explore: (i) the genesis and evolution of the concept of an integrated South African peacekeeping force; (ii) its character, composition, command structure, and cohesion; and (iii) the causes and consequences of its fateful deployment on the volatile East Rand. Two pressing concerns accounted for the mounting demand for a national peacekeeping force: the deteriorating security situation in the country with the approach of the elections, and the profound public distrust of the existing security services, especially the South African Police (SAP). As the Goldstone Commission observed in I992: For many South Africans, the police and the army are not perceived as fair, objective or friendly institutions. In addition, the alternative of an international peacekeeping force was politically never a real possibility. Although there was some support for this idea, the weight of informed opinion considered that an outside military presence was neither necessary nor desirable.2 More important, not only was Pretoria adamant in its opposition, but the leaders of the African National

Zambian Crisis Behavior: Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

This study of the behavior of Zambias decision makers, confronted with the implications of Rhodesias unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, forms part of Michael Brechers International Crisis Behavior Project and employs (with adaptations) his ICB framework. This article analyzes by period the critical situation Zambia faced, particularly as a result of its historical legacy of almost total dependency on Rhodesia for energy supplies and access to the sea for its copper exports. Next, it seeks to measure, by means of a content analysis of official statements, changes in crisis-induced stress over time in terms of the basic elements in Brechers operational definition of a crisis. The paper then dissects the decision-making process with respect to one decision in one phase of the crisis in terms of the coping mechanisms employed. On the basis of this, certain tentative conclusions on Zambian crisis behavior are outlined. Finally, the attempt is made to set the Zambian case in the perspective of the wider ICB Project and of African foreign policy studies generally.