Douglas L. Bland

A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations

This articles thesis is that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused. The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms, rules, and expectations concerning civil-military relations. Although a regime may be stable for long periods, it can change as basic causal factors such as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats change. Alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the dynamic nature of civil-military relations, while alterations of norms and principles account for conflict in civil-military relations. Regime differences between states account for the particular national character of civil-military relations, much as like-minded regimes account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations.

A strategy of choice: Preparing the Canadian armed forces for the 21st century

This article examines the basic assumptions behind Canadian defence planning and suggests a new conceptual framework from which to determine Canadian defence priorities and needs. The discussion begins with an examination of the some of the inefficiencies in how defence expenditures are allocated and how certain policies tend to reinforce these inefficiencies. This is followed by analysis of two different approaches to the development of national military structures. The analysis provides the context for the development of a new framework ‐ a strategy of choice ‐ for determining Canadian defence needs.

The RMA: Managing an Idea

The RMA is an idea, not a fact. Eventually, the strength of the idea, and not the supposed fact, will determine whether there will be a revolution and who will benefit from it. The influence of the idea of the RMA on defence policies and strategies will be determined by popular and political perceptions of military capabilities now and in the future and by its effects on the structure of defence establishments. Moreover, the idea will tend to favour particular policies, institutions and strategies whenever it is characterized in particular terms: as a technical phenomenon, for example.

Managing the ‘Expert Problem’ in Civil‐Military Relations

Samuel Huntington once defined ‘the modern problem of civil‐military relations’ as managing the relationship between military experts and civilian ministers. The expert/minister problem arises not simply because senior military officers and defense officials hold a monopoly on technical and operational expertise, but also because they are charged by governments to execute policy, a duty that invites their interpretation of those policies. This paper seeks to examine two critical questions: what kind of continuing relationship between experts and ministers best serves liberal democracies in the long run and what strategies and instruments best allow ministers of defense to control defense policy outcomes and the activities of armed forces.

New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle

Americans spend more than

Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations

100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Todays weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nations military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition--the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nations defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion--less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.