Edita Poljac

Reduced accuracy and sensitivity in the perception of emotional facial expressions in individuals with high autism spectrum traits

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is among other things characterized by specific impairments in emotion processing. It is not clear, however, to what extent the typical decline in affective functioning is related to the specific autistic traits. We employed The Autism Spectrum-Quotient (AQ) to quantify autistic traits in a group of 500 healthy individuals and investigate whether we could detect similar difficulties in the perception of emotional expressions in a broader autistic phenotype. The group with high AQ score was less accurate and needed higher emotional content to recognize emotions of anger, disgust, and sadness. Our findings demonstrate a selective impairment in identification of emotional facial expressions in healthy individuals that is primarily related to the extent of autistic traits.

Dissociating restart cost and mixing cost in task switching

Three experiments investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying the restart cost and mixing cost in task switching. To this aim, the predictability of task order was varied (unpredictable in Experiment 1 and predictable in Experiments 2 and 3) across experiments, which employed a multiple-trial paradigm. Verbal cues for color and shape matching tasks were presented before a run of four trials. Focusing on task-repetition runs only, we measured restart cost as the difference in performance between trials 1 and 2 and mixing cost as the difference in performance on the non-cued trials under mixed-tasks conditions (Experiments 1 and 2) and single-task conditions (Experiment 3). The restart cost was observed under mixed-tasks conditions with both unpredictable and predictable task orders but not under the single-task condition. In contrast, the mixing cost was observed under the mixed-tasks condition with unpredictable task order only (Experiment 1). This finding implies that the optimal task execution on repetition trials depends on how predictable the identity of the approaching task is. Therefore, we suggest that mixing cost arises from limited preparation on repetition trials when task order is unpredictable, while restart cost arises from processes involved in cue-based task activation that is needed to resolve task interference. Together, these data suggest that restart cost and mixing cost are based on dissociable mechanisms.

Dissociable Neural Correlates of Intention and Action Preparation in Voluntary Task Switching

This electroencephalographic (EEG) study investigated the impact of between-task competition on intentional control in voluntary task switching. Anticipatory preparation for an upcoming task switch is a hallmark of top-down intentional control. Meanwhile, asymmetries in performance and voluntary choice when switching between tasks differing in relative strength reveal the effects of between-task competition, reflected in a surprising bias against switching to an easier task. Here, we assessed the impact of this bias on EEG markers of intentional control during preparation for an upcoming task switch. The results revealed strong and varied effects of between-task competition on EEG markers of global task preparation—a frontal contingent negative variation (CNV), a posterior slow positive wave, and oscillatory activity in the alpha band (8–12 Hz) over posterior scalp sites. In contrast, we observed no between-task differences in motor-specific task preparation, as indexed by the lateralized readiness potential and by motor-related amplitude asymmetries in the mu (9–13 Hz) and beta (18–26 Hz) frequency bands. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that between-task competition directly influences the formation of top-down intentions, not only their expression in overt behavior. Specifically, this influence occurs at the level of global task intention rather than the preparation of specific actions.

Current task activation predicts general effects of advance preparation in task switching.

Two experiments investigated the way that beforehand preparation influences general task execution in reaction-time matching tasks. Response times (RTs) and error rates were measured for switching and nonswitching conditions in a color- and shape-matching task. The task blocks could repeat (task repetition) or alternate (task switch), and the preparation interval (PI) was manipulated within-subjects (Experiment 1) and between-subjects (Experiment 2). The study illustrated a comparable general task performance after a long PI for both experiments, within and between PI madipulations. After a short PI, however, the general task performance increased significantly for the between-subjects manipulation of the PI. Furthermore, both experiments demonstrated an analogous preparation effect for both task switching and task repetitions. Next, a consistent switch cost throughout the whole run of trials and a within-run slowing effect were observed in both experiments. Altogether, the present study implies that the effects of the advance preparation go beyond the first trials and confirms different points of the activation approach (Altmann, 2002) to task switching.

A review of intentional and cognitive control in autism

Different clinical studies have provided empirical evidence for impairments in cognitive control in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The challenge arises, however, when trying to specify the neurocognitive mechanisms behind the reported observations of deviant patterns of goal-directed behavior in ASD. Studies trying to test specific assumptions by applying designs that are based on a more controlled experimental conditions often fail in providing strong evidence for an impairment in specific cognitive functions. In this review, we summarize and critically reflect on behavioral findings and their theoretical explanations regarding cognitive control processing in autism, also from a developmental perspective. The specific focus of this review is the recent evidence of deficits in intentional control – a specific subset of cognitive control processes that biases the choice of our behavioral goals – coming from different research fields. We relate this evidence to the cognitive rigidity observed in ASD and argue that individuals with ASD experience problems at the intentional level rather than at the level of implementation of intentions. Both these processes are related to cognitive control mechanisms but in different ways. Finally, we discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in ASD and how these relate to adaptive cognition.

Cognitive Control of Intentions for Voluntary Actions in Individuals With a High Level of Autistic Traits

Impairments in cognitive control generating deviant adaptive cognition have been proposed to account for the strong preference for repetitive behavior in autism. We examined if this preference reflects intentional deficits rather than problems in task execution in the broader autism phenotype using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Participants chose between two tasks differing in their relative strength by indicating first their voluntary task choice and then responding to the subsequently presented stimulus. We observed a stronger repetition bias for the harder task in high AQ participants, with no other differences between the two groups. These findings indicate that the interference between competing tasks significantly contributes to repetitive behavior in autism by modulating the formation of task intentions when choosing tasks voluntarily.

Understanding the flexibility of action–perception coupling

The idea that observing an action triggers an automatic and obligatory activation of an imitative action in the motor system of the observer has recently been questioned by studies examining complementary actions. Instead of a tendency for imitation, cooperative settings may facilitate the execution of dissimilar actions, resulting in a relative disadvantage for imitative actions. The present study aimed at clarifying the contribution of associative learning and interference of task representations to the reversal of congruency effects. To distinguish between the two, an experiment was designed, in which we increased the effects of associative learning and minimized the effects of task interference. Participants completed a series of imitation and complementary action runs, in which they continuously imitated or complemented the actions of a virtual co-actor. Each run was alternated with a test run showing the same actions but including color-cues, and the participants were instructed to respond to color instead of the actor’s posture. Reaction times to test runs showed no reversal of facilitation effects between the imitation and complementary action conditions. This result strongly argues that associative learning cannot adequately account for reversed facilitation effects. Our study provides additional support for action–perception models that allow flexible selection of action–perception coupling and challenges the existing models purely based on stimulus–response associations.

Cognitive structure, flexibility, and plasticity in human multitasking—An integrative review of dual-task and task-switching research.pr

Numerous studies showed decreased performance in situations that require multiple tasks or actions relative to appropriate control conditions. Because humans often engage in such multitasking activities, it is important to understand how multitasking affects performance. In the present article, we argue that research on dual-task interference and sequential task switching has proceeded largely separately using different experimental paradigms and methodology. In our article we aim at organizing this complex set of research in terms of three complementary research perspectives on human multitasking. One perspective refers to structural accounts in terms of cognitive bottlenecks (i.e., critical processing stages). A second perspective refers to cognitive flexibility in terms of the underlying cognitive control processes. A third perspective emphasizes cognitive plasticity in terms of the influence of practice on human multitasking abilities. With our review article we aimed at highlighting the value of an integrative position that goes beyond isolated consideration of a single theoretical research perspective and that broadens the focus from single experimental paradigms (dual task and task switching) to favor instead a view that emphasizes the fundamental similarity of the underlying cognitive mechanisms across multitasking paradigms.

Between-task competition for intentions and actions

People can switch quickly and flexibly from one task to another, but suffer the effects of between-task competition when they do so: After switching, they tend to be distracted by irrelevant stimulus information and hampered by incorrect actions associated with recently performed tasks. This competition results in performance costs of switching, as well as a bias against switching when there is choice over which task to perform, particularly when switching from a difficult task to an easier one. Two experiments investigated the locus of these between-task competition effects in voluntary task switching. Participants switched between an easy location classification and a harder shape classification, making two responses on each trial: the first to register their task choice, the second to perform the chosen task on a subsequently presented stimulus. The results indicated that participants chose to perform the difficult shape task more often than the easier location task, evidence that between-task competition affects intentions that are expressed independently of task-specific actions. The bias was stronger in participants with faster choice speed, suggesting that these influences are relatively automatic. Moreover, even though participants had unlimited time to choose and prepare a task before stimulus presentation, their subsequent performance was nonetheless sensitive to persisting effects of between-task competition. Altogether these results indicate the pervasive influence of between-task competition, which affects both the expression of global task intentions and the production of task-specific actions.

Multitasking as a choice: a perspective

Performance decrements in multitasking have been explained by limitations in cognitive capacity, either modelled as static structural bottlenecks or as the scarcity of overall cognitive resources that prevent humans, or at least restrict them, from processing two tasks at the same time. However, recent research has shown that individual differences, flexible resource allocation, and prioritization of tasks cannot be fully explained by these accounts. We argue that understanding human multitasking as a choice and examining multitasking performance from the perspective of judgment and decision-making (JDM), may complement current dual-task theories. We outline two prominent theories from the area of JDM, namely Simple Heuristics and the Decision Field Theory, and adapt these theories to multitasking research. Here, we explain how computational modelling techniques and decision-making parameters used in JDM may provide a benefit to understanding multitasking costs and argue that these techniques and parameters have the potential to predict multitasking behavior in general, and also individual differences in behavior. Finally, we present the one-reason choice metaphor to explain a flexible use of limited capacity as well as changes in serial and parallel task processing. Based on this newly combined approach, we outline a concrete interdisciplinary future research program that we think will help to further develop multitasking research.