Edouard Machery

Redefine Statistical Significance

We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.

Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long‐term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the natural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind.

Social Construction and the Concept of Race

There has been little serious work to integrate the constructionist approach and the cognitive/evolutionary approach in the domain of race, although many researchers have paid lip service to this project. We believe that any satisfactory account of human beings’ racialist cognition has to integrate both approaches. In this paper, we propose to move toward this integration. We present an evolutionary hypothesis that rests on a distinction between three kinds of groups—kin‐based groups, small scale coalitions, and ethnies. Following Gil‐White (1999, 2001a, 2001b), we propose that ethnies have raised specific evolutionary challenges that were solved by an evolved cognitive system. We suggest that the concept of race is a byproduct of this mechanism. We argue that recent theories of cultural transmission are our best hope for integrating social constructionists’ and cognitive/evolutionary theorists’ insights.

Why I stopped worrying about the definition of life... and why you should as well

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life.

Precis of Doing without Concepts

Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.

How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness

The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). We charge that their studies do not establish that the folk have a concept of phenomenal consciousness in part because they compare group agents to individuals. The problem is that group agents and individuals differ in some significant ways in terms of functional organization and behavior. We propose that future experiments should establish that ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions.

A Plea for Human Nature

Philosophers of biology, such as David Hull and Michael Ghiselin, have argued that the notion of human nature is incompatible with modern evolutionary biology and they have recommended rejecting this notion. In this article, I rebut this argument: I show that an important notion of human nature is compatible with modern evolutionary biology.

Innateness, Canalization, and ‘Biologicizing the Mind’

This article examines and rejects the claim that ‘innateness is canalization’. Waddingtons concept of canalization is distinguished from the narrower concept of environmental canalization with which it is often confused. Evidence is presented that the concept of environmental canalization is not an accurate analysis of the existing concept of innateness. The strategy of ‘biologicizing the mind’ by treating psychological or behavioral traits as if they were environmentally canalized physiological traits is criticized using data from developmental psychobiology. It is concluded that identifying innateness with environmental canalization can only result in adding unhelpful associations from ‘folkbiology’ to the relatively precise idea of canalization.

In Defense of Reverse Inference

Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this article, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in these terms. 1 Introduction 2 Reverse Inference 3 Reverse Inference Defended   3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious   3.2 No quick and easy fix   3.3 A likelihoodist defense of reverse inference   3.4 An example 4 Appropriateness of the Likelihoodist Approach   4.1 Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable   4.2 Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions   4.3 Reverse inference and negative hypotheses   4.4 Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists   4.5 Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences 5 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Reverse Inference 3 Reverse Inference Defended   3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious   3.2 No quick and easy fix   3.3 A likelihoodist defense of reverse inference   3.4 An example   3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious   3.2 No quick and easy fix   3.3 A likelihoodist defense of reverse inference   3.4 An example 4 Appropriateness of the Likelihoodist Approach   4.1 Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable   4.2 Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions   4.3 Reverse inference and negative hypotheses   4.4 Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists   4.5 Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences   4.1 Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable   4.2 Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions   4.3 Reverse inference and negative hypotheses   4.4 Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists   4.5 Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences 5 Conclusion

Essay Review: Debunking Adapting Minds*

David Buller’s recent book, Adapting Minds, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although Adapting Minds has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller’s critique of evolutionary psychology fails.