Eduard Marbach

What Does Noematic Intentionality Tell Us About the Ontological Status of the Noema

Through past experience with Husserl’s phenomenology, I have arrived at a certain view of “the noema” that I share with a number of other interpreters.1 Thus I believe that it is crucial for an understanding of “the phenomenology of the noema” not to waver in one’s conviction that the topic must be seen in the light of the change of attitude towards objects (things, events, etc.; in short, the world) that occurs when we are doing phenomenology. Accordingly, it has for a long time seemed right to me to argue in defence of the ontological identity of the noema and the corresponding object simpliciter, provided that one consistently takes into account the difference between one’s stance towards the object in question in doing phenomenology and one’s stance in living in the pre-phenomenological attitude.

On Bringing Consciousness into the House of Science – with the Help of Husserlian Phenomenology

The title of this paper adopts the phrase of “bringing consciousness into the house of science” from the neuroscientists Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, and by alluding to “the help of Husserlian phenomenology” it is meant to announce a far-reaching thesis regarding the very explanandum of scientific accounts of consciousness. However, within a collection of papers entitled “Continental Philosophies of Science”, the title may readily provoke a sceptical raising of eyebrows with readers familiar with Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. Does it not in some way entail the suggestion that Husserl’s phenomenological approach to consciousness cannot on its own claim to be a properly “scientific” enterprise, and that it can only be brought within the house of science if it is able to prove its scientific credentials by providing heuristic assistance to the “real” (natural, experimental) sciences? To forestall worries of this sort — worries that I hope will in the end turn out to be inappropriate ones — let me make a preliminary comment on how I would like the title to be taken.

Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness

The objective of developing a formalism in Phenomenology is threefold. First, a formalism should help the phenomenologist to put down in more precise and stable form what this or that means in his or her attempt reflectively to describe conscious experiences. Second, it should facilitate communication of phenomenological findings. Third, it should advance the elaboration of agreement procedures among researchers of consciousness using first-person methodologies. To enable intersubjective agreement concerning essentially subjective, first-person data would, in itself, seem to be a valuable goal for an investigation of consciousness within philosophical Phenomenology.1 Moreover, such agreement is no doubt requisite for successfully integrating phenomenological data within scientific studies of consciousness in the Cognitive Sciences.2

Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Intentionality and Reference

Abstract There is widespread agreement among philosophers that we refer to, think or talk about non-existent objects in much the same way as we refer to, think or talk about other objects. This paper explores the case of objects of fiction in the perspective of Husserlian philosophical phenomenology. In this perspective, everything objective is dealt with as object of some consciousness and as presenting itself in subjective modes. Within the scope of this paper, the focus of the descriptive analysis will be on showing in some detail how conscious experiences of intentionally referring to something fictive in pre-linguistic intuitive acts of imagining something are to be articulated with regard to the object of consciousness, i.e. noematically, and with regard to the intentional act, i.e. noetically. Special attention will be given to the reflective finding of some consciousness being intentionally implied and thereby modified in the very performance of an intentional act of representifying (vergegenwärtigen) something in fiction and to the question of identity and individuation of objects in fiction. It will be argued that modifications occurring in representificational consciousness, which Husserl called ‘as-if’ or ‘quasi’ modifications, provide the key for understanding the phenomenology of fictional intentionality and reference.

Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective

This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind.

Phänomenologie der sinnlichen Anschauung

Die in Husserls »analytischer Phanomenologie« (Hua XIX/1, 17) von fruh an zentrale Thematik des anschaulichen Bewusstseins gilt der Analyse jener »Phanomene, die unter den etwas vagen Titeln Wahrnehmung, Empfindung, Phantasievorstellung, Bildvorstellung, Erinnerung allbekannt und doch wissenschaftlich noch viel zu wenig durchforscht« seien. In seinem Verstandnis sei hier eine »Fulle phanomenologischer Arbeit [...] zu leisten, die im ernstesten Sinn fundamental genannt werden muss fur die Erkenntnistheorie auf der einen und fur die Psychologie auf der anderen Seite« (Hua XXXVIII, 3).

Introduction. Mental Representation in Cognitive Science and the Point of View of the Phenomenology of Consciousness

This study is about mental representation considered from the point of view of reflection upon consciousness. Methodologically speaking it is thus a phenomenological investigation in Husserl’s sense. In elaborating the text, however, I did not primarily intend to make a contribution to Husserl scholarship. Rather, as I wish to outline here, my hope is that the thoughts expressed in this study will be of interest to readers who are receptive to recent developments in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, which has seen a resurgence of activity in the wake of the “cognitive revolution” in scientific psychology.

The Phenomenological Form of Pictorial Representation

The theory of mental representation that I am arguing for in the present study is, as was already apparent in the Introduction, in sharp contrast to currently held versions of the so-called representational theory of mind (RTM). To recall the main point, proponents of RTM, or of representationalism, postulate mental vehicles, or mental symbols/signs, of representation. In the context of the present study, mental images, quasi-pictorial representations and the like entities, assumed to be at work in achieving imagistic reference,are of particular interest (see above, p. 2ff.). For up to this point an analysis of relatively simple phenomenological forms of purely mentally representing something has here been proposed, according to which these activities of intentionally referring to an object in the intuitive manner do not require any mental vehicle of representation.

Conclusion: Two Basic Phenomenological Forms of Intuitive Mental Representation

The main assumption, perhaps, of the present investigation can be put as simply as follows: consciousness matters in mental representation. In this study, I have tried to show exactly how consciousness is involved in any of several more or less elementary varieties of mentally representing something. The reader will have understood that the range of what is referred to by the title of the present study, mental representation and consciousness, has been confined just to intuitive mental representation.

Phenomenological Forms of Purely Mental Representation

The following discussion of a few phenomenological forms of activities of mental representation is best viewed as a development towards a general phenomenological theory of reference in the intuitive manner. Let me say a word beforehand about the use of the phenomenological notation in what follows. In progressively elaborating the henceforth more complex phenomenological forms, I will go back and forth between ordinary language and signs of the notation. The resulting formulae, or partial formulae, will finally be rendered in common language.