Eduard Niesten

Direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries: practical insights for design and implementation

The idea of direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries has generated much debate. Despite substantial experience with related economic instruments in high-income countries such approaches are rare in tropical developing countries, where conservation action is most urgently needed. We explore current experience with the application of direct payments in developing countries through an extensive review and subsequent analysis of the efforts of Conservation International. Our review identifies a broad spectrum of possible direct payment contracts. However, we focus on those involving international conservation interests. Firstly, we develop a framework for the design of direct payment applications, addressing four major aspects: contractual arrangements, definition of conservation services, performance payments, and monitoring and enforcement systems. Secondly, we discuss implementation issues, highlighting the need to consider social factors such as participatory processes, property rights, local institutions and contract legitimacy. Finally, we discuss important considerations for future payment schemes. These include the need for social responsibility, as well as rigorous assessments of effectiveness. We conclude that direct payments show potential as an innovative tool for engaging local communities or resource users in conservation and as a mechanism for channelling global investments in biodiversity conservation services to site-based initiatives.

Incentive-based Approaches in Marine Conservation: Applications for Sea Turtles

Conservation practitioners are increasingly turning to incentive-based approaches to encourage local resource users to change behaviors that impact biodiversity and natural habitat. We assess the design and performance of marine conservation interventions with varying types of incentives through an analysis of case studies from around the world. Here we focus on seven examples that are particularly relevant to designing incentives for sea turtle conservation. Four of the cases are focused on sea turtle conservation, and the others contain elements that may be applied to turtle projects. Many more opportunities exist for interventions that combine the strengths of these approaches, such as performance-based agreements that provide funds for education or alternative livelihood development, and leasing fishing rights to reduce bycatch.

Conservation agreements as a tool to generate direct incentives for biodiversity conservation.

Abstract Many environmental issues can be attributed to misaligned distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation. For instance, biodiversity represents value for the global community, but biodiversity protection imposes various costs on local communities that depend on forests, marine areas, and other habitats of conservation importance in developing countries. Correcting this misalignment requires presenting these local communities with appropriate incentives. Conservation agreements—negotiated transactions in which conservation investors finance direct social benefits in return for conservation actions by communities—are one tool for doing so. This direct incentive approach departs from Integrated Conservation and Development (ICDP) approaches by explicitly linking benefits to verified conservation performance by resource owners/users, thus requiring effective performance monitoring protocols. In doing so, conservation agreements parallel the logic of easements and related mechanisms used in developed countries, but adapt that logic to property rights and governance challenges that characterize developing country contexts. This paper will present the conservation agreement model using examples of agreements supported by Conservation Internationals Conservation Stewards Program (CSP), and drawing on a recent portfolio-wide assessment of these experiences. Elements to be considered include conservation outcomes as well as socio-economic impacts and financial and institutional sustainability. Individual agreements in the CSP portfolio vary widely with respect to conservation objectives, including efforts to protect individual species, improve natural resource management, prevent carbon emissions from deforestation, and reinforce protected areas; the paper will argue that the conservation agreement model readily lends itself to tailoring for particular conservation aims as well as community development priorities. The paper will conclude by summarizing the strengths and limitations of the conservation agreement model and identifying key considerations for scaling up the approach to advance conservation and poverty alleviation at regional and national levels.

Incentives for marine conservation: options for small island developing states

Conservation practitioners are increasingly turning to incentive-based approaches to encourage local resource users to change behaviors that impact on biodiversity and natural habitat. Three such approaches are buyouts, conservation agreements and alternative livelihoods. We assess the design and performance of these types of marine conservation interventions through an analysis of 27 case studies from around the world. Here we focus on cases that are particularly relevant to designing incentives for Small Island Developing States. Many more opportunities exist for interventions that combine the strengths of these approaches, such as through performance-based agreements that provide funds for education or alternative livelihood development.

A contract-theoretic model of conservation agreements

We model conservation agreements using contractual equilibrium, a concept introduced by Miller and Watson (2010) to model dynamic relationships with renegotiation. The setting takes the form of a repeated principal-agent problem, where the principal must pay to observe a noisy signal of the agent’s effort. Lacking a strong external enforcement system, the parties rely on self-enforcement for their relational contract. We characterize equilibrium play (including how punishments and rewards are structured) and we show how the parties’ relative bargaining powers affect their ability to sustain cooperation over time. We argue that the model captures important features of real conservation agreements and reveals the ingredients required for successful agreements.