Edward Ashbee

Polyamory, Social Conservatism and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate in the US

The arguments against same-sex marriage used by the Christian right and other social conservatives in the US have shifted in character. Drawing upon the work of Stanley Kurtz, they have increasingly suggested that same-sex marriage will necessarily lead to the legal recognition of polygamous and polyamorous relationships. From this perspective, the Supreme Courts ruling in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) had, by expanding notions of ‘sexual liberty’, paved the way for the legalisation and recognition of all consenting adult relationships. The article suggests that the Christian rights increased use of consequentialist arguments rather than claims structured around biblical authority or opposition to homosexuality per se is a form of adaptation to long-term shifts in the character of US popular attitudes.

Neoliberalism, conservative politics, and ‘social recapitalization’

Although embedded neoliberalism takes different forms, it is nonetheless defined by its commitment to ‘roll back’ the state in terms of its role as a social provider, as a mediator between capital and labour, and as an ameliorator of perceived market failure. Having said this, the British state, certainly if measured by taking government spending as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), has proved stubbornly resistant to retrenchment processes. Against this background, some on the right have periodically turned to social recapitalization and ways of developing greater civic engagement and voluntary effort in place of state provision. Such projects seemed to offer the promise of redefining the relationship between the individual and the state. Yet, while often seen as communitarian and thereby the antithesis of neoliberalism, such projects constitute a counterpart or corollary. Nonetheless, although the Conservative-led government in the UK has through the austerity measures pursued from 2010 onwar...

The Culture War and Issue Salience: An Analysis of American Sentiment on Traditional Moral Issues

Despite much talk of a culture war, scholars continue to argue over whether the American public is divided on cultural and social issues. Some of the most prominent work in this area, such as Fiorinas Culture War? , has rejected the idea. However, this work has in turn been criticized for focussing only on the distribution of attitudes within the American public and ignoring the possibility that the culture war may also be driven by the increasing strength with which sections of the population hold their opinions. This paper tests the strength, or saliency, hypothesis using individual-level over-time data and nonlinear regression. It finds (1) that there was a steady and significant increase in concern about traditional moral issues between the early 1980s and 2000, but (2) that the over-time increase was driven by an upward and equal shift in the importance attached to traditional moral issues by Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, evangelicals and non-evangelicals, and frequent and infrequent worshippers alike. While the first finding offers support for the saliency hypothesis and the culture war thesis, the second challenges the idea that Americans are engaged in a war over culture. Both findings enhance but also complicate our theoretical understanding of the culture war, and have important real-world consequences for American politics.

Immigration, National Identity, and Conservatism in the United States

American conservatives are divided about the future of legal immigration. Whereas some assert that the US should remain a ‘nation of immigrants’, others insist that immigration levels should be reduced to a bare minimum. The divisions owe much to ddifferent conceptions of American national identity. Whereas some represent the US as a ‘universal nation’ open to all those who subscribe to particular political and philosophical principles, growing numbers within the conservative movement put forward visions of an American nation structured around a distinct ethno-culture. The rifts are deeply rooted, and have consequences for the future of both American conservatism and the Republican Party.

Fiscal Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis in the UK and the US

Despite the many references to an ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ bringing countries such as the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand together there were, as the financial crisis unfolded, important economic policy differences between the US and the UK. In particular, discretionary fiscal policies took very different forms. While the formation of the Conservative-led Coalition government in Britain in May 2010 and its commitment to large-scale retrenchment made some of these differences very visible, there were policy cleavages between the two countries throughout the crisis period.

The US Republicans

Both Labour’s victory in the 1997 general election and the US Republicans’ loss of the White House in 1992 led to crises of confidence among conservatives. Although there were those in both countries who attributed these defeats to presentational errors or the campaigning skills of their Labour and Democrat opponents, others saw a need for far-reaching policy shifts and a restructuring of conservative politics. This chapter considers the character of US conservatism during the 1990s, the different strands of opinion that emerged in the wake of the 1992 defeat, the factors that shaped the victorious Bush campaign in 2000, and the implications of these events for the Conservative Party in Britain. George Bush’s 1992 defeat was a watershed, bringing twelve years of Republican rule in the White House to a close. Although constrained by Democratic opposition in Congress, the ‘Reagan revolution’ had, seemingly, ushered in a fundamental shift in the character of US politics. Tax rates had been reduced and there was growing confidence in US economic capabilities. Indeed, Reaganism appropriated a number of the long-term goals that had long been associated with liberalism. In particular, the supply-side policies with which the administration associated itself promised that unfettered market forces would not only increase overall economic growth but also alleviate poverty and address deprivation in the inner-city neighbourhoods. The USA had also, it was said, regained its place in the world through the arms build-up and military intervention in Grenada. There had, furthermore, been shifts in political allegiances. Although there had not been a ‘critical’ election such as those of 1896 and 1932, some spoke in terms of realignment. In 1980 and 1984, Reagan had attracted a significant proportion of the blue-collar vote, much of which had traditionally been loyal to the Democrats. Indeed, in 1984, he captured 46 per cent of the votes of those living in union households. How and why was this inheritance squandered in 1992? For Bush himself, the failure to secure a second term was largely inexplicable. His approval ratings had reached 89 per cent during the Gulf War only eighteenth months earlier. Furthermore, he faced an opponent who many regarded as morally

Macroeconomic Policy and Processes of Neoliberalization During the Obama Years

This chapter considers the fiscal and monetary policies pursued during the Obama years. It argues that notwithstanding the early hopes among the president’s backers of a radical policy shift, the effects of the fiscal and monetary policies that were pursued accelerated the neoliberalization of the US economy. Although fiscal policy was initially expansive, it quickly turned to fiscal consolidation. In contrast, monetary policy has been expansionary. It created “winners” and “losers”, thereby fuelling inequalities, weakening former solidarities and adding to the relative economic and political weight of finance capital. Thus, whereas the New Deal reforms changed the direction of US politics and restructured the governing regime, the net effects of the fiscal and monetary policies that have been pursued since 2009 bolstered a regime that had become increasingly entrenched over the preceding decades.

Introduction: The Politics of Change

The introduction sets a framework for subsequent chapters by considering theories of change and the extent to which there was consequential change during the Obama years. It draws upon earlier scholarship to suggest that although there certainly was no “transformation” (when new interests secure power, institutional relationships are rearranged, governmental priorities are recast on a long-run basis and when there is an accompanying paradigm shift), more limited, incremental forms of change were enacted through, for example, the Affordable Care Act or some of executive actions used to bypass Congress. Nonetheless, although recent literature within historical institutionalism has stressed the importance of incrementalism, it is vulnerable to rollback. Against this background, the introduction sets questions about the character of change that are addressed in the case studies included in this volume.

A Terminal Prognosis? The Study of US Politics in Europe

The study of US politics in Europe has always been small-scale. In the UK, it is often tied to contemporary history. In much of continental Europe, it is distanced from political science (which largely eschews area studies) and is instead, intellectually and institutionally, an adjunct to American studies. Whereas many other fields within political science have been compelled to consider the methodological underpinnings of their work, US politics has yet to do this. In contrast, within the US, political science has, since the behaviouralist revolution, been largely structured around quantitative forms of analysis. There is therefore a significant gulf between the study of US politics in Europe and political science in both Europe and the US. Furthermore, American studies is itself under long-term threat in some European countries because, forecasters suggest, the demand for English-language teaching (to which American studies is generally tied) will decline in the long term. As a consequence of these developments, those who study US politics at university level are not being replaced as they retire and there are few new entrants into the profession. The article suggests that US politics should, as a subdiscipline, seek out openings that might bring the subject back towards political science. In particular, it argues that US politics researchers in Europe should look more closely at developments within historical institutionalism, American political development (APD) and comparative politics.

Imperial missions and the American state

Although some eschew the term, and it has always been employed uneasily, there has been talk of an American empire for over a century. The scholarly literature on the subject has however been subject to deep and profound mood swings. References to ‘pax Americana’ and the ‘American century’ became commonplace during the postwar decades although they had already begun to seem quaintly out of place in the wake of the Vietnamese quagmire and amidst the political and economic crises of the 1970s. Then, during the latter half of the 1980s, popular commentaries and scholarly discourse embraced Kennedy’s celebrated book, The rise and fall of the great powers and turned to notions of ‘imperial decline’ (1987). The Kennedy thesis appeared to suggest that the US was destined to follow the course of earlier empires and great powers. American economic might had permitted the construction of an empire but, as the Romans, British, and other earlier imperial powers had found, expansion imposed costs. Although such costs could be borne for a period, there was a point at which they could no longer be sustained. Overstretch and decline (as well as the emergence of rivals) then followed. In Kennedy’s account, as Cox has also noted, imperial decline ‘. . . was almost, though not quite, a law of history’ (2001, p. 323). Even among those who had reservations about the Kennedy thesis, there seemed to be a shift in the ways in which American power was represented. References to ‘hegemony’ were increasingly displaced by ‘preponderance’ (Cox 2001, p. 320).