Edward G. Carmines

The Two Faces of Issue Voting

Both implicit democratic norms and the reconstructions provided by theorists of rational choice suggest that issue voters are more sophisticated–educated, informed, and active in politics–than other voters. But some issues are clearly more difficult than others, and the voters who respond to “hard” and “easy” issues, respectively, are assumed to differ in kind. We propose the hypothesis that “easy-issue” voters are no more sophisticated than non-issue voters, and this is found to be the case. The findings suggest a reevaluation of the import of rising and falling levels of issue voting and suggest a prominent role for “easy” issues in electoral realignments.

Measurement in the social sciences : the link between theory and data

1. Introduction to measurement 2. Factor analysis 3. Reliability 4. Validity 5. Evaluating systematic error 6. Integrating reliability and validity Appendix: multiple indicators Bibliography Index.

Beyond Race: Social Justice as a Race Neutral Ideal

Theory: The theory of policy particularism attributes the greater popularity of raceneutral policies compared to race-specific policies not to the fact the former only benefit blacks or minorities but to the fact they target only a particular segment of the population. The theory, moreover, points to a neglected distinction-between how a policy is targeted and how it is justified. Applied to race, a policy may be particularistic or race-specific in its focus, yet universalistic or race-neutral in its justification, or universalistic in both, with politically significant consequences for the level of public support the policy wins. Hypotheses: If what limits the appeal of racially-specific politics is not that they are restricted to blacks specifically but that they aim to benefit only a particular and limited group, then policies targeted to an equivalently particularistic group of whites should be similarly limited in their appeal. There should be more support among whites, moreover, even for policies explicitly targeted to blacks if they are justified on more universalistic grounds. Methods: Regression analysis and analysis of variance is used in a survey-based experimental design that varies randomly both the target of the policy and the justification for it. Results: Public support for programs directed at an equivalently limited group of whites-new immigrants from Europe is not just as limited as support for blacks and minorities, but more so. Differentiating between the target of a policy and its justification is also important because even programs directed at blacks gain more support if justified on more universalistic grounds, although programs that are universalistic in both focus and justification gain the widest measure of support. Universalistic arguments in behalf of government assistance for minorities have a persuasive force for whites generally, very much including liberals. Only conservatives are relatively unaffected by altering the justification and focus of proposed government programs.

The transformation of the new deal party system: Social groups, political ideology, and changing partisanship among northern whites, 1972–1988

This paper examines the partisanship of a neglected segment of the American electorate—white northerners. Like their southern counterparts, northern whites have moved toward the GOP (Grand Old Party) and away from the Democratic party during the last two decades. In fact, a substantial plurality of northern whites now identify with the Republican party. Moreover, Democratic losses and Republican gains have not been confined to particular categories of social groups but have cut across groups traditionally identified with the parties. However, political ideology is closely related to the changing partisanship of northern whites. Liberals have become more Democratic and conservatives have become substantially more Republican since 1972. Moreover, the relationship between ideology and changing partisanship occurs within most categories of social group membership, suggesting that ideological orientations now override social group ties in the formation of partisanship. The northern white electorate, in sum, is undergoing an ideological transformation that is reshaping the contours of American politics.

Value Priorities, Partisanship and Electoral Choice: The Neglected Case of the United States

A wealth of comparative scholarship indicates that a transformation in the value priorities of Western publics has been occurring during the last quarter century, and that value-based cleavages are increasingly coming to structure Western political behavior. The United States, however, has been conspicuous by its relative absence from this research enterprise. This paper attempts to partially fill this void in the literature by examining the impact of materialist-postmaterialist value priorities on American political behavior. Using data from the 1972 through 1992 American National Election Studies, we first compare the impact of the value-based cleavage on partisanship and presidential vote choice to that of other relevant sociodemographic variables. These analyses show that the effect of postmaterialism on American political behavior is not negligible. When the parties take distinct stances on postmaterial concerns, value type exerts a noticeable, though not overwhelming, influence on partisanship and vote choice. Further analyses show that the effect of value priorities on electoral behavior is mainly indirect, as they significantly shape attitudes on defense and racial issues, which in turn influence vote choice. Surprisingly, however, value type is not related to attitudes on cultural issues such as abortion and homosexual rights. Thus, although postmaterialism does have some relevance for American political attitudes and behavior, it does not seem to be pertinent to the cultural conflicts that are increasingly salient to American political life.

The Rise of Ideology in the Post-New Deal Party System, 1972-1992

Scholars argue that the social structural basis of the party system in the United States developed during the New Deal era has weakened, resulting in an increasing tendency for ideology to shape partisan support. We test this proposition by examining the role of ideology in the formation of partisanship in the United States over the last two decades. We find that, over the last 20 years, ideology has played an increasing role in shaping partisanship, one that cuts across traditional New Deal social group cleavages.

Materialists, Postmaterialists, and the Criteria for Political Choice in U.S. Presidential Elections

The theory of value change suggests not only that materialists and postmaterialists make different political choices but that, more fundamentally, they use different criteria for making those choices. Specifically, it is argued that materialists rely mainly on economic criteria to make political decisions whereas postmaterialists are motivated primarily by noneconomic concerns. Using data from the 1976-1992 National Election Studies (NES) presidential year surveys, this article estimates a series of logit models in which presidential choice is the dependent variable, and the effects of economic and noneconomic issues are assessed separately for materialists and postmaterialists. The results indicate that noneconomic issues do exert an impact on postmaterialists, but they also tend to be significant for materialists as well. Similarly, economic issues, when they exert an impact, are significant for both materialists and postmaterialists. Thus, although the evidence in this article does not support the proposition that materialists and postmaterialists employ a different political calculus, it does indicate that noneconomic concerns have come to play a significant role in U.S. presidential elections.

Who Fits the Left-Right Divide? Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate

How has the American public responded to elite partisan polarization? Using panel data from both the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project and the American National Election Studies, we explore the partisan consequences of the discrepancy between the one-dimensional structure of elite policy preferences and the two-dimensional structure of citizens’ policy preferences. We find that those citizens with preferences that are consistently liberal or consistently conservative across both economic and social issues have responded to elite polarization with mass polarization. However, we also find that the sizable number of citizens who hold preferences on economic and social issues that do not perfectly match the menu of options provided by elite Republicans and Democrats have not responded to elite polarization; indeed, these citizens are more likely to shift their partisan allegiance in the short-term and less likely to strengthen their party identification in the long term.

On the Meaning, Measurement, and Implications of Racial Resentment:

A new racism, it is claimed, has become a dominant feature of contemporary American politics. According to the theory’s originators, the new racism has largely replaced the old racism, which was based on the alleged biological inferiority of blacks. The new racism, referred to as “symbolic racism” or, more recently, “racial resentment,” by contrast, is defined as a conjunction of anti-black feelings and American moral traditionalism. According to its proponents, this new racism now structures and dominates the racial thinking of whites generally. Howard Schuman has suggested, however, that the index used to measure racial resentment may be fundamentally flawed because it may be conflated with the measurement of attitudes toward racial policies. The authors’ analysis supports Schuman’s suggestion. They conclude that racial resentment is not a valid measure of racism, which raises questions about the extent to which a new racism now dominates the thinking of white Americans.

Political Ideology in American Politics: One, Two, or None?

Abstract Are Americans ideological, and if so, what are the foundations of their ideology? According to Converse’s seminal view, whatever the case in other western democracies and despite its centrality to traditional versions of textbook democracy, the American public is distinctly non-ideological. Our objective is to compare the standard and by far most widely used measure of political ideology—a measure that presumes ideology is one-dimensional—to a more recent measure that allows for a multi-dimensional conception and measurement. This measure demonstrates that while American political elites compete across a single dimension of conflict, the American people organize their policy attitudes around two distinct dimensions, one economic and one social. After explaining how we derived the measure and how it can be used to develop five separate ideological groups, we show how these groups differ politically and why it is not possible to map their preferences onto a one-dimensional measure of ideology.