Edward H. Madden

Ernest Nagel's The Structure of Science

Let me say at the outset, what no one would have doubted, that Professor Nagels book is an excellent one. He offers detailed and clear analyses of many fundamental problems in the philosophy of science and he throws fresh light on everything he discusses. The book is a long one and includes many topics, so a useful summary is impossible. Instead I shall briefly list the topics covered, select one for more detailed exposition, and finish with some comments.

Postulates and meaning

Most philosophers of science nowadays hold a network or postulational view of the meaning of theoretical words. However, there are many nuances to this view, and after explicitly separating them, we show what we take to be wrong with each one. While we reject the postulational view we do not defend its traditional alternatives either; rather we show the pointlessness of insisting on a single source for the meaning of theoretical words. We also point out the shortcomings of Carnaps newest meaning criterion which depends upon a network view. But, again, we suggest not only that this new rendition of the criterion is faulty but also that there is something misguided about any search at all for such a criterion.

Explanation in Psychoanalysis and History

A number of authors recently have pointed out what they think are enlightening similarities between psychoanalysis and history. In stressing such similarities they are usually trying to justify their own particular characterization of psychoanalysis. I show wherein I think these characterizations go wrong and at the same time try my own hand at clarifying the nature of psychoanalytic propositions.