Edward J. Conlon

Effects of Monitoring and Tradition on Compensation Arrangements: An Experiment with Principal-Agent Dyads

An experiment tested the theory that behavior monitoring and the presence of a tradition of noncontingent pay would interact to affect compensation agreements in principal-agent dyads. On the basis of the notion that risk takers can command premiums, we also predicted that agents who accepted contingent pay would earn more than those who did not. Finally, we predicted that the presence of a tradition of non-contingent pay would anchor both the form and amount of agent earnings. Data collected from 40 dyads supported all three predictions. Further, we observed that the impact of tradition exceeded that of monitoring and became stronger over time. The study has implications for predicting the features of compensation agreements and understanding the impact of traditions on levels of earnings.

Commitment to Employer and Union: Effects of Membership Status

The article discusses the loyalty of employees to their employers and to labor unions. According to the author, prior research into this matter fails to consider whether or not union membership is ...

Diffusibility of Blame: Effects on Persistence in a Project

The article provides information on a study which investigated the effects of the diffusion of blame on commitment to a previously chosen course of action. A discussion is presented about the importance of wise resource allocation and the difficulty faced by executives forced to shut down a failing program. Psychological factors influencing managerial decisions regarding personal projects are examined. The authors examine the diffusion of blame related to an employee strike on commitment to a given project.

Absence Schema and Managerial Judgment

Two studies investigated the cognitive categorization of absences by managers. In study 1, managers produced absence patterns for hypothetical employees who were labeled as having excellent, typical, uncontrollable, and controllable absence-prone attendance records. In study 2, managers rated the reliability of employees with absence patterns like those found in study 1. Study I found the distinction between excellent and absence-prone employees was related mainly to the total days absent and absence-episode parameters of prototypical absence records. The controllability distinction affected the proportions of absences reported as excused or adjacent to scheduled days off Study 2 obtained results generally consistent with study 1 butfound that the adjacency manipulation produced the hypothesized results only for experienced managers.