Edward Levitas

Partner Selection in Emerging and Developed Market Contexts: Resource-Based and Organizational Learning Perspectives

This study of the international partner selection of firms from emerging (Mexico, Poland, and Romania) and developed (Canada, France, and the United States) markets supports resource-based and organizational learning explanations of such partner selection, a critical factor for success with international strategic alliances. Emerging market firms emphasized financial assets, technical capabilities, intangible assets, and willingness to share expertise in selection of partners more than developed market firms. In contrast, developed market firms tried to leverage their resources through partner selection. In particular, they emphasized unique competencies and local market knowledge and access in their partner selection more than emerging market firms.

The Effect of Institutional Investors on the Level and Mix of Ceo Compensation

This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influenc...

Signaling the Strategic Value of Knowledge

Firms competing primarily on knowledge resources face problems in informing relevant external stakeholders about the value of that knowledge without losing its value. This knowledge may be transferred to stakeholders only at great expense, or that transfer of knowledge to stakeholders may simultaneously promote its transfer to competitors. By conceptualizing firms and the environments within which they compete to differ in levels of uncertainty, this paper develops a framework to examine signaling mechanisms firms can use to effectively signal the value of their knowledge to two key stakeholder groups, the capital and labor markets, while avoiding associated transfer problems.

What to Do With the Resource-Based View: A Few Suggestions for What Ails the RBV That Supporters and Opponents Might Accept

The intention of this essay is to point out the key weaknesses of the resource-based view (RBV) and provide prescriptions for curing them. The authors begin with Gibbert’s (this issue) question of whether the RBV is ready for generalization and concluded generalizability is an inappropriate goal for the RBV. Furthermore, they believe that the RBV is simply not ready for generalization. They argue that the quest for generalizability is counter productive when applied to the RBV. Generalizability is not only the least relevant of the external validity criteria but also can only be assessed after valid operationalizations for constructs are developed across different contexts, industries, samples, and so on. Because they believe that RBV researchers have yet to achieve construct validity within their empirical testing, it appears to them that the RBV is simply not ready for generalizability. Finally, when they incorporate RBV developments that have occurred since Barney such as the knowledge-based view and dynamic capabilities, many arguments by Gibbert and others are rendered obsolete.

Top manager ownership levels and incentive alignment in inventively active firms

Purpose – Firms that pursue invention face special conditions that heighten the potential conflict between managers and shareholders. High R&D spending increases the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders because the invention process is rooted in tacit knowledge. Because tacit knowledge is difficult to communicate to external parties, shareholders will have problems monitoring whether managers are spending R&D in a manner that maximizes firm value.Design/methodology/approach – Using agency theory, it is argued that managerial ownership is one solution to this problem and that high levels of R&D intensity will necessitate high levels of managerial ownership to counteract agency problems. However, it is also argued based on signaling theory that a firms patenting activity reduces ownership requirement as well as moderating the managerial ownership‐R&D relationship.Findings – Using a sample of firms from the knowledge‐intensive biotechnology industry, a positive relationship was found betw...

Demand-Side Research’s Role in Macro-Management A Commentary on Priem, Li, and Carr

I respond to the recent article in the Journal of Management by Priem, Li, and Carr titled “Insights and New Directions From Demand-Side Approaches to Technology Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic Management Research.” Priem et al. argue that demand-side research can provide understandings of firm activity that research focusing on other aspects of the firm’s value chain cannot. I highlight what I believe are issues that, if addressed, can promote the contribution of demand-side studies to macro-management research.

The Determinants of Voluntary Disclosures in R&D Alliances

We examine R&D alliance signaling through the lens of voluntary disclosures. Voluntary disclosure occurs when a firm reveals more information than that which is legally mandated and provides extern...

How Innovation Can Affect Ownership Structure: The Case of Transient and Dedicated Institutional Investors

Abstract This study empirically examines the relationship between institutional ownership and innovation activity in the unique setting of the clinical trials for US biopharmaceutical companies. We used multiple statistical techniques in the period from 1990 through 2006 for firms in the biopharmaceutical industry to examine this relationship. Contrary to the widely believed relationship discussed in the literature, our findings suggest that institutional investors vary in their reactions to innovative progress. Specifically, we find that institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon (i.e., dedicated owners) increase their holdings of a firm’s equity as the number of the firm’s products increases in phases I and II of FDA clinical trials. These findings are robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as well as for different operationalizations of the change of institutional ownership.