Edward N. Luttwak

Give War a Chance

An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement

Toward Post-Heroic Warfare

Only one thing could possibly link the protracted warfare in the former Yugoslavia, the destruction of Grozny, and the recent border fighting between Ecuador and Peru. Once more, as in centuries past, wars are rather easily started and then fought without perceptible restraint. When belligerents see that no particular penalty is paid for opening fire first or using any and all means of warfare?even the wholesale destruction of cities by aerial or artillery bombardment? self-imposed restraints on the use of force are everywhere eroded. The border fighting between Ecuador and Peru had only just begun when tactical bombing was employed, as if it were no more conse quential than one more infantry skirmish. This new season of war is upon us as one more consequence of the passing of the Cold War. The latter induced or intensified a number of hot wars in the contested zones between each camp as each super power provided allies and clients with weapons and expertise far beyond their own capacities. Thus the Middle East especially became something of a preferred battleground by proxy. At the same time, however, the fear that escalation could eventu ally reach the nuclear level inhibited any direct combat whatsoever by the superpowers themselves in Europe or anywhere else, even on the

Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids

only groups of secessionists and aggres sive small powers, such as Serbia, but even mere armed bands can now impose their will or simply rampage, unchecked by any greater force from without. Today there is neither the danger of great power wars nor the relative tranquillity once imposed by each great power within its own sphere of influence. By the traditional definition, great powers were states strong enough to suc cessfully wage war without calling on allies. But that distinction is now out dated, because the issue today is not whether war can be made with or with out allies, but whether war can be made at all. Historically, there have been tacit preconditions to great power status: a readiness to use force whenever it was

Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement

Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of American forces from much of the country --while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempts to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the American withdrawal is carried out, and this gives Washington a great deal of leverage that should be used to advance American interests. The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country’s future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun--the calculus of other parties must change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the American hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too short-sighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of American diplomacy.

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.

Preface Part I: The Logic of Strategy 1. The Conscious Use of Paradox in War 2. The Logic in Action 3. Efficiency and the Culminating Point of Success 4. The Coming Together of Opposites Part II: The Levels of Strategy 5. The Technical Level 6. The Tactical Level 7. The Operational Level 8. Theater Strategy I: Military Options and Political Choices 9. Theater Strategy II: Offense and Defense 10. Theater Stragegy III: Interdiction and the Surprise Attack 11. Nonstrategies: Naval, Air, Nuclear 12. The Renaissance of Strategic Air Power Part III: Outcomes: Grand Strategy 13. The Scope of Grand Strategy 14. Armed Suasion 15. Harmony and Disharmony in War 16. Can Strategy Be Useful? Appendix A: Definitions of Strategy Appendix B: The Gulf War Air Campaign Appendix C: Instant Thunder Notes Works Cited Index