Edward Nęcka

Priming and Acceptance of Close and Remote Associations by Creative and Less Creative People

ABSTRACT: This study examined the relationships between creativity and associative memory processes. Participants were shown pairs of words, with the instruction to say yes if they could discern any associative connection between the words, or no otherwise. The second word of every pair was preceded by exposition of a prime (200 ms). Positive primes were based on meaning or spelling similarity with the target word, whereas neutral control primes were either unrelated words or nonsensical letter strings. Creative people differed from less creative people in readiness to accept word associations and susceptibility to priming. Two bottom-up cognitive explanations of the outcomes of this study are supplemented with 2 top-down explanations, pertaining to the motivational processes.

Visual selective attention and personality: An experimental verification of three models of extra version☆

Abstract The authors examine the relationships between basic personality dimensions, assessed with Eysencks EPQ-R and the efficiency of visual selective attention. Level of intelligence was also taken into account as a separate dimension of individual differences. Three theoretical models of the relationships between attention and individual differences were formulated: the arousal model, the impulsivity model and the resource availability model. Predictions based on these models were verified in three experiments (N = 110, N = 80 and N = 80). A computerized test of visual selective attention, developed in its difficult and easy versions, was applied in each experiment in order to assess selectivity, distraction susceptibility, sustained attention and dual task performance. Regarding extraversion/introversion, the arousal model appeared best suited to account for the results obtained in three experiments. As to intelligence, the resource availability model proved its appropriateness, although the concept of neural efficiency was discussed, too. None of the models was possible to employ concerning neuroticism and psychoticism, although the relevant data are reported for the sake of completeness.

The Contribution of Working Memory to Fluid Reasoning: Capacity, Control, or Both?

Fluid reasoning shares a large part of its variance with working memory capacity (WMC). The literature on working memory (WM) suggests that the capacity of the focus of attention responsible for simultaneous maintenance and integration of information within WM, as well as the effectiveness of executive control exerted over WM, determines individual variation in both WMC and reasoning. In 6 experiments, we used a modified n-back task to test the amount of variance in reasoning that is accounted for by each of these 2 theoretical constructs. The capacity of the focus accounted for up to 62% of variance in fluid reasoning, while the recognition of stimuli encoded outside of the focus was not related to reasoning ability. Executive control, measured as the ability to reject distractors identical to targets but presented in improper contexts, accounted for up to 13% of reasoning variance. Multiple analyses indicated that capacity and control predicted non-overlapping amounts of variance in reasoning.

Professional mathematicians differ from controls in their spatial-numerical associations

While mathematically impaired individuals have been shown to have deficits in all kinds of basic numerical representations, among them spatial-numerical associations, little is known about individuals with exceptionally high math expertise. They might have a more abstract magnitude representation or more flexible spatial associations, so that no automatic left/small and right/large spatial-numerical association is elicited. To pursue this question, we examined the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect in professional mathematicians which was compared to two control groups: Professionals who use advanced math in their work but are not mathematicians (mostly engineers), and matched controls. Contrarily to both control groups, Mathematicians did not reveal a SNARC effect. The group differences could not be accounted for by differences in mean response speed, response variance or intelligence or a general tendency not to show spatial-numerical associations. We propose that professional mathematicians possess more abstract and/or spatially very flexible numerical representations and therefore do not exhibit or do have a largely reduced default left-to-right spatial-numerical orientation as indexed by the SNARC effect, but we also discuss other possible accounts. We argue that this comparison with professional mathematicians also tells us about the nature of spatial-numerical associations in persons with much less mathematical expertise or knowledge.

Intelligence and Cognitive Control

The concept of “intelligence” has evolved in order to account for two facts, namely, intraindividual stability and interindividual variability of human intellectual performance. On one hand, people who outperform others in one class of tasks that involve reasoning, abstracting, or learning, will most probably excel in any other class of such tasks. On the other hand, within any class of cognitive tasks, one can find people who perform in an outstanding way as well as ones who fail. Early studies on the structure of intelligence examined if there is one general ability factor that manifests itself in all cognitive activities (g factor; Spearman, 1927) or maybe more domain-specific factors (e.g., linguistic, mathematical, etc., Thurstone, 1938) exist. These studies have converged to the widely accepted proposal (Caroll, 1993) of the three-layer hierarchy of factors, with general ability (g) on its highest level, several subordinate group factors (loading groups of tasks like mnemonic or perceptual tasks) on the middle level, and many low-level specific factors for particular tasks (e.g., one for perceptual speed). The most important middle-level factor is general fluid intelligence (Gf; Cattell, 1971), which represents human ability to adapt to the novelty and complexity by means of discovery of abstract relations in the environment and by their efficient goal-oriented application. In this respect, Gf differs from crystallized intelligence (Gc factor; ibidem), which consists in the application of one’s existing knowledge to the requirements of a situation.

Chapter 12 Attention, working memory and arousal: Concepts apt to account for the “process of intelligence”

Publisher Summary The chapter presents a model of intelligence that combines the trait stance with the information-processing approach. The model assumes the existence of some structural determinants of intelligent behavior—the structural limitations of attention and working memory—as foundations of the stable trait of intelligence. The structural limitations define the absolute capability of an individual, whereas the actual level of arousal defines the actual ability to deal with certain cognitive tasks in certain circumstances. The chapter describes a new theoretical model of “the process of intelligence.” “The process of intelligence” is defined in terms of the way in which a person deals with cognitive task while being determined by both stable structural limitations and constantly changing level of arousal. The empirical verification of the basic assumptions and propositions of the model are presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the validity of the proposed model of intelligence as well as its relevance for the cognitive science approach.

Insightful Imagery is Related to Working Memory Updating

Available body of evidence concerning the relationship between insight problem solving and working memory (WM) is ambiguous. Several authors propose that restructuring of the problem representation requires controlled search processes, which needs planning and involvement of WM. Other researchers suggest that the restructuring is achieved through the automatic spread of activation in long-term memory, assigning a limited role to WM capacity. In the present study we examined the correlations between insight problem solving performance and measures of WM updating function (n-back task), including general intelligence (as measured by Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices). The results revealed that updating function shared up to 30% of variance with the insight problem task performance, even when the influence of general mental ability was controlled for. These results suggest that insight problem solving is constrained by individual ability to update the content of WM.

Explicit Instructions Increase Cognitive Costs of Deception in Predictable Social Context

Convincing participants to deceive remains one of the biggest and most important challenges of laboratory-based deception research. The simplest and most prevalent method involves explicitly instructing participants to lie or tell the truth before presenting each task item. The usual finding of such experiments is increased cognitive load associated with deceptive responses, explained by necessity to inhibit default and automatic honest responses. However, explicit instructions are usually coupled with the absence of social context in the experimental task. Context plays a key role in social cognition by activating prior knowledge, which facilitates behaviors consistent with the latter. We hypothesized that in the presence of social context, both honest and deceptive responses can be produced on the basis of prior knowledge, without reliance on truth and without additional cognitive load during deceptive responses. In order to test the hypothesis, we have developed Speed-Dating Task (SDT), which is based on a real-life social event. In SDT, participants respond both honestly and deceptively to questions in order to appear similar to each of the dates. The dates are predictable and represent well-known categories (i.e., atheist or conservative). In one condition participants rely on explicit instructions preceding each question (external cue). In the second condition no explicit instructions are present, so the participants need to adapt based on prior knowledge about the category the dates belong to (internal cue). With internal cues, reaction times (RTs) are similar for both honest and deceptive responses. However, in the presence of external cues (EC), RTs are longer for deceptive than honest responses, suggesting that deceptive responses are associated with increased cognitive load. Compared to internal cues, deception costs were higher when EC were present. However, the effect was limited to the first part of the experiment, only partially confirming our initial hypothesis. The results suggest that the presence of social context in deception tasks might have a significant influence on cognitive processes associated with deception.

LEVELS OF MIND: A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF INTELLECT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF THE GIFTED 1

Abstract Contemporary theories of intelligence seek to relate certain behavioral or psychometric traits to information processing. It is believed that the study of basic information processing characteristics will enhance understanding of more complex behavioral traits. The present paper presents a new theoretical framework which should help to interpret findings obtained within this approach. The proposed model assumes that human intellect is determined by elementary cognitive functions that operate at four distinct levels: biological, formal, heuristic, pragmatic. Thus, the question of what intelligence is (or creativity, etc) may be answered in four different ways, depending on the level under consideration. At present, numerous incomplete theories that refer only to one particular level are competing with each other. Consequently, it is not possible to agree upon concepts and instruments suitable for identification of the gifted. The aim of the proposed framework is to provide a theoretical background...

Individual Differences in Attention: The Commentaries

In this commentary, I will focus on a few key issues and priorities for future research on individual differences in attention. More specifically, I will consider the following: (a) the kinds of tasks that are most relevant for assessing attentional and executive processes; (b) attentional biases and cognitive performance; and (c) the most relevant dimensions of individual differences.