Edythe S. Miller

The Economics of Progress

Is institutional economics an economics of progress? And if so what bearing, if any, does the identification of it as such have upon its claims to indeterminacy? The quotations from the works of Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres used as a lead-in to this article seem to indicate the existence of a certain ambivalence within the school in regard to this issue. I will be contending that there exists more than a little ambiguity about the topic in the work of institutional economists. As a foundational matter, and as is well understood, a defining characteristic of institutional economics, is its apprehension that all human thought and action is simultaneously governed by two sets of influences. These influences variously are designated as ceremonial and instrumental, institutional and technological, honorific and matter-of-

Economic Regulation and the Social Contract: An Appraisal of Recent Developments in the Social Control of Telecommunications

Recent decades have witnessed, in the United States and worldwide, the convergence and ascendancy of political and economic agendas that stress individualism and free private enterprise unencumbered by government intervention. The critique of traditional regulation, initially a preoccupation of a more or less fringe group within academic economics, increasingly has become the norm-perhaps even de rigueur-for the mainstream, and in the interim it has worked its way down from scholarly manuscript to editorial comment in the popular press and thence to an almost reflexive public acceptance. And yet the persistence of market imperfections and market power in the traditional public utility industries, including the telecommunications industry, is manifest. Historically in the

The Economics of Power, Knowledge, and Time

general public and consciously designed to survey political economy as a field in its own right, rather than as a subset of a broader discipline. As a result there are far more political economics topics covered in this encyclopedia than in the New Palgrave. For example, while this encyclopedia has entries on alienation, ceremonial encapsulation, disembedded economy, determinism and overdetermination, feminist political economy, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and the social wage, the New Palgrave addresses only one and a half of these entries, namely, alienation and determinism. When compared with The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (available as an Internet site), this encyclopedia has more depth and a greater appreciation for the range of topics relevant to economics. To be sure, the two encyclopedias cover different terrains, with the former focusing on the mainstream and the Encyclopedia of Political Economy focusing on political economy. But, unlike the New Palgrave, which does address political economic topics, though not as thoroughly as the encyclopedia under review, The Concise Encyclopedia is oblivious to the existence of this movement; the closest it comes to acknowledging political economy is a poorly written entry on Marxism and a shallow entry on Veblen. By contrast, the Encyclopedia of Political Economy has a well-written entry on neoclassical economics. This is an excellent reference source, well suited for the non-specialist seeking to understand political economy. It should be available in all university libraries and departments of economics or political economy.

Rate Structure Reform: A Review of the Current Debate

Regulation of utility rate structure, traditionally focusing on overall earnings and the concept that competition discourages efficiency, has recently shifted in response to new technological, economic, and legal issues. The author reviews recent controversies involving the electric and telecommunications industries and concludes that it is time to revise rate structures. The impetus for reform in the electric utility industry comes from a combination of factors that have emerged in public hearings and meetings, while technological innovations and institutional changes have influenced the movement for rate reform in the telecommunications industry. The costs of changing rate structures are noted, and the author warns that the benefits may not be as all-encompassing as reformists hope. 22 references.