Elena Ambrosetti

Giving from the Heart or from the Ego? Motives behind Remittances of the Second Generation in Europe.

The aim of this article is to investigate the remittance behavior of host country-born children of migrants – the second generation – in various European cities. We address the following question: Are second-generation remitters driven more by altruism or by self-interest? Data from “The Integration of the European Second Generation” (TIES) survey are utilized and encompass individuals with at least one migrant parent from Morocco, Turkey, or former Yugoslavia. Using logistic models, we test different classical theories on microeconomic determinants of remittances and add some additional expectations for the second generation. The results show that those second-generation Moroccans, Turks, and former Yugoslavs who send money are motivated by two main reasons: Emotional attachment to their parents’ home country (altruism motive) or to pay people who look after their investments or other material assets that are likely to be part of their preparation for “returning” (self-interest – exchange motive). These two motives are not necessarily exclusive: As part of a well-prepared return, to integrate easily once back “home,” it is not only relevant to ensure that people take care of ones investments and other material assets, but also to strengthen social ties and be well informed about the situation in the country of origin. This interpretation fits closely with the return model, which deserves more attention in the theoretical literature on remittances.

Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Italy

Italy is among the countries with a “colour-blind” approach: during Fascism, the 1938 race Italian legislation, openly discriminated against Jews and Roma. In the post-WWII period, discourses about race and ethnicity (“razza” in Italian) became a taboo. Nevertheless, race is mentioned in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, where equality of citizens is stated. The Italian Constitution, not only guarantees equality of citizens but also establishes a “positive clause” (Article 3.2) in order to “remove those obstacles of economic or social nature which constrain the freedom of equality of citizens”. In addition, Article 6 recognizes and protects historic linguistic minorities. The term ethnic is therefore not used in the Constitution for the obvious above-mentioned reasons. According to the last population Census, the most numerous are the “Sardo”, a language spoken for the most part by inhabitants of the Sardinia islands (over one million), the “German” (about 350,000), the “Slovenian” (about 60,000) and the “French” (about 70,000). Ethno-racial statistics are not permitted in Italy, apart from the specific case of those historic ethno-linguistic minorities guaranteed by the Constitution and law. Therefore, in the Italian census, race and ethnicity are identified with proxies: citizenship, place of birth, former citizenship for Italians and citizenship of parents (the latter since the last Census of 2011). Data on religion and language is not collected in the Census. The only exception is data on language of ethno-linguistic historical minorities.

Immigration Policies in the EU: Failure or Success? Evidences from Italy

As stressed by Boswell and Geddes (2011), two approaches can be followed to analyze immigration policies in the European Union (EU) context. The first approach is the so-called “policy failure,” and it highlights the limited success of immigration policies in regulating and controlling migration (e.g., Bhagwati, 2003; Castles, 2004a, b; Cornelius, 2005). According to this approach, states are not able to perfectly define the migration outcomes and to limit migration for several reasons. First, immigration policies cannot influence structural factors, such as socioeconomic inequalities, labor market shortages, and political conflicts in origin countries (Czaika and de Haas, 2013). Second, while migration is a long-term and “self-sustaining process” (Castles, 2004b: 222), immigration policies are often shortterm rules with limited and populist goals and clear-cut targets. Third, liberal states have moral obligations towards migration since they have to respect international laws and human rights, such as the right of family reunification and the right of asylum (Joppke, 1998; Weiner, 1996). Finally, governments often need to conciliate the natives’ feelings of rejection towards migrants, declaring zero immigration, with economic interests (Freeman, 1995), such as the employment of lowskilled and low-wage workers. This can produce paradoxes (Geddes, 2008) and unintended consequences, such as irregular migration. From this perspective, immigration policies can be considered, to a certain extent, unintentionally permissive toward migrants. Failing in their objective of affecting migration inflows, immigration policies foster movements of people across borders.

Ukrajinski migranti u europskoj uniji: Komparativna studija češke republike i Italije

This paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of links between personal characteristics and remittance behavior as well as to investigate the determinants of integration and to validate the remittance decay hypothesis in the target country for Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic and Italy. Our research attempts to answer a number of novel research questions by determining whether some personal attributes could be attached to Ukrainian labor migrants in the EU and their families in Ukraine. Our findings show that migration characteristics of one ethnic group or nation reveal the same patterns regardless of the target country. It appears that remittance behav** Corresponding author Sociologija i prostor, 52 (2014) 199 (2): 141-166 142 S o c i o l o g i j a i p r o s t o r ior of Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic and Italy is significantly determined by their financial situation, demographic characteristics, level of human capital and level of integration as well as specific context characteristics. Moreover, our findings provide evidence for the fact that those Ukrainian migrants who are more settled in a target country tend to send fewer or no remittances back to their home country.