Elena Del Rey

Economic Integration and Public Provision of Education

This paper develops a model of fiscal competition in public provision of a private good: education. In this framework, the welfare enhancing effects of public education provision are shown to be reduced by increased student mobility when, like in the EU, countries are unable to set differentiated fees to foreign students. Indeed, the threat of attraction of foreigners who free-ride on the national education system may induce suboptimal levels of public education provision when (price) discrimination is forbidden. Alternatively, countries may try to escape regulation and avoid equal treatment of foreign students. The paper provides some empirical evidence of the existence of a fiscal externality in education at the EU level.This paper develops a model of fiscal competition in public provision of a private good: education. In this framework, the welfare enhancing effects of public education provision are shown to be reduced by increased student mobility when, like in the EU, countries are unable to set differentiated fees to foreign students. Indeed, the threat of attraction of foreigners who free-ride on the national education system may induce suboptimal levels of public education provision when (price) discrimination is forbidden. Alternatively, countries may try to escape regulation and avoid equal treatment of foreign students. The paper provides some empirical evidence of the existence of a fiscal externality in education at the EU level.

Voting on Income‐Contingent Loans for Higher Education

We consider risk-averse individuals who differ in two characteristics - ability to benefit from education and inherited wealth - and analyze higher education participation under two alternative financing schemes - tax subsidy and (risk-sharing) income-contingent loans. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier individuals are more likely to undertake higher education despite the fact that, according to the stylized financing schemes we consider, individuals do not pay any up-front financial cost of education. We then determine which financing scheme arises when individuals are allowed to vote between schemes. We show that the degree of risk aversion plays a crucial role in determining which financing scheme obtains a majority, and that the composition of the support group for each financing scheme can be of two different types.

Optimal education and pensions in an endogenous growth model

In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumulation. We characterize the optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced growth path when there are no constraints for individuals to finance their education investments, and show that it involves education taxes. Also, when the government subsidizes the repayment of education loans, optimal pensions are positive.

Deferring higher education fees without relying on contributions from non-students

The benefits of deferring the payment of higher-education costs are increasingly acknowledged as a way to overcome student-borrowing constraints. Since higher education is a risky investment and students are generally risk averse, the repayment arrangements proposed in the literature frequently include some insurance. In a competitive environment, preventing adverse selection may require coercion to join the scheme or the use of public funds (i.e. contributions from non-students) to make the scheme attractive to all students. Alternatively, when the number of higher-ability students is low, students can be given the option to choose among arrangements that include different degrees of insurance.The benefits of deferring the payment of higher-education costs are increasingly acknowledged as a way to overcome student-borrowing constraints. Since higher education is a risky investment and students are generally risk averse, the repayment arrangements proposed in the literature frequently include some insurance. In a competitive environment, preventing adverse selection may require coercion to join the scheme or the use of public funds (i.e. contributions from non-students) to make the scheme attractive to all students. Alternatively, when the number of higher-ability students is low, students can be given the option to choose among arrangements that include different degrees of insurance.

Funding schools for greater equity

Abstract Countries that finance schools by means of uniform per-student allocations and allow free school choice seem to recognize the need to regulate admissions at over-subscribed schools. In this paper, we show that, without such regulations, (i) allowing free school choice leads to complete segregation unless mobility costs are high, and (ii) higher allocations per disadvantaged student enrolled can help achieve a unique and less segregated equilibrium, especially when mobility costs are low. The latter instrument can make regulation unnecessary when the aim is to avoid cream-skimming by publicly financed schools.

Can State University Fees Increase Welfare? A Mixed Oligopoly Approach

When students are unable to borrow, exams can be more efficient than fees in allocating students to schools. Optimal fees will then be zero for a monopolistic state university, but they can be positive when there is competition with a private, revenue-oriented university. The reason is that, by raising its tuition fees, the state university induces the private university to enrol more students. As a result, total enrolments and thus welfare can increase. For this to be possible we need the private university (i) to be of lower quality and selective, or (ii) to be of higher quality and not selective.

On The Dynamic Efficiency Of Balanced Growth Paths In An Endogenous Growth Setting

In overlapping-generations economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, the laissez-faire equilibrium balanced growth path fails in general to achieve optimality, but is dynamically efficient if the marginal product of physical capital is greater than the growth rate of the economy. In this paper, we accommodate the concept of dynamic (in)efficiency in an overlapping-generations economy with endogenous growth due to human capital accumulation. We show that the condition that the marginal product of physical capital is larger than the growth rate of the economy is necessary but no longer sufficient for the dynamic efficiency of the laissez-faire equilibrium balanced growth path.