Elena Kleiman
University of Haifa
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Featured researches published by Elena Kleiman.
workshop on internet and network economics | 2009
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman; Julián Mestre
The subset sum algorithm is a natural heuristic for the classical Bin Packing problem: In each iteration, the algorithm finds among the unpacked items, a maximum size set of items that fits into a new bin. More than 35 years after its first mention in the literature, establishing the worst-case performance of this heuristic remains, surprisingly, an open problem. Due to their simplicity and intuitive appeal, greedy algorithms are the heuristics of choice of many practitioners. Therefore, better understanding simple greedy heuristics is, in general, an interesting topic in its own right. Very recently, Epstein and Kleiman (Proc. ESA 2008, pages 368-380) provided another incentive to study the subset sum algorithm by showing that the Strong Price of Anarchy of the game theoretic version of the Bin Packing problem is precisely the approximation ratio of this heuristic. In this paper we establish the exact approximation ratio of the subset sum algorithm, thus settling a long standing open problem. We generalize this result to the parametric variant of the Bin Packing problem where item sizes lie on the interval (0, ?] for some ? ≤ 1, yielding tight bounds for the Strong Price of Anarchy for all ? ≤ 1. Finally, we study the pure Price of Anarchy of the parametric Bin Packing game for which we show nearly tight upper and lower bounds for all ? ≤ 1.
workshop on internet and network economics | 2009
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman; Rob van Stee
We consider a scheduling problem where each job is controlled by a selfish agent, who is only interested in minimizing its own cost, which is defined as the total load on the machine that its job is assigned to. We consider the objective of maximizing the minimum load (cover) over the machines. Unlike the regular makespan minimization problem, which was extensively studied in a game theoretic context, this problem has not been considered in this setting before. We study the price of anarchy (poa) and the price of stability (pos). We show that on related machines, both these values are unbounded. We then focus on identical machines. We show that the
european symposium on algorithms | 2008
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman
\textsc{pos}
Discrete Applied Mathematics | 2009
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman
is 1, and we derive tight bounds on the
european symposium on algorithms | 2015
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman
\textsc{poa}
Theoretical Computer Science | 2017
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman
for m ≤ 6 and nearly tight bounds for general m. In particular, we show that the
adaptive agents and multi agents systems | 2011
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman
\textsc{poa}
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization | 2014
Leah Epstein; Elena Kleiman; Rob van Stee
is at least 1.691 for larger m and at most 1.7. Hence, surprisingly, the
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory | 2011
Elena Kleiman
\textsc{poa}