Eli M. Noam

Electronics and the Dim Future of the University

The growth of electronic media and communication has provided new tools for academics, but also poses several fundamental challenges to the future of universities as centers of research and higher education. One result of the rapid increase in the production and dissemination of information is that the advantage of physical proximity of researchers in universities is diminished. The strength of the university of the future may lie less in pure centers of information and more in college as a community.

Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access

The auction paradigm for spectrum allocation has moved from heresy to orthodoxy, but like its predecessors it will not be the end of history. A better alternative, not driven by the revenue needs of government, is license‐free spectrum. Users would gain entry to frequency bands on a pay‐as‐you‐go basis, instead of controlling a slice of the spectrum. They would transmit their content together with access tokens. These tokens are electronic money. Access prices would vary with congestion, set by automatic clearinghouses of spectrum users. Spot and futures markets for spectrum access would emerge. Once technology and economics can solve the interference problem in ways other than exclusivity, the question arises whether the right to use the spectrum for electronic speech is the governments to sell in the first place.

Taking the next step beyond spectrum auctions: open spectrum access

The author presents the case for a better to approach to spectrum use involving a pragmatic and searching fashion rather than with an ideological mind set that equates the free market with one and only one particular allocation technique. Spectrum auctions are considered as an application for present times. The author goes on to look at the future.

A public and private-choice model of broadcasting

ConclusionThis paper has established a framework for the analysis of program diversity and audience shares under different regimes of ownership, regulation, and channel quality. The model is one of comparative statics, and lends itself to analytical solutions. It can serve as a tool to clarify programming decision-making and the impact of various institutional arrangements. The audience maximization of commercial broadcasting leads to program quality similar to that of a direct democratic process. To create a bias towards quality, alternative mechanisms had to be introduced. That, together with the potential for the propaganda use of broadcasting and the potentially large rents of controlling a scarce channel, made questions of broadcast policy extraordinarily hard-fought, especially in European countries. However, the emergence of alternative distribution channels and payment mechanisms has moved television programs much more into the mainstream of economic transactions. In consequence, the need to use the political arena to assure the supply of certain programs has declined, the marginal losses to incumbent channels has successively decreased, and the propaganda reach has been reduced by the spread of programs over the distribution. Therefore, liberalization is less resisted because the stakes have become lower.There are, however, some losers, in relative or absolute terms, of a multichannel media landscape, in particular the traditional public-broadcast institutions. Not only does their audience share decline, but, most fundamentally, an important part of their programming function, together with the influential constituencies that go with it, is taken away by regular market participants. Thus, while the analysis predicts a decline in the importance and intensity of media policy discussion, the major exception will be the friction accompanying the decline in the scope of public broadcasting.

Beyond liberalization II: The impending doom of common carriage

This article argues that the institution of common carriage, historically the foundation of the way telecommunications are delivered, will not survive. The article first discusses the meaning of common carriage and how it emerged It then analyses the present and future pressures on the common carrier system. Finally, it speculates about a future without common carriage and the impact on the free flow of diverse information.

The WTO deal on basic telecommunications: Big bang or little whimper?

Abstract It has been widely asserted that the Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) agreement reached in February 1997 is a significant step forward for the cause of global telecommunications liberalization. This article brings together two authors on different sides of the needed debate about the potential impact of the GBT deal. Following a brief introduction, William Drake argues that the GBT deal could, depending on its implementation, have a substantial liberalizing effect not only on specific markets, but also on the broader institutional arrangements of the global telecommunications policy environment. In response, Eli Noam argues that the GBT is useful, but that its significance is being greatly exaggerated, that most policy changes were taking place anyway, and that it could in some cases have the negative effect of slowing down the process of global liberalization.

Beyond liberalization: From the network of networks to the system of systems☆

Abstract Telecommunications are moving from the traditional monopoly, by way of the intermediate stage of a ‘network of networks’ to the stage of a ‘system of systems’ in which users are served by systems integrators that access each other. This environment will not be the ‘end of history’ as far as regulation is concerned, and government is not likely to disappear from this area. It would be naive to expect less regulatory tasks. Liberalization will not mean libertarianism. Opening telecommunications to competition, painful as it is, will prove to be politically and conceptually the easy part. Dealing with the consequences will be the next and more difficult challenge.

Why the Internet is bad for democracy

The Internet is not simply a set of interconnected links and protocols---it is also a construct of the imagination, an inkblot test into which everyone projects their desires, fears, and fantasies. Some see enlightenment and education. Others see pornography and gambling. Some see sharing and collaboration. Others see spam and viruses. Yet when it comes to the impact on the democratic process, the answer seems unanimous. The Internet is good for democracy. It creates digital citizens active in the teledemocracy [1] of the Electronic Republic [2] in the e-nation [3]. But this bubble, too, needs to be pricked.

The Efficiency of Direct Democracy

The paper investigates the Pareto efficiency of direct democracy and searches for the frequency with which the losing minority in referendum voting could compensate the majority and still be better off. A model is defined that permits the measuring of the intensity of preferences in a population, based on voting and abstention behavior. Using the model, an analysis of over 100 Swiss referenda reveals only a few instances in which the outcome of direct voting is inefficient. It seems that the political system evolves methods of trade-off that permit efficient outcomes in most cases. Criticism of direct democracy should therefore not rely on the primarily hypothetical objection of inefficiency.

Beyond liberalization III: Reforming universal service

At present, transfer within a telecommunications monopoly from some users to others support universal service. With the onset of competition in the USA, a complex system of contributory access charges, revenue pools and other devices has been added. Yet these arrangements are not suitable in a competitive environment. This article therefore develops an alternative system for the financing of universal service that is compatible with a multi-provider world. The proposal is for an accounting system that would debit a carriers added value and credit its transfers to universal service schemes. It creates a fund to support portable vouchers for the benefited users and credits for low-density areas. It operates on the premise of competitive neutrality - equal rights and equal burdens to all carriers, and customer choice.