Elisa Magrì

Some Remarks on For-me-ness and Empathy

Abstract My discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavis argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception.

Memory and Self-Knowledge in Hegel’s Philosophy

„Know thyself“ is the Greek imperative to which Hegel devoted his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PhSS) in the Encyclopaedia1. In this paper, I shall concentrate on the relation between self-knowledge and the cognitive development of spirit. In my view, theoretical spirit is the manifestation of a drive that actualises itself at different levels (Anthropology, Phenomenology, Psychology) up to and including the Logic. I shall raise the following question: What is the relation between theoretical spirit and self-knowledge? My thesis is articulated in three main parts. First, I will focus on the meaning of formative drive, pointing out Hegel’s original appropriation of this concept. I will explain why the Hegelian notion of drive is closely related to the concept of expression, which can be analysed in relation to the Science of Logic. I will then concentrate on the role of memory in Hegel’s psychology, showing to what extent mnemonic activity allows for spirit’s ontological manifestation. Finally, I will clarify the difference between thinking in names and objective thought, explaining why such difference is fundamentally related to spirit’s self-knowledge.