Elisa Paganini

Vague Objects within Classical Logic and Standard Mereology, and without Indeterminate Identity

Weatherson (The Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 481–501 2003) argues that whoever accepts classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, should conclude that there are no vague objects. Barnes and Williams (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90, 176–187 2009) claim that a supporter of vague objects who accepts classical logic and standard mereology should recognize that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity. Even though it is not clearly stated, they all seem to be committed to the assumption that reality is ultimately constituted by mereological atoms. This assumption is not granted by standard mereology which instead remains silent on whether reality is atomic or gunky; therefore, I contend that whoever maintains classical logic, standard mereology and the difference between vague objects and any others, is not forced to conclude with Weatherson that there are no vague objects; nor is she compelled to revise her point of view according to Barnes and Williams’s proposal and to accept that the existence of vague objects implies indeterminate identity.

Informative Identities: A Challenge for Frege's Puzzle

Freges puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Freges puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of Freges puzzle. The final outcome is negative, no satisfactory formulation of the evidential datum is found and Freges puzzle is challenged until a better formulation of it is found.

Indiscriminable but Not Identical Looks: Non-vague Phenomenal Predicates and Phenomenal Properties

A deep-rooted assumption concerning indiscriminability between visual appearances is the following: two things are indiscriminable in look to an observer at a particular instant of time if and only if they look the same to that observer at that particular instant of time. I argue that this deep-rooted assumption may be false. The argument is in two steps. First, it is argued that indiscriminability between appearances may be non-transitive. Then it is argued that non-transitive indiscriminability between appearances is inconsistent with the deep-rooted assumption. It is therefore deduced that the deep-rooted assumption may be false.