Elísio Brandão

The Impact of Working Capital Management Upon Companies’ Profitability: Evidence from European Companies

Companies can use working capital management as an approach to influence their profitability. This paper studies the impact of working capital management and its components upon the profitability of European companies. Cash Conversion Cycle is used as a comprehensive measure for working capital management and Gross Operating Profitability used as a measure for profitability. This study is based on a sample of 2,974 non - financial companies listed in 11 European Stock Exchanges for a period of 12 years: 1998 - 2009. The results of GLS and OLS regression analysis found a significant negative relationship between Receivables Collection Period, Inventory Conversion Period, Payables Deferral Period, Cash Conversion Cycle and profitability. This suggests that companies can improve their profitability by reducing the time span during which working capital is tied up within the company. An inverse relationship between liquidity measured by Current Ratio and profitability was also found and an additional analysis revealed that different levels of liquidity lead to differentiated impacts of the Cash Conversion Cycle upon operating profitability.

Reaching an Optimal Mark-Up Bid through the Valuation of the Option to Sign the Contract by the Successful Bidder

This paper aims to establish a support decision model by which an optimal mark-up (profit margin) in the context of a bidding process is reached through the valuation of the option to sign the contract assuming the contractor is chosen to perform the project. The price included in the bid proposal remains unchanged from the moment the offer is sealed until the contractor has the right - but not the obligation - to sign the contract, whereas construction costs vary stochastically throughout the period. Contractors should only sign the contract if the construction costs, at that moment, are lower than the price previously defined. We evaluate the option using an adapted version of the Margrabe (1978) exchange option formula and we also assign a probability of winning the bid for each profit margin using a function that respects the inverse relationship between these two variables. We conclude that to the higher value of the option - weighted by the probability of winning the contract - corresponds the optimal mark-up bid. Finally, we consider the existence of penalty costs which makes the model more efficient in explaining what actually takes place in some legal environments; we then conclude that the option to sign the contract and, therefore, the optimal mark-up bid are affected by their existence.

Audit Fees and Firm Performance

There are multiple studies investigating firm performance, in particular studies identifying firm characteristics that drive performance. On the other hand, research on the pricing of audit fees provides credible evidence that the financial condition of a client is a critical factor, in the sense that riskier clients demand more thorough audit procedures. This study investigates the relationship between audit fees and firm performance. Using a sample of U.S. publicly traded, non-financial firms covering the period from 2000 to 2008, a fixed effects model is presented to estimate firm operating performance. The model included standard control variables, such as size, leverage, sales growth and research and development intensity. In addition, measures of corporate governance were introduced. This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between firm performance and audit fees. Specifically, increases (decreases) in operating performance are connected with decreases (increases) in audit fees. This investigation provides initial grounds on the performance perspective of the stated association.

Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions

Our setting comprises one entrepreneurial firm with a growth opportunity seeking for external funding from a venture capitalist, where the entrepreneur and venture capitalist have homogeneous or heterogeneous beliefs about its growth prospects. We developed a real options model to determine the optimal ownership structure that triggers the simultaneous exercise of the growth option on the entrepreneurial firm by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Our results show that the more optimistic any of the parties is, the lower the post-money firm ownership that party will retain. However, optimism leads parties to delay their decision to invest in the entrepreneurial firm, by demanding higher profit triggers and investing only in more valuable entrepreneurial firms. The combination of these two effects leaves perceived returns on investment unchanged and not dependent on their own optimism.

Are European Socially Responsible Mutual Funds Rewarding and Profitable

The last two decades have shown us the growing importance of corporate, social and governance programs, as executives, investors and regulators have become increasingly aware of these programs’ potential to mitigate corporate crises and build solid social reputation. Thus, mutual funds that invest according to social, environmental and ethical criteria have increased both in volume and value. This paper investigates the performance of a sample of 80 socially responsible mutual funds from 8 European countries, within the period from 2002 to 2010. Using both the mainstream unconditional model and the most recent conditional models, we address a performance comparison between these funds and unscreened benchmark Indices as well as socially responsible benchmark Indices. We then attest the models results by applying the classical Sharpe Ratio to our Funds sample. We find out that European socially responsible mutual funds present, in general, neutral performance when compared with both benchmark portfolios. Furthermore, performance estimates seem to be slightly higher when funds are analyzed in relation to socially responsible indices and this benchmark has higher explaining power. Conditional models also seem to lead to a slight uplift of performance estimates and of explanatory capacity of the models applied. Sharpe Ratio confirms that there is no significant performance difference between the compared elements. This is consistent with most precedent empirical findings on this issue. Our study reveals that investors can adhibit social screens to their investment choices without pledging their financial returns, contrary to portfolio theory predictions. This paper proves that it is possible to “do well (financially) while doing good (socially)”.

A Two-Factor Uncertainty Model to Determine the Optimal Contractual Penalty for a Build-Own-Transfer Project

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) became one of the most common types of public procurement arrangements and Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) projects, awarded through adequate bidding competitions, have been increasingly promoted by governments. The theoretical model herein proposed is based on a contractual framework where the government grants leeway to the private entity regarding the timing for project implementation. However, the government is aware that delaying the beginning of operations will lead to the emergence of social costs, i.e., the costs that result from the corresponding loss of social welfare. This fact should motivate the government to include a contractual penalty in case the private firm does not implement the project immediately. The government also recognizes that the private entity is more efficient in constructing the project facility. Considering both the existence of social costs and the private firm’s greater efficiency, the model’s outcome is the optimal value for the legal penalty the government should include in the contract form. A two-factor uncertainty approach is adopted, where the facility construction costs and the cash-flows to be generated by running the subsequent activities follow geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated. Adkins and Paxson (2011) quasianalytical solution is followed since homogeneity of degree one can not be invoked in all of the model’s boundary conditions. Sensitivity analysis reveals that variations both in the correlation coefficients and in the standard deviations have a strong impact on the optimal contractual penalty. Sensitivity analysis also demonstrates that there is a level of social costs above which the inclusion of a legal penalty is necessary and, similarly, that there is a level for the comparative efficiency above which the inclusion of a legal penalty is not justifiable. The analytical solution to determine each of these values is presented. Finally, the effects of including a non-optimal penalty value in the contract form, which result from overestimating or underestimating the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency are examined, using a numerical example. Results demonstrate that overestimating (underestimating) the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency leads to the inclusion of a below-optimal (above-optimal) value for the legal penalty in the contract and produces effects that the government would prefer to prevent.

Optimal contingent payment mechanisms and entrepreneurial financing decisions

Abstract We explore Contingent Payment Mechanisms (also known as Contingent Earn-Outs) as a capital raising strategy surrounding Entrepreneurial Financing decisions. Unlike previous literature, which investigates how Contingent Payment Mechanisms are used within the context of mergers and acquisitions, we show how an optimum contingent payment might be designed so that one Entrepreneur and one external equity provider – taken as a Venture Capitalist – are simultaneously and jointly willing to support a given Entrepreneurial Firm and its growth strategy. We show that such optimum contingent payment might be designed for a range of different types of contingent payments, for which we present a novel taxonomy. As closed-form solutions underlay the terms of such optimum contingent payments, we provide a tractable analytical tool for Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists to easily contract these Contingent Payment Mechanisms.

The Management of Working Capital and Profitability of SMEs in the Euro Area

Short-term financial management involves the management of current assets and liabilities, which directly affect an organisation’s liquidity and profitability. This study aims to examine the relationship between the operating performance and short-term financial management of small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe. Return on assets is used as a proxy for profitability and the cash conversion cycle is used as a proxy for working capital management. The analysis in this study is based on non-financial firms in 19 euro area countries, over a six-year period from 2008 to 2013. The negative and significant relationship between profitability and each of its determinants, such as average collection period, average payment period, average inventory period, cash conversion cycle and profitability, was found using the GLS and OLS methods. This means that managers may create value for shareholders through shorter collection periods, a guarantee of fast moving inventories and longer payment periods (provided this does not affect their credit risk). In addition, the governance structure of a firm affects how it reacts to external factors and influences its financial performance, for which reason the number of directors variable was included in this study in order to test this relationship. The results indicate that there is an inverse relationship between the number of director and profitability, which can be explained by the fact that a larger board of directors generates communication and decision problems. The positive relationship found between liquidity and profitability can be explained by the fact that firms use first of all the amount generated and accumulated internally before seeking external resources, especially in the case of SMEs, which have difficulties in obtaining external financing.

Crossing Mountains: The Effect of Competition on the Laffer Curve

Regarding states and state-like entities as producers and taxation as a price, this paper connects the thoroughly studied impacts of the market structures in microeconomics to the controversial Laffer curve, suggesting that the outcome of the “taxation market�? depends also on competition. By studying the determinants for Property Tax revenue for the 308 Portuguese municipalities, a general model that successfully explains tax revenue is developed. Evidence is found for the existence of a two-peaked Laffer curve in the sample, and various tests indicate that competition impacts – shifting but also changing – the Laffer curve, causing more competitive municipalities to maximize revenue at lower tax rates – i.e. lower prices - than those in a more monopolistic setting.

Volume Uncertainty in Construction Projects: A Real Options Approach

The levels of uncertainty surrounding construction projects are particularly high and construction managers should be aware that adequately managing the effects of the different types of uncertainty may lead to an increase in the project’s final Net Present Value (NPV). The model proposed focus on the impact that a specific type of uncertainty - volume uncertainty - may produce in the project’s expected NPV. Volume uncertainty is present in most construction projects since managers do not know, during the bid preparation stage, the exact volume of work that will be executed during the project’s life cycle. Volume uncertainty leads to profit uncertainty and the model integrates a discrete-time stochastic variable, designated as “additional value”, i.e., the value that does not directly derive from the execution of the tasks specified in the bid documents, and which can only be quantified with precision by undertaking an incremental investment in human capital and technology. The model determines that, even only recurring to the skills of their own experienced staff, contractors will produce a more competitive bid, provided that the expected amount for the additional profit is greater than zero. However, construction managers often need to hire specialized firms and highly skilled professionals in order to quantify, with accuracy, the expected amount of additional value and, hence, the precise impact of such additional value in the optimal bidding price. Based on the option to sign the contract and to perform the project by the selected bidder, identified and evaluated by Ribeiro et al. (2013), the model’s outcome is the threshold value for this incremental investment. A decision rule is then reached: construction managers should invest in human capital and technology provided that the cost of such incremental investment does not exceed the predetermined threshold value. The model also proposes new forms of reaching the optimal bidding price, considering solely the effects of the non-incremental investment and also considering the possible impact of the incremental investment in human capital and technology.