Elizabeth Brake

Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law*

Recent defenses of same-sex marriage have invoked the liberal doctrines of neutrality and public reason, and similar reasoning has been extended to polygamy. Such reasoning is generally sound but does not go far enough in examining the implications of political liberalism for marriage. This article takes to their appropriate conclusion the implications of political liberalism’s commitment to excluding from the public forum arguments which depend on comprehensive doctrines. It might be thought that excluding arguments depending on com-

Justice and Virtue in Kant's Account of Marriage

All duties are either duties of right (officia iuris) , that is, duties for which external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica) , for which external lawgiving is not possible. - Duties of virtue cannot be subject to external lawgiving simply because they have to do with an end which (or the having of which) is also a duty. No external lawgiving can bring about someones setting an end for himself (because this is an internal act of the mind), although it may prescribe external actions that lead to an end without the subject making it his end. (Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals )

Rawls and Feminism: What Should Feminists Make of Liberal Neutrality?

I argue that Rawls’s liberalism is compatible with feminist goals. I focus primarily on the issue of liberal neutrality, a topic suggested by the work of Catharine MacKinnon. I discuss two kinds of neutrality: neutrality at the level of justifying liberalism itself, and state neutrality in political decision-making. Both kinds are contentious within liberal theory. Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness has been criticized for non-neutrality at the justificatory level, a problem noted by Rawls himself in Political Liberalism. I will defend a qualified account of neutrality at the justificatory level, taking an epistemic approach to argue for the exclusion of certain doctrines from the justificatory process. I then argue that the justification process I describe offers a justificatory stance supportive of the feminist rejection of state-sponsored gender hierarchy. Further, I argue that liberal neutrality at the level of political decision-making will have surprising implications for gender equality. Once the extent of the state’s involvement in the apparently private spheres of family and civil society is recognized, and the disproportionate influence of a sexist conception of the good on those structures—and concomitant promotion of that ideal—is seen, state neutrality implies substantive change. While—as Susan Moller Okin avowed—Rawls himself may have remained ambiguous on how to address gender inequality, his theory implies that the state must seek to create substantive, not merely formal, equality. I suggest that those substantive changes will not conflict with liberal neutrality but instead be required by it.

Fair care Elder care and distributive justice

Caring relationships and material caregiving are politically significant goods that should be distributed according to principles of justice. I argue that, within Rawlsian liberalism, care should be considered a primary good and propose a third principle of justice requiring access to the social and legal supports of caring relationships. I examine what social and legal institutions supporting care might require, with particular attention to allowing the infirm elderly and persons with disabilities access to caring relationships. I propose the formation of a Care Corps, providing access to caring relationships for elderly and housebound citizens. If universally required and compensated, the Care Corps could address two other injustices related to care: the unjust distribution of caring labor between men and women and the relatively low status of caring work.

Making philosophical progress: The big questions, applied philosophy, and the profession

The debate over whether philosophy makes progress has focused on its failure to answer a core set of “big” questions. I argue that there are other kinds of philosophical progress which are equally important yet underappreciated: the creative development of new “philosophical devices” which increase our ability to think about the world, and the broadening of philosophical topics to ever greater adequacy to what matters. The conception of philosophy as defined by a narrow “core” set of questions is responsible for skepticism about progress, as well as for philosophy’s “marketing problem” — its failure to reach the general public. I argue for abandoning the distinction between “core” and “marginal” questions. The greater openness of philosophy to methodological diversity and diversity in topics, especially applied topics, will make a distinct kind of progress: in the breadth and completeness of the questions asked, phenomena investigated, and theories generated. Such openness may also make philosophy more hospitable to more diverse practitioners. This would also be conducive to progress, in the sense of reaching true answers to philosophical questions: greater diversity of philosophical practitioners has epistemic benefits, such as increasing objectivity.