Elizabeth Burns

Iris Murdoch and the nature of Good

Iris Murdochs concept of Good is a central feature of her moral theory; in Murdochs thought, attention to the Good is the primary means of improving our moral conduct. Unfortunately, her unsystematic presentation of her ideas and the difficulty of the issues being considered make it hard to be sure what she means by the Good, and how we are to attend to it. I will argue that this uncertainty has given rise to three objections which, with some clarification and development of Murdochs view, are by no means fatal to her position.

‘Ontological’ arguments from experience: Daniel A. Dombrowski, Iris Murdoch, and the nature of divine reality

Dombrowski and Murdoch offer versions of the ontological argument which aim to avoid two types of objection – those concerned with the nature of the divine, and those concerned with the move from an abstract concept to a mind-independent reality. For both, the nature of the concept of God/Good entails its instantiation, and both supply a supporting argument from experience. It is only Murdoch who successfully negotiates the transition from an abstract concept to the instantiation of that concept, however, and this is achieved by means of an ontological argument from moral experience which, in a reversal of the Kantian doctrine, depends ultimately on a form of the cosmological argument.

Where the Conflict Really Lies: Plantinga, the Challenge of Evil, and Religious Naturalism

In this paper I argue that, although Alvin Plantinga’s Felix Culpa theodicy appears on only two pages (i.e. 58-59) of his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism (2011), it is of pivotal importance for the book as a whole. Plantinga argues that there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science and monotheism, and that there is superficial concord but deep conflict between science and naturalism. I contend that the weakness of the Felix Culpa theodicy lends support to the view that there is more than superficial conflict between science and monotheism, and offer an alternative response to the challenge of evil which suggests that there might be, after all, concord between science and (religious) naturalism.

MUST THEISTS BELIEVE IN A PERSONAL GOD

The claim that God is a person or personal is, perhaps, one of the most fundamental claims which religious believers make about God. In Hinduism, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva are represented in person-like form. In the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament God walks in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 3:8), experiences emotions (e.g., Isaiah 61:8), and converses with human beings (e.g., Job 38-41). In the New Testament, God communicates with his people, usually by means of angels or visions (e.g., Matthew 1:20-21), and retains the ability to speak audibly, as he does to Paul on the Damascus road (Acts 9:4-6). And, in the Qur’an, Allah is said to have a face and two hands (e.g., Qur’an 38: 75), to see, and to sit on a throne (e.g. Qur’an 57:4). Many believers today would still claim that, among other things which God can do, he loves those who believe in him (e.g., Ephesians 5:29; I Peter 5:7; Qur’an 1:3) and responds to their prayers (e.g., Matthew 7: 7-8; Mark 11:24; Qur’an 11:61). In this article, I will consider several ways in which God has been understood to be a person or personal and argue that, if God’s person-like characteristics must be understood in a metaphorical sense, we cannot draw a clear line between a personal God and an impersonal Absolute.