Elizabeth Greenhalgh

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, AND THE 1918 MANPOWER CRISIS

This analysis of the Anglo-French dispute over manpower resources in 1918, in the context of Germanys five Spring offensives on the Western Front, reveals the lack of effective and agreed policies. It examines from an alliance perspective a problem that has not before been so treated in print. After a brief account of the background to the crisis, the article discusses, first, the arguments presented in a French war ministry report on British manpower, and, second, the effects of the problems of transporting and deploying American troops. It goes on to examine some of the questions that were raised in consequence: industrial versus military mobilization; troop densities for a given length of line; and categories of fitness. Both British and French prime ministers spent much time and emotional energy in arguing about these matters. This was a dispute that was as bitter as it was pointless, because ultimately insoluble. Yet the efficient deployment of manpower resources was crucial to victory, and the dispute was dangerous for the maintenance of the coalition.

Flames over the Somme: A Retort to William Philpott

This response to William Philpott’s ‘Why the British Were Really on the Somme’ (War in History xi, 4) underlines Philpott’s failure to take adequate account of French sources, dismisses his long defence of Kitchener as beside the point and views his ‘strategic paradox’ as no more convincing for its reiteration. His ‘seven types of success’, offered as an alternative to my judgement that the 1916 battle of the Somme was a failure, are demonstrated to be fragile, nugatory and unsubstantiated. The theme of the response is that an examination and knowledge of French archival and published sources are crucial to any balanced understanding of the Somme battle.

The Experience of Fighting with Allies: The Case of the Capture of Falfemont Farm during the Battle of the Somme, 1916:

The Somme was the only significant joint Anglo-French operation of the First World War. This study of one important, though small, action in that battle shows how the Allies worked together. Using both French and British operational records, it challenges the accepted account. Analysis of the artillery preparations reveals that the initial failure of the infantry was entirely predictable. The ‘gallant’ infantry were not betrayed by the French artillery. The need to apportion blame coincided with the recent relief of the units that fought the action. Fighting with allies is more harmonious when troops know each other and their efforts are attended by success.

Errors and Omissions in Franco–British Co-operation over Munitions Production, 1914–1918

The opening weeks of the First World War depleted stocks of guns and munitions for all belligerents. For Britain and France the potential existed for co-operation to overcome the slow rate of the necessary industrial mobilization. French expertise combined with British resources might have given the two countries a vital advantage over the Central Powers, but national sentiment vitiated this potential. Although the two countries co-operated in less vital matters such as finance and coal imports, and the first munitions ministers of both countries worked well together, no big project (such as an Allied artillery reserve of heavy guns mounted on railway wagons to be used between Italy and the North Sea as required) ever materialized. When the USA joined the war, problems were compounded. The struggle for influence in arming the new American armies presented an unedifying spectacle. The bureaucratic successes in transport matters contrast sharply with the missed opportunities chronicled here.

Technology Development in Coalition: The Case of the First World War Tank

Perhaps developed, and deployed entirely between 1914 and 1918, it is often credited with achieving far more than it did. This article ignores the merits and defects of the tank as a new weapon in order to examine the opportunities for co-operation it gave to the allies who developed it, France and Great Britain. The tanks history illustrates both the way the relationship between the partners evolved, and their ambivalent attitude to their eventual associate, the United States. With the tank, opportunities for allied co-operation were there for the taking. There was no reason to build incompatibilities which might impede interoperability (differing calibres, or metric versus imperial measurements) into a new weapon; nor a history of production to prevent joint development. The infrastructure of Frances munitions industry and its world leadership in automobileand aero-engines, and the pre-eminence of its premier 75mm field gun, complemented Britains command of world resources of coal and steel, and of shipping for their transport. Despite Frances loss of its coaland steel-producing areas to Germany in 1914, its munitions capability complemented Britains pre-eminence in light engineering. Lastly, the wish of both the tanks French and British sponsors to deploy it en masse would be more easily fulfilled with the savings in time and cost that joint production and deployment might bring. The record of allied co-operation is tracked here through three phases of production and deployment. The first covers the tanks genesis to the deployment of fifty on the Somme in 1916; the second covers its deployment in 1916 and 1917, the tactical lessons learned, and the improvements in design to which they led; and the third covers the attempts to increase production and to exchange tanks in 1918.

Marshal Ferdinand Foch versus Georges Clemenceau in 1919

This article defends Marshal Ferdinand Foch against historian J.C. King’s harsh verdict that Foch had caused a political crisis in 1919 with his dispute with the French premier, Georges Clemenceau, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles. After placing civil–military relations in France into a wide chronological and national context, the relative contributions of Foch and Clemenceau to the treaty negotiations and the stages of their quarrel are assessed and the degree of danger to the French polity is evaluated. Finally the reasons for the surprising persistence into recent times both of King’s verdict and of the concept of complete civilian control over the military are weighed.

Living Propaganda and Self-Serving Recruitment: The Nazi Rationale for the German-Arab Training Unit, May 1941 to May 1943:

In 1941 Hitler set aside racial purity restrictions for the Wehrmacht to form the German-Arab Training Unit. New sources reveal Arab recruitment was self-serving, meant to bolster Nazi propaganda and foment anti-Allied Arab violence. Racism towards Arabs was pervasive throughout the Nazi regime and the Wehrmacht, stemming from Nazi ideology and older colonial attitudes. Consequently, the unit’s two-year history from May 1941 to May 1943 was defined by tension between retaining racial segregation and feigning collaboration. The results were command indecision, neglect, reticence to deploy into combat, and reluctant expansion, which together created dysfunction and disorder in the unit.

Foch, chef de guerre

Eleve a la dignite de marechal de France en aout 1918, Ferdinand Foch n’a pourtant jamais commande de troupes au combat avant la guerre. Entre 1914 et 1916, il livre des batailles, notamment devant Ypres a la fin de 1914, en Artois en 1915 jusqu’a l’echec dans la Somme l’annee suivante. Nomme chef d’etat-major general en 1917, il devient commandant supreme des forces alliees au cours des derniers mois qui precederent la victoire. A l’inverse d’un Petain plus prudent, Foch se revele un homme energique, volontaire et tenace, d’un optimisme inalterable. Et il obtient alors des resultats decisifs ; c’est bien lui qui met en place les strategies victorieuses, avant que les realites politiques contribuent ensuite a le faire echouer dans la paix. A l’appui d’une masse documentaire (carnets de notes, lettres) jusqu’ici sous-exploitee, Elizabeth Greenhalgh propose une etude novatrice de la contribution de Foch a la victoire des Allies. Elle nous invite a comprendre comment cet officier d’artillerie apprit a combattre l’ennemi, a negocier avec des allies difficiles a manœuvrer et a se frayer un chemin a travers le veritable champ de mine forme par l’echeveau des relations politico-militaires. En un mot, comment Ferdinand Foch faconna la Grande Guerre.

Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915

This is a marvellous and wide-ranging book that rewards close attention. Stevenson’s major achievement is to place the climactic last year of the war into a series of contexts, eschewing simple explanations and in the process demonstrating both how and why the allies went from a situation at the year’s beginning characterized by demoralization and seeming defeat to one in less than a year that saw the collapse of the Central Powers and a decisive, if ambiguous, victory for the Allies. It deserves a wide readership.

Paul Painlevé and Franco-British Relations in 1917

Paul Painlevé took important decisions during 1917 as war minister and then premier. Professor Dutton examined his record in connection with General Sarrail and Balkan diplomacy. Here, I concentrate on the relationship with Lloyd George and Britain, analyse Painlevés role both in the failed Nivelle offensive and its effects on the British Army and in the creation of the Supreme War Council that led eventually to unity of command. Although he was Premier for only nine weeks, this little-known politician played an important role in these events. My examination of that role will illuminate the troubled year of Passchendaele, demonstrating how closely it affected Britain, its army and civil–military relations.