Elke Brendel

Coherence Theory of Knowledge: a Gradational Account

A satisfactory theory of knowledge in which the shortcomings of a pure externalist account are avoided and in which the Gettier problem is solved should consist in a combination of externalist and internalist components. The internalist component should guarantee that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifying grounds of her belief. And the externalist component should guarantee that the justification of her belief does not depend on any false statement. Keith Lehrers coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification is an example of such an internalist-externalist analysis of knowledge. But nevertheless, Lehrers account leads to unintended results. Therefore, it is argued that a satisfactory coherence theory of knowledge must also be based on a gradual notion of systematic coherence.

Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects

In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributed contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske’s Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick’s Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to handle some notorious epistemological quandaries, especially skepticism and the lottery paradox. Then we outline the most important problems that contextualist theories face, and give overviews of their criticisms and defenses as developed in this issue.

Contextualisms in epistemology

Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.- Externalism and Modest Contextualism.- Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretskes Theory of Knowledge.- Whats Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox.- Contextualism and the Skeptic: Comments on Engel.- How to Be an Anti-Skeptic and a Noncontextualist.- Are Knowledge Claims Indexical?.- In Defense of Indexicalism: Comments on Davis.- Keeping the Conversational Score: Constraints for an Optimal Contextualist Answer?.- Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses.- Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams.- Epistemic Contextualism.- Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke.- A Different Sort of Contextualism.- On the Prospects for Virtue Contextualism: Comments on Greco.- Lotteries and Contexts.- Reply to Baumann.- Defeasibility and the Normative Grasp of Context.- Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little.- Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge.- The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott.

Partial worlds and paradox

Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on the totality of possible worlds semantics can be found in the fact that the so-called “Strengthened Liar problem” is avoided.

Was können wir von der Welt wissen

Leben wir in einer simulierten Scheinrealitat statt in einer Welt tatsachlich existierender Dinge? Diese These der so genannten Skeptiker lasst sich zwar nicht grundsatzlich widerlegen, erscheint aber ziemlich unwahrscheinlich.

Korrespondenz und Kohärenz

Eine der grundlegenden Fragen der Metaphysik lautet: Was ist Wahrheit? Worin geeignete Adaquatheitsbedingungen zur Beantwortung dieser Frage bestehen, ist in der philosophischen Wahrheitsdiskussion allerdings umstritten.

Deflationismus, Redundanz und Disquotation

Der Wahrheitsdeflationismus zahlt zu den bedeutendsten Stromungen innerhalb der wahrheitsphilosophischen Debatte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts. Die Grundidee deflationarer Wahrheitskonzeptionen besteht in der Ablehnung von Wahrheit als einem substantiellen Begriff.

SELF-REFERENTIAL ARGUMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY

Th e paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of proper selfreference, arguments of self-application and arguments of iterative application. A formalization of the underlying logical structure of these arguments helps to identify the implicit premises on which these arguments rest. If the premises are plausible, the conclusions reached by these arguments must be taken seriously. In particular, all the types of argument discussed, when sound, show that certain theories that purport to be universally applicable are not tenable. Th e argumentative power of such arguments then depends on how devastating it is for the theories in question to give up their claim of universal applicability.

Allwissenheit und ``Offenes Philosophieren''

As a result of his studies in metalogicEssler became convincedthat an absolute fixed totality of alltruths and a final metalanguage doesnot exist. Taking this result into account,it is shown that the usualabsolute concept of omniscience isuntenable. From this it can be concludedthat definitions of knowledge whichappeal to such a concept of omnisciencelead to serious problems.