Ellsworth R. Fuhrman

Neither Proscience nor Antiscience: Metasociology as Dialogue

This paper defends metasociology against the attacks of a particular brand of metasociological critique done in the name of scientific progress. The proponents of scientific progress often argue that metasociology does not contribute anything of substantial value to the progress of sociology as a science. In contrast, we argue that this view of metasociology is not terribly well informed. We suggest that metasociology should be thought of as a dialogue with other nearby disciplines and with contemporary political and moral conversations about the social world. One job of metasociology is to expose the assumptions of sociologists so as to make them more aware of where they stand in relation to other contemporary dialogues. We also argue that for metasociology to be taken seriously as dialogue, we must give up certain pretensions. The social grounds for metasociology as dialogue rest on epistemic relativism and, more importantly, on judgmental relativism.

STS and Utopian thinking

I (however fractured that may be) desire to continue the dialogue about politics and STS. In particular, I want to extend some of the ideas articulated by Haraway and Latour about STS and politics in our time. First, I lay out what some of the issues are : the contradictions of postmodernity; second, I describe the political and economic context in which some STS work gets done. Third, through the use of science fiction in the work of Kim Stanley Robinsons Red Mars, try to lay out what the politics of today are about and what role STS can play in this discussion. Contrary to other theorists, I believe that Utopian thinking is still important and should not be discarded by STS practitioners.

Reflexivity and alvin gouldner: The coming crisisin 1990

My initial reading of The Coming Crisis occurred in my first year of graduate school (1971). One year earlier I had read Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology. I was particularly taken with the Friedrichss volume because of its discussion of the prophetic strain in sociology. It seemed to me then, and still does, to be an important and attractive part of sociology. Gouldners book, unlike Friedrichss, seemed to raise a ruckus among faculty (perhaps this interpretation is exagger ated because it was my first year of graduate school when every intellectual disagreement is an important one) who had read it even among those who had not. The graduate students I knew were fascinated, appalled, and some applauded the book. Part of the effect of the Gouldner book was to place political discussions of the discipline in the forefront of graduate student consciousness. However, I remained unconvinced of the overall thesis of The Coming Crisis. I had com pleted a study of early American sociology {The Sociology of Knowledge in America, 1883-1915). My reading of early American sociology and particularly that of Albion Smalls writing had suggested that at the turn of the century Amer

The constancy of crime hypothesis: Historical evidence from Plymouth Colony

In extending Durkheimian thought on the relationship between deviance and social order, Erikson (1966) advanced the constancy of crime hypothesis, maintaining that the volume of deviant behavior remains stable over time. Eriksons data for Essex County do show remarkable stability for the years 1651–1680 in the reported offender rate. However, Essex County represents a very limited test of the hypothesis. We present comparative historical data for the entirety of Plymouth Colony, 1633–1679, finding that change—not constancy—best characterizes the evidence. The lack of unequivocal support for the hypothesis suggests a need for its rethinking. Several such possibilities are briefly discussed.

Review Essay : The Main Event: Jeffrey Alexander Theoretical Logic in Sociology, 4 Vols Berkeley University of California Press, 1983

In this essay I review the tenets of Alexander’s four-volume work on sociological theory and various criticisms of it which have appeared in US sociology journals (see References). I’n the last section of the essay, I contrast the idea of ’interpretive reason’ with ’theoretical reason’ to place Alexander’s work in the context of the cracks and fissures m contemporary American sociology. (All page references are to the volume under discussion unless indicated differently. ) Alexander intends to ’present the case for developing a conception of general theoretical logic in sociology’ (p. 2). In him view. if we are gomg to preserve the role of general thinking in sociology, a reinterpretation of the conventional understanding of scientific process is necessary. The reinterpretation of the conventional understanding of the scientific, process is represented by a continuum with arrows pointing outward at both ends. It is framed by an empirical environment on the rights on the left, by a metaphysical environment. Moving from left to right we find: General presuppositions. Models. Concepts. Definitions, Classifications, Laws. Complev and simple propositions. Correlations, Methodological assumptions, Observations. The conventtonal view suggests that these elements are discrete and concretely separable from one another. In contrast, Alexander argues that these are analytic distinctions, ’separations estahlished for the convenience of scientific discourse, made to facilitate communication and not to establsh ontological qualities’ (p. 4). The positivist persuasion is predominant although this view is thought to be a ’steadily shrinking one’. He discusses a number of tenets central to the positivist:

Critique: The Sociology of Knowledge and American Social Theory

I believe that early American sociologists showed a concern for the relationship between social structure and ideas. What about the nature of their formulation? First, it can be noted that they applied an evolutionary framework to their analyses of thought; they tended toward a macro-analysis of knowledge systems: characterizing the stages of thought from “primitive” to “modern” life. As a consequence, their analyses focused on “things” like traditional and modern knowledge. Second, they also preferred institutional analyses, that is, the types of thought generated by given institutions — religious, political, or economic. In particular, we may note that Sumner was closest to the materialist bent. As he explained it, the mores were products of concrete solutions to survival: in contrast, Giddings and Ross emphasized the development of knowledge from primarily a collectivist-idealist position; knowledge was generated by groups or societies in terms of basic inter-individual influences, Cooley shares the idealist bent of these two, yet he also emphasizes multiple factors in the genesis of knowledge, where Ward stressed a very broad collectivist orientation in accounting for the genesis of knowledge. Although Ward also argued that ideas emerged from feelings and that language was extremely important for the development of knowledge. Smalls formulation approached most closely the idea of interest bound knowledge. For him, occupations (through the division of labor) generated ethical systems which basically supported their own interests. In this sense, Small is closely aligned with Sumners materialist orientation. Giddings and Ross, tended to analyze a collective national (racial) type of knowledge; while Sumner, Ross and Cooley primarily concerned themselves with the mores of everyday life. Small expended a great deal of energy analyzing the history of social thought. Interestingly, all of these sociologists wrote about the foundations of social scientific knowledge. They did not take this aspect for granted and tried to demonstrate the utility and superiority of sociology for analyzing the modern world. In addition, all of these men accepted the pluralist thesis (in some version) that knowledge was generated by a variety of factors — not simply class interests. Concomitantly, they argued that public opinion was the most important source of political and social control in the modern world; therefore, it was not classes which needed to be accounted for but public opinion. Public opinion was not a nefarious term in their vocabulary, rather it meant a kind of collective conscience on the part of the middle classes. It should also be noted that early American sociologists utilized the sociology of knowledge to discredit other social theories. However, they did not criticize from a “Marxian” or “critical theory” type formulation (Habermas, 1968; Horkheimer, 1974; Lukacs, 1971; Marcuse, 1964; Wellmer, 1971; Schroyer, 1975). These early sociologists mainly showed that other social theories were limited or relied on partial explanations, From their point of view, other social theories were not scientific but rather utopian or fragmented: the writings of early American sociologists were primarily social-technological in nature than critical-emancipatory.