Els Lecoutere

Institutions under construction: resolving resource conflicts in Tanzanian irrigation schemes

Abstract Water governance in Tanzanias small-scale irrigation schemes has become ever more challenging because of increasing market penetration, declining predictability of water availability and widening institutional pluralism. Despite these trends, resource conflicts at the local level have generally been avoided. Instead, one observes processes in which actors involved in conflicts make and remake institutions. This renders these irrigation schemes interesting for studying water governance institutions under construction. By documenting how conflicts over water are solved in small-scale irrigation schemes in rural Tanzania, we show that resource conflicts do not necessarily lead to violence, but motivate actors to pragmatically search for solutions. Institutional pluralism is turned into an asset because it increases the potential for creativity. As such, pragmatic conflict resolution and institutional pluralism contribute to the development of more sophisticated and locally adapted resource governance institutions. However, despite its potential, actor-driven development of resource governance institutions can also reproduce deeply entrenched power imbalances and gender roles. As such, it can hinder inclusion of less powerful resource users because the latter do not always have the capability to engage in creative conflict resolution.

Who Engages in Water Scarcity Conflicts? A Field Experiment with Irrigators in Semi-Arid Africa

Does water scarcity induce conflict? And who would engage in a water scarcity conflict? In this paper we look for evidence of the relation between water scarcity and conflictive behavior. With a framed field experiment conducted with smallholder irrigators from semi-arid Tanzania that replicates appropriation from an occasionally scarce common water flow we assess what type of water users is more inclined to react in conflictive way to scarcity. On average, water scarcity induces selfish appropriation behavior in the experiment which is regarded conflictive in the Tanzanian irrigator communities where strong noncompetition norms regulate irrigation water distribution. But not all react to water scarcity in the same way. Poor, marginalized, dissocialized irrigators with low human capital and with higher stakes are most likely to react with conflictive appropriation behavior to water scarcity. Viewed a political ecology perspective we conclude that circumstances in Tanzania are conducive to resource scarcity conflicts. Water scarcity and water values are increasing. Water governance institutions entail exclusionary elements. Moreover, a higher likelihood to react in a conflictive way to water scarcity coincides with real economic and political inequalities which could form a basis for mobilization for more violent ways of competing for scarce resources.

Modernisation and Time Preferences in Tanzania: Evidence from a Large-Scale Elicitation Exercise

Abstract Assumptions about individual time preferences are important for explanations of poverty and development. Data from a large-scale elicitation exercise in Tanzania show significantly higher levels of impatience in urban areas than in rural areas. This result remains robust to adding controls for socio-economic differences between rural and urban areas, which possibly correlate with time preferences. We attribute this to differences in ‘modernisation’ between urban and rural areas, with modernisation leading to increased impatience. This is corroborated by the observed positive correlation between impatience and education; the latter being an important vehicle of modernisation for traditional societies in Tanzania.

Equity–Efficiency Optimizing Resource Allocation: The Role of Time Preferences in a Repeated Irrigation Game†

We study repeated water allocation decisions among small scale irrigation users in Tanzania. In a treatment replicating water scarcity conditions, convexities in production make that substantial efficiency gains can be obtained by deviating from equal sharing, leading to an equity–efficiency trade-off. In a repeated game setting, it becomes possible to reconcile efficiency with equity by rotating the person who receives the largest share, but such a strategy requires a longer run perspective. Correlating experimental data from an irrigation game with individual time preference data, we find that less patient irrigators are less likely to use a rotation strategy.

Sharing Common Resources in Patriarchal and Status Based Societies: Evidence from Tanzania

ABSTRACT In rural African societies, socioeconomic differentiation linked to gender and social status exerts an important influence on the distribution of common-pool resources. Through a behavioral experiment conducted in 2008 in rural Tanzania, this contribution examines the influence of gender and social status on distribution behavior of users of self-governed common watersheds. It finds that men and women with low social status distribute water equally when water is abundant but keep larger shares when water is scarce, although low-status women try to be as fair as possible at the expense of their returns from irrigated agriculture. Men of high social status keep more than half of the available water for themselves, both in abundance and scarcity, and deprive others from sizeable returns from irrigated agriculture. Women of high social status share altruistically when water is abundant and equally when water is scarce, giving up on returns from irrigated agriculture.