Ema Sullivan-Bissett

Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence.

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.

The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions

In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in peoples memory of their past, where peoples self‐image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both peoples capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to peoples sense of competence and self‐confidence, increasing psychological well‐being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.

Biological function and epistemic normativity

I give a biological account of epistemic normativity. My account explains the sense in which it is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduces epistemic norms to there being doxastic strategies which guide how best to meet that standard. Additionally, I give an explanation of the mistakes we make in our epistemic discourse, understood as either taking epistemic properties and norms to be sui generis and irreducible, and/or as failing to recognise the reductive base of epistemic normativity. This explanation will appeal to the claim that the beliefs which constitute our epistemic discourse are false but adaptive, and are the outcome of a non-truth-tracking process. The opponents of my position are philosophers who take epistemic normativity not to be reducible in this way, and to involve sui generis properties and norms governing belief. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemic normativity can be explained by appeal to the biological functions of our mechanisms of belief-production.

Better No Longer to Be

Abstract David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life,2 one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism3. This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism4 deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be.

Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?

I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this endeavour. These difficulties are a function of seeking an explanation of transparency at the agential level, either with the subject aiming at truth, or being guided by a norm of truth. I adopt a motivational account of belief, one which severs the connection between belief and truth, and supplement this with an account of actual world beliefs. My alternative explanation is found at the sub-intentional, non-agential level, secured by biology. This explanation casts transparency not as related to the nature of deliberation over what to believe, but rather as contingently characterizing the beliefs of some believers, namely those with a particular biological history. My explanation thus parts company with what has come before along two dimensions: it moves away from transparency being something related to the agent’s aims or commitments, and it understands it as a contingent phenomenon. I close by considering an objection to my view—that transparency must not be understood as a contingent phenomenon—and a nearby alternative position which avoids this consequence. I respond to this objection and give reasons not to endorse the nearby alternative. I conclude that my explanation does not face the difficulties of those offered by teleologists and normativists, and, that by moving away from agential explanations, and casting transparency as contingent, we can provide a successful explanation of it.

How can false or irrational beliefs be useful

For this special issue we asked leading epistemologists and philosophers of mind to bring together their different perspectives on what it is for a false or irrational belief to be useful. It is no surprise that false or irrational beliefs can be biologically adaptive by furthering survival and reproduction, and psychologically adaptive by enhancing self-esteem and wellbeing. The research questions driving our project are: (1) whether false or irrational beliefs can have epistemic benefits; (2) how such benefits interact with biological and psychological benefits; and (3) how considerations about the utility of false or irrational beliefs affect our conception of what a belief does or should aim for, or how to best promote the epistemic standing of a real-life agent. The varied and thorough contributions to this special issue make progress with respect to all three issues. Some contributors focus on the nature of the benefits that false or irrational beliefs may have. Can false or irrational beliefs have epistemic benefits despite being epistemically faulty? Can some false or irrational beliefs be necessary for successful agency, by enhancing the agent’s motivation to pursue her goals, or by directly promoting the fulfilment of such goals? Other contributors reflect on the implications of recognizing such benefits for our concept of belief, truth, or rationality. How does the acknowledgement that false or irrational beliefs can be useful impact on the debate about the aims and norms of belief? Is it always preferable to have true rather than false beliefs if false beliefs can have benefits? Duncan Pritchard opens the special issue with his paper “Epistemically Useful False Beliefs.” He is interested in evaluating the claim that there is a set of false but useful beliefs, which are appropriately classified as such on the grounds of epistemic usefulness. He considers three candidate cases which might be thought to result in false but epistemically useful beliefs: scientific fictions, epistemic situationism embedded within virtue epistemology, and hinge commitments. He argues that merely accepting scientific fictions is sufficient to reap the epistemic benefits, and so there are no epistemically beneficial false beliefs to be found here. With respect to the challenge posed by certain kinds of epistemic situationism, once again, Pritchard suggests that it is difficult to describe the nature of such cases by appeal to belief. Finally, on hinge commitments, Pritchard argues that though there is epistemic utility, there are, as with the previous two cases, no beliefs here. Pritchard

Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.03.013 1053-8100/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). In May 2014 we organised a workshop entitled ‘‘Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions’’, hosted by the University of Birmingham and funded by an AHRC Fellowship on the epistemic innocence of imperfect cognitions. Most of the talks presented during the workshop are now part of this special issue. Two additional papers are also included. The purpose of the workshop and this collection of papers is to reflect on the effects of ‘‘imperfect cognitions’’ on agents’ wellbeing, success, health, and capacity for knowledge. We consider some paradigmatic examples of irrational beliefs, such as beliefs formed as a result of reasoning mistakes; delusions in schizophrenia, delusional disorders, and anosognosia; memories that are either distorted or entirely fabricated; and beliefs and preferences affected by implicit bias. Our first objective is to discuss the different types of costs and benefits that such cognitions might have, and debunk some myths. Here are some of the questions the contributors ask: Can delusions have some epistemic benefits? Are ecologically rational choices always adaptive? Why are delusions regarded as pathological whereas other irrational beliefs are not? Are there any positive ways for distorted or false memories to impact on wellbeing or knowledge? Is it true that we are not responsible for actions driven by implicit attitudes? Our second objective is to explore the relationship among different types of costs and benefits. The following issues are part of this exploration: Do evolutionary advantages and epistemic ones go hand-in-hand? Does the harmfulness of delusions always translate into impoverished epistemic access to the world? What are the effects of an out-of-date conception of the self for wellbeing and socialisation? Can confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias be good for the agents who provide them? Can a false memory fail to represent reality but succeed in conveying personal meanings? A very common way of understanding the role of imperfect cognitions is to present them as epistemically bad but otherwise pragmatically useful. Self-deception is the obvious case: if we avoid the belief that we are responsible for some negatively valued event, we end up feeling better about ourselves, but we forego an understanding of the process that led to the event. The thought then is that pragmatic benefits are had at the expense of epistemic ones. Our research into imperfect cognitions has just started, but the contributions to this volume suggest that we should resist the trade-off view of the relationship between pragmatic and epistemic benefits, and adopt a more liberal view of what constitutes an epistemic benefit.

Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience

ABSTRACT Empiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors (if any) need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic delusions, one which resists the trade-off view of pragmatic benefits and epistemic costs. Though monothematic delusions are often characterized by appeal to their epistemic costs, they can play a positive epistemic role, and this is a surprising conclusion on which, so I argue, all empiricists can agree. Thus, I show that all empiricists have the notion of epistemic innocence at their disposal.