Emil J. Kirchner

EU security governance

List of figures, tables and appendices Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1. Introduction: the EU and the governance of European security 2. Policies of prevention: pre-empting disorder along the periphery 3. Policies of assurance: peace-building in south eastern Europe 4. Policies of protection: meeting the challenge of internal security 5. Policies of compellance: projecting force into an uncertain world 6. Conclusion: securing Europe in the 21st century Bibliography Index

The Challenge of European Union Security Governance

The central aim of this article is to explore whether or not the EU is an effective security actor. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the EU, three security functions (conflict prevention, peace-enforcement/peace-keeping and peace-building) and three core components of governance (co-ordination, management and regulation) are applied. Security governance is seen as a helpful framework for studying the interactions between a diverse number of actors and for conceptualizing EU security policy-making in a meaningful way.

Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union

This article compares European Union ~EU! burden-sharing in secu- rity governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and com- pellence policies+ We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggre- gation technologies in each policy domain+ Joint-product models predict equal burden- sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs+ Prevention is also char- acterized by the technology of summation, but asymmetry of costs implies uneven burden-sharing+ Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence because it has the largest asymmetry of costs and a best-shot aggregation technology+ Evaluating burden-sharing relative to a countrys ability to contribute, Kendalls tau tests exam- ine the rank-correlation between security burden and the capacity of EU member states+ These tests show that the smaller EU members disproportionately shoulder the costs of assurance and protection; wealthier EU members carry a somewhat dis- proportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and larger EU members in the provision of compellence+Analyzing contributions relative to expected benefits, asym- metric marginal costs can largely explain uneven burden-sharing+ The main conclu- sion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the EU is shared quite evenly+

European Energy Security Co-operation: Between Amity and Enmity

Through an application of Regional Security Complex Theory and empirical examination, this article explores the pros and cons of regional and inter-regional energy co-operation. In spite of present unilateral and bilateral manoeuvres on the part of EU Member States to the contrary, a common energy security policy appears feasible over the next five to ten years. However, EU–Russian co-operation in the energy sector is not likely to improve considerably over this period, and EU attempts to counterbalance the dominant and growing position that Russia has occupied in the supply of gas to EU countries by seeking alternative energy supply from central Asia are likely to be thwarted by countervailing Russian measures.

Economic security and the problem of cooperation in post-Cold War Europe

The end of the Cold War and the transformation of the Yalta security system generated a debate about the survivability of the postwar institutions of security, particularly NATO. This debate is too narrow in its focus. We argue that security has two mutual constitutive elements, the political-military and the economic. The interdependence of these two elements of the future security architecture raises a set of interrelated questions addressed in this article: What are the economic elements of security? How have the changes in the European state system affected the prospects for the institutionalization of security cooperation, broadly defined? Does a stable security architecture require the parallel construction of the economic and military institutions of security?

Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned

Abstract Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions have increased substantially in number, functions and geographic spread since their inception in 2003. Despite their expansion in numbers and scope, especially in the Western Balkans, few systematic assessments of the contributions that CSDP missions make to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have been undertaken to date. This article addresses that lacuna by assessing the contributions CSDP missions have made in recent years to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Western Balkans. It explores whether CSDP missions in that region: make an intrinsic contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in those countries or merely profit (or take credit) from the initial groundwork laid by United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions; are adequately coordinated within the European Union (EU) and between the EU and other international organisations, including NATO; are sufficiently embedded or effectively linked to other EU instruments, such as the Stability and Association Process to the Western Balkans; and engender adequate elite or public support or ‘ownership’ in these countries.

Will form lead to function? Institutional enlargement and the creation of a European security and defence identity

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent nullification of the Yalta agreement initiated institutional change in the European security space. The emerging form and content of the post-Yalta European security order is increasingly codetermined by the interaction of national interests and international institutional constraints, chief of which are located in NATO and the European Union (EU). The prominence of NATO and the EU in the new European security order raises troubling questions about the end point of the European security order. It also puts into question the ability of the Western powers to shape a security order that performs the necessary task of assimilating Russia into the system without sacrificing the integrity of either institution or damaging member state interests. The confluence of the joint enlargements of NATO and the EU into central Europe, combined with the European effort to fashion a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), provides some insight into the problems facing the major Western powers in fashioning both a mutually acceptable and an adequate institutional response to the problem of European security.

Security Relations between China and the European Union: From Convergence to Cooperation?

© Cambridge University Press 2016. Over the past decade, the EU and China have expanded their relations beyond a focus on economic and trade issues to the sphere of security. Taking a broad definition of security, a multidisciplinary approach, and a comparative perspective (including scholars from both Europe and China), this book provides an in-depth analysis of the extent to which the EU and China not only express similar threat concerns, or make declarations about joint responses, but also adopt concrete measures in the pursuance of security cooperation. In particular, the book seeks to explore a range of key themes in the field of EU-China security cooperation such as nuclear proliferation, international terrorist threats and cyber attacks. Besides providing an overview of the areas where security cooperation exists and where it does not, it also highlights the aspects of convergence and divergence and the reasons for their occurrence.

Security governance in a comparative regional perspective

This article aims to explore the relationship between domestic economic and political conditions and the performance of 14 regional organizations over a range of security provisions. It argues that the willingness of member states to increase the range of security provisions of a regional organization is influenced by the combination of high levels of economic and political development and low levels of dispersion among the members of a regional organization. In order to evaluate this assumption, two aspects of regional organizations are explored. The first is to examine the development of security governance provisions of 14 regional organizations as well as the levels of empowerment or autonomy of those organizations. The second is to analyze how six economic and political variables influence the range of security provisions and the degree of empowerment of regional organizations. The final part of the article examines how regional organizations play a significant role in stimulating and reproducing regional governance orders.

Genscher and what lies behind ‘Genscherism’

This article analyses the factors which have contributed to West Germanys decision to oppose the modernisation of short‐range nuclear missilesin 1989 and focuses on the likely impact Hans‐Dietrich Genscher had on this decision. By considering both West German domestic conditions (value changes, mass perceptions of detente, and party‐political consensus on Ostpolitik) and external factors (changing superpower relations, reforms in Eastern Europe, and European Community progress), it is argued that Genscher is neither the single architect of, nor the sole influence on, West Germanys security policy‐making.