Emily W. Bushnell

Children's haptic and cross-modal recognition with familiar and unfamiliar objects

Five-year-old children explored multidimensional objects either haptically or visually and then were tested for recognition with target and distractor items in either the same or the alternative modality. In Experiments 1 and 2, haptic, visual, and cross-modal recognition were all nearly with familiar objects; haptic and visual recognition were also excellent with unfamiliar objects, but cross-modal recognition was less accurate. In Experiment 3, cross-modal recognition was also less accurate than within-mode recognition with familiar objects that were members of the same basic-level category. The results indicate that childrens haptic recognition is remarkably good, that cross-modal recognition is otherwise constrained, and that cross-modal recognition may be accomplished differently for familiar and unfamiliar objects.

Spilling thoughts: configuring attentional resources in infants’ goal-directed actions

Abstract The focus and organization of attention in perception-action coupling is systematically examined in two studies involving 9 1 2 and 10 1 2 -month-old infants engaged in learning goal-directed behaviors. Experiment 1 (discrimination study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding motor task on learning and cognition, while Experiment 2 (means-ends study) observed the influence of an attentionally demanding goal on motor planning and reaching performance. Taken together the results of these two experiments revealed that when mental processing resources were directed to thinking about movement, discrimination performance became compromised; conversely, when processing resources were directed to thinking about the goal-state, the motor planning and execution became compromised. These results suggest a “spilling forward” of thoughts onto actions and goal-states and thus an attention-driven cognition/action trade-off for infants’ goal-directed actions. Findings highlight the ultimate importance of emerging motor skills on cognition and are contextualized within the on-going dialogues and developmental debates surrounding perceptual-motor skill development and problem-solving strategies during the first year.

Infants' sensitivity to arbitrary pairings of color and taste*

Infants were familiarized with sweet and tart foods fed from distinctively colored cups. On a subsequent choice Vial, the infants consistently selected the color that had been paired with sweetness. The results indicate that infants can readily learn at least certain arbitrary bimodal correspondences, and they suggest the importance of motivational factors and biological significance in infant learning.

Visual-tactual knowledge in 8-, 9½, and 11-month-old infants*

The visual-tactual knowledge of 8, 9½, and 11-month-old infants was assessed by comparing their responses on two sorts of “trick” trials to those on matched control trials. On the virtual object task, the infants felt nothing at all where they could see an object on the trick trial, and they felt the visible object on the control trial. On two cross-modal tasks, the infants felt something different in shape and texture from what they could see in a certain place on trick trials, and they felt an object identical to the one seen an control trials. The two older groups of infants responded differentially to the trick and control trials, while the 8-moth-olds did not. It is concluded that 9½ and 11-month-old infant posses visual tactual knowledge about both object existence and object feature. The failure of 8-month-olds to similarly evidence such knowledge is discussed with reference to their less mature information processing abilities and reaching skills

The Ontogeny of Intermodal Relations: Vision and Touch in Infancy

The ontogeny of intermodal functioning and knowledge has long been considered by philosophers and psychologists. The question of the origin and development of cross-modal knowledge was raised in the seventeenth century, when Molyneux wrote his famous letter to Locke inquiring about the abilities of a blind man hypothetically restored to sight (cited in Gregory, 1966). The answer to this monumental query is still a matter for debate. How does the human organism arrive at the position where the perceptual systems are coordinated with each other so that, for example, stimulation to one modality gives rise to expectancies for stimulation to another? (McGurk, Turnure, & Creighton, 1977, p. 138)

Infants’ identification of three-dimensional form from transformations of linear perspective

The ability of infants to perceive three-dimensional structure from transformations of linear perspective was investigated in two studies. Infants were habituated to the pattern of linear perspective transformations corresponding to a particular three-dimensional object, and their relative preference for that object as compared with a different three-dimensional object was assessed both before and after habituation. The habituation displays showed the distorting shadow cast by a rotating object and therefore provided only transformations of linear perspective as information specifying three-dimensional form. The pre- and posttest displays involved the actual three-dimensional objects and provided binocular, shading, and texture information specifying three-dimensional form, but did not provide informative transformations of linear perspective. In Study 1, 6-month-olds showed changes in preference from pre- to posttest that were related to the identity of the object whose shadow they had seen during habituation; 4-month-olds, however, did not show preference changes related to the habituation object. In Study 2, rhythm information that may have served as a basis for responding in Study 1 was eliminated from the test displays. Six-month-olds again showed changes in preference that were dependent on their habituation experience. It is concluded that, by 6 months of age, infants are able to perceive object structure from the isolated cue of transformations of linear perspective. The findings are discussed with reference to infants’ three-dimensional form perception based on other cues and also with reference to the emergence of certain spatially related moter activities.

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

There is much to like in Campos et al.’s (this issue) comprehensive and thoughtful target article on the psychological changes impelled by the onset of self-produced locomotion. The critical role of motor abilities in development is reestablished in the midst of an era preoccupied with infants’ precocious worldly knowledge and children’s emerging theories of mind. The complexity, indirectness, and nonlinearity of development are also wonderfully illustrated. Who would have thought that crawling promotes the understanding of referential gestures, until Campos et al. point out an obvious connection via the increase in parents’ distal prohibitions and commands? The article also draws on a wealth of evidence, showcasing all of the classic methodologies in developmental psychology, from deprivation designs and parent interviews to animal models and cross-cultural comparisons. It will be a terrific article to teach from in methods and design courses. Along with its many virtues, however, Campos et al.’s strong emphasis on locomotor experience as an agent of change seems to sharpen several distinctions that developmental psychologists have been working hard to blur. The first of these is the well-known “nature versus nurture” dichotomy, once the reason for and now the bane of the discipline’s existence. Early in the article, Campos et al. state their aim of showing that the broad-scale transition in infancy involving search for hidden objects, secondary intersubjectivity, reactions to heights, and so forth “is not necessarily mediated by maturational factors (i.e., by the unfolding of a genetic blueprint for psychological changes), but instead, is intimately linked to experience” (pp. 153–154). They go on to argue persuasively that these diverse cognitive and social acquisitions are related to experiences and attentional biases that in turn are the inevitable consequences of self-produced locomotion. Hence, once an indiINFANCY, 1(2), 225–230 Copyright

The perception of identity by 6 1/2-month-old infants

In Study 1, sixteen 6 1/2-month-olds were habituated to a Reversible stimulus (an upright face that could be perceived as an entirely different upright face when it was rotated 180 degrees) and to a Nonreversible stimulus (a face that could be perceived as upright in only one orientation). Following habituation for each type of stimulus, test trials paired the habituated face with a novel stimulus (an inversion of the same face). For both Reversible and Nonreversible stimuli, the physical difference between the old and new test stimuli was the same (a 180 degrees rotation); however, infants devoted more visual attention to the 180 degrees rotation only when it was a Reversible face, suggesting that the identity change was detected. Experiment 2 ruled out the explanation that infants might have failed to dishabituate to the inversion of the Nonreversible stimulus because they could not remember it. Results are interpreted as evidence that 6 1/2-month-old infants are not limited to face recognition based on similarity in pattern arrangement alone, but are capable of processing faces at a representational level.

Thoughts on Imitation as a Perception–Action Coupling: An Essay in Honor of Herbert L. Pick, Jr.

Perception–action couplings such as were the focus of research by Herbert L. Pick, Jr. are compared and contrasted with the perception–action pairings involved in successful imitation. In both cases, the links between perceptions and corresponding actions may be formed very early in life, and they seem to form implicitly, through cyclic or repeated instances of experiencing a perception while executing the corresponding action. Once formed, though, perception–action couplings are “tighter” or more restricted than imitative perception–action pairings. Research by Herb and his colleagues shows that perceptual-motor couplings do not transfer across domains, and they are also impenetrable to cognition. In contrast, studies conducted by the author and others indicate that imitative pairings readily transfer to new contexts, and they may be suppressed or altered by other knowledge and information. These differences are probably related to the different primary functions of perceptual-motor couplings and imitation—to facilitate smooth and continuous ongoing behavior on the one hand and to promote learning new skills and social bonding on the other.