Emily Wyman

Two key steps in the evolution of human cooperation: the interdependence hypothesis

Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.

Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation

Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.

Coordination of Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a Stag Hunt Game

Group-living animals frequently face situations in which they must coordinate individual and sometimes conflicting goals. We assessed chimpanzees’ ability to coordinate in a Stag Hunt game. Dyads were confronted with a situation in which each individual was already foraging on a low-value food (hare) when a high-value food (stag) appeared that required collaboration for retrieval, with a solo attempt to get the stag resulting in a loss of both options. In one condition visibility between partners was open whereas in the other it was blocked by a barrier. Regardless of condition, dyads almost always (91%) coordinated to choose the higher valued collaborative option. Intentional communication or monitoring of the partner’s behavior before decision making—characteristic of much human coordination—were limited. Instead, all dyads adopted a leader–follower strategy in which one partner took the risk of going first, presumably predicting that this would induce the other to join in (sometimes communicating if she was slow to do so). These results show that humans’ closest primate relatives do not use complex communication to coordinate but most often use a less cognitively complex strategy that achieves the same end.

Young children understand multiple pretend identities in their object play.

This set of studies examined the ability of 3-year-olds to conceptualize multiple pretend identities with objects. Rather than relying on verbal response measures, as has been done in the past, childrens creative and inferential pretend actions were used as indicators of their understanding. The common structure to all four studies was that children were confronted with one pretend scenario, moved to a second pretend scenario and then back again to the first. Children proficiently tailored their pretence to an object whose pretend identity changed between scenarios despite being less able to name each identity. Thus, using an inferential action methodology, these studies provide early and particularly convincing evidence that children can track the multiple pretend identities of objects.

Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in a Stag Hunt game

Much of human cooperation takes place in mutualistic contexts in which the main challenge for individuals is how to coordinate decisions. In the current studies, we compared the abilities of chimpanzees and young children to coordinate with a partner in two versions of a Stag Hunt game. When risks were low (the hare was of low value) and information was cheap (the partners behaviour was readily observable), partners of both species were able to successfully coordinate on the higher value stag more than 90% of the time. By contrast, when the risks were raised and observing the partner was more difficult, the chimpanzees became less successful, whereas the children compensated, and so remained highly successful, by communicating more often and more specifically. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that humans evolved unique skills of coordination and communication in the context of especially risky coordination problems.

Non-verbal communication enables children’s coordination in a “Stag Hunt” game

This study assessed the role of non-verbal communication in 4-year-old children’s decisions to coordinate with others. During a “Stag Hunt” game, the child and an adult individually and continually collected low-value prizes (hares). Occasionally, an alternative option of collecting a high-value prize (stag) cooperatively with the adult arose, but entailed a risk: a lone attempt on this prize by either player would leave that player empty handed. Children coordinated with the adult to obtain the high-value prize more often when that adult made mutual eye contact and smiled at them than when she attended to the prizes only. This suggests that neither verbal nor gestural communication are necessary for coordination: Minimal, non-verbal communication enables children’s coordination with others towards joint goals.

Children use salience to solve coordination problems.

Humans are routinely required to coordinate with others. When communication is not possible, adults often achieve this by using salient cues in the environment (e.g. going to the Eiffel Tower, as an obvious meeting point). To explore the development of this capacity, we presented dyads of 3-, 5-, and 8-year-olds (N = 144) with a coordination problem: Two balls had to be inserted into the same of four boxes to obtain a reward. Identical pictures were attached to three boxes whereas a unique--and thus salient--picture was attached to the fourth. Children either received one ball each, and so had to choose the same box (experimental condition), or they received both balls and could get the reward independently (control condition). In all cases, children could neither communicate nor see each others choices. Children were significantly more likely to choose the salient option in the experimental condition than in the control condition. However, only the two older age groups chose the salient box above chance levels. This study is the first to show that children from at least age 5 can solve coordination problems by converging on a salient solution.

Cultural learning and cultural creation

U. Muller, J. Carpendale, N. Budwig, B. Sokol, Developmental Relations Between Forms of Social Interaction and Forms of Thought: An Introduction. M. Bickhard, Are You Social? The Ontological and Developmental Emergence of the Person. J. Martin, Perspectives and Persons: Ontological, Constitutive Possibilities. T. Behne, M. Carpenter, M. Grafenhain, K. Liebal, U. Liszkowski, H. Moll, H.Rakoczy, M. Tomasello, F. Warneken, E. Wyman, Cultural Learning and Cultural Creation. P. Hobson, J. Meyer, In the Beginning is Relation and Then What? V. Reddy, Experiencing the Social. M. B. Bibok, J.I.M. Carpendale, C. Lewis, Social Knowledge as Social Skill: An Action Based View of Social Understanding. J. Dunn, Relationships and Childrens Discovery of Mind. G. Duveen, C. Psaltis, The Constructive Role of Asymmetry in Social Interaction. M. Bamberg, Selves and Identities in the Making: The Study of Microgenetic Processes in Interactive Practices. C. R. Hallpike, The Anthropology of Moral Development. E. Turiel, Individuals and Social Change.

Social Conventions, Institutions, and Human Uniqueness: Lessons from Children and Chimpanzees

Cooperative behavior has become conventionalized and institutionalized over the course of human evolution. When faced with situations in which we desire to coordinate with others, we adopt social conventions such as driving on a particular side of the road, and adhere to these for social reasons: we expect others to, they expect us to, and this is common knowledge in our cultural community. Many of these practices have also become institutionalized via processes of formal codification and symbolic mediation, resulting for instance, in traffic laws and road signs. And such practices have a normative quality such that there may be penalties for non-adherence.

Conforming to coordinate: children use majority information for peer coordination.

Humans are constantly required to coordinate their behaviour with others. As this often relies on everyones convergence on the same strategy (e.g., driving on the left side of the road), a common solution is to conform to majority behaviour. In this study, we presented 5-year-old children with a coordination problem: To retrieve some rewards, they had to choose the same of four options as a peer partner--in reality a stooge--whose decision they were unable to see. Before making a choice, they watched a video showing how other children from their partners peer group had behaved; a majority chose the same option and a minority chose a different one. In a control condition, children watched the same video but could then retrieve the reward irrespective of their partners choice (i.e., no coordination was necessary). Children followed the majority more often when coordination was required. Moreover, conformers mostly justified their choices by referring to the majority from the video demonstration. This study is the first to show that young children are able to strategically coordinate decisions with peers by conforming to the majority.