Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interaction between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization can not prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way out is to set up a central fiscal authority.

Imperfect Competition and Fiscal Policy Transmission in a Two-Country Economy

This paper explores the interactions between countries implementing a fiscal policy in a monopolistic competition framework. The study of the fiscal multipliers shows that a fiscal expansion in the home country increases domestic output and diminishes foreign output in the short run. Profit redistribution to households constitutes the main channel of transmission. Both influence of the proportion of domestic firms owned by domestic households and the effect of the mark-up on the transmission of government policies are analysed. In the long run there is no interaction between countries since profits are zero. The welfare analysis reveals the possibility of positive externalities across countries, and the introduction of alternative taxation principles shows that the main results can be altered by the taxation scheme.