Ergete Ferede

What Does it Cost Society to Raise a Dollar of Tax Revenue? The Marginal Cost of Public Funds

The marginal cost of public funds measures the welfare loss a society incurs in raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. Tax increases distort economic decisions and erode tax bases because of tax avoidance and tax evasion by taxpayers. This Commentary uses econometric estimates of the effects of higher provincial tax rates on the provinces’ corporate income tax, personal income tax, and sales tax bases to calculate the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) for these taxes. The results indicate that the cost of increasing provincial tax revenues through a corporate tax rate increase is very high, and in some provinces, corporate tax rate reductions in 2006 would have increased the present value of the provincial government’s total tax revenues. The results also suggest that significant welfare gains would accrue from reducing provincial corporate income tax rates. As well, increasing provincial corporate and personal income tax rates can cause significant reductions in federal tax revenues because the federal and provincial governments levy taxes on the same tax bases. Finally, Canada’s system of the equalization grants might reduce the perceived MCF of recipient provinces.

Dynamic Scoring in the Ramsey Growth Model

Abstract This paper extends the Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) model and examines the revenue effects of capital and labor income tax cuts under alternative financing regimes. Our analysis suggests that the revenue losses from capital and labor income tax cuts are the highest when the tax cuts are productive spending-financed and the lowest when transfer payments are used to finance the tax cuts. For plausible parameter values consistent with the US economy, we find that about 47 percent of a transfer-financed capital income tax cut is self-financing. The corresponding result for a productive spending-financed capital income tax cut is only 6 percent.

The Incentive Effects of Equalization Grants on Tax Policy Evidence from Canadian Provinces

This article provides an empirical analysis of the incentive effects of equalization grants on business and personal income tax rates using panel data from Canadian provinces. We exploit the discontinuity in the equalization grant allocation formula to identify the exogenous income and incentive effects of equalization grants on tax policy. Our empirical results indicate that equalization grants provide provincial governments an incentive to raise their business and personal income tax rates. The results also suggest that if the equalization program in its current form was abandoned, then business and personal income tax rates would be lower in the grant receiving provinces.

Block Grants and Education Expenditure

This article investigates the effects of block grants on education expenditures using panel data from Canadian provinces over the period 1982 to 2008. Our main empirical identification strategy relies on the use of the allocation formula for equalization grant—a component of the Canadian federal block grant. The results indicate that block grants have stimulative effects on provincial education expenditure. Our results suggest that a one dollar increase in per capita federal grants is associated with an increase in per capita education expenditure of about Can

Who Pays the Corporate Tax?: Insights from the Literature and Evidence for Canadian Provinces

0.21, which is roughly proportional to the share of education in total provincial spending. The results are robust to various sensitivity checks.

The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax on Wages: Evidence from Canadian Provinces

Who bears the burden, or incidence, of the corporate income tax (CIT)? This is an important, if not somewhat contentious, policy issue. In this paper we provide a discussion of the existing research on the question, viewing it through a Canadian policy lens. We also use some new results from a companion technical paper, which undertakes one of the few empirical investigations of the issue using Canadian data, to discuss the implications of increases in corporate taxes for wages in Canadian provinces. While it is clear that people, not corporate entities, ultimately bear the burden of corporate taxes, a key question is which people? The answer to this question has important implications for the equity, or fairness, of the tax system. Much of the recent focus in policy discussions concerns the allocation of the burden of the CIT between owners of capital and labour. Since income from capital tends to be concentrated with wealthier individuals, if the burden of the CIT falls mostly on the owners of capital, it increases the progressivity of the tax system. On the other hand, if the tax is borne mostly by labour through lower wages, the CIT is less progressive. Much of the research into the incidence of the CIT has employed theoretical simulation models. Early models of this type, which were based on a closed economy with fixed supplies of labour and capital, suggested that most of the burden of the CIT would be borne by the owners of capital throughout the economy, and not just the shareholders of firms in the corporate sector. Subsequent extensions of those models into a small open economy setting, where capital and goods are highly mobile between jurisdictions (countries, provinces), predict that most of the burden of the CIT will be borne by other inputs that are relatively inelastic in supply, such as labour. These small open economy models are particularly relevant for Canada. Viewing the results of these models through a Canadian lens, we conclude that there is good reason to expect that much of the burden of corporate taxes in Canada, particularly those levied by provincial governments, will fall on labour through lower wages. While useful, the predictions of these simulation models should be viewed with caution, largely because of the sensitivity of the results to the underlying assumptions. A nascent empirical literature has emerged that provides econometric-based estimates of the distribution of the burden of corporate taxes. While this research is relatively new, our reading is that the evidence is mounting that corporate taxes are indeed borne to a significant extent by labour through lower wages. However, there is very little empirical work done in an explicitly Canadian context. In a companion technical paper we employ Canadian data to examine the impact of provincial corporate taxes on wages. Our results suggest that, consistent with the predictions of the open economy simulation models, provincial corporate taxes adversely affect the capital/labour ratio, which lowers the productivity of labour which, in turn, lowers wages. Accounting for the shrinkage in the corporate tax base in response to an increase in the tax rate, we calculate that for every

The Incentive Effects of Equalization Grants on Fiscal Policy

1 in extra tax revenue generated by an increase in the provincial CIT rate, the associated long-run decrease in aggregate wages ranges from

The Timing and Direction of Statutory Tax Rate Changes by the Canadian Provinces

1.52 for Alberta to

Provincial Tax Rate Adjustments in Canada

3.85 for Prince Edward Island. Applying our estimates to the recent 2 percentage point increase in the CIT rate in Alberta we calculate that labour earnings for an average two-earner household will decline by the equivalent of approximately

The effects of tax rate changes on tax bases and the marginal cost of public funds for Canadian provincial governments

830 per year, which amounts to a