Ergun Özbudun

AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift

The cleavage between the secular centre and the religious-conservative periphery has been the most important dividing line in modern Turkish politics. In the past, centre-right parties have successfully appealed to the peripheral majority, emerging as victors in almost all parliamentary elections since 1950. This trend continues with the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In power since 2002, winner of three consecutive elections with increasing majorities, the AKP qualifies as a predominant party. The article focuses on the AKPs recent drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an electoral authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character. Topics discussed include the Gezi Park events in May–June 2013, the conflict with the Gülen movement, corruption charges against government ministers, recent legislation weakening judicial independence and restricting freedom of expression, and the 30 March 2014 local elections.

Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004

The Turkish Constitution, which was drafted in 1982 under the aegis of the military regime, has been the subject of protracted domestic and international criticisms for its shortcomings according to international democratic norms. There had been a number of changes to the Constitution during the 1990s to address some of these shortcomings. In particular, there have been important amendments and changes to the Constitution between 2002 and 2004 that have led to significant improvements in fundamental rights and liberties, political rights, the rule of law, and civil–military relations. This essay examines the changes that have taken place to the Turkish Constitution and their ramifications on Turkish politics.

From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey

If one of the most interesting characteristics of the Turkish party system in the 1990s was the rapid rise of political Islam under the banner of the Welfare Party, an equally, perhaps even more, noteworthy development in the early 2000s is its transformation under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership into a moderate conservative democratic party. Various aspects of this transformation are the central focus of this work. The AKP is compared with the earlier Islamist parties in terms of ideology, organization, competitive strategy, and government performance.

Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive Authoritarianism

Turkey has always been considered an “illiberal democracy”, or in Freedom House’s terms, a “partly-free” country. In recent years, however, there has been a downward trend toward “competitive authoritarianism”. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents. One of the methods employed by competitive authoritarian leaders is the use of informal mechanisms of repression. This, in turn, requires a dependent and cooperative judiciary. Thus, in Turkey the year 2014 can be described as a period when the governing AKP (Justice and Development Party) made a sustained and systematic effort to establish its control over the judiciary by means of a series of laws of dubious constitutionality.

Party prohibition cases: different approaches by the Turkish constitutional court and the European Court of Human Rights

The article deals with the different approaches followed by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in party prohibition cases. The Turkish Constitution and even more so the Law on Political Parties contain a long list of party bans, the violation of which leads to the closure of the party by the Constitutional Court. The Turkish Constitutional Court, both under the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions, interpreted these provisions in an exceedingly illiberal manner, and has so far closed down a total of 24 political parties. Turkish rules and practices concerning the prohibition of political parties are among the most important ‘democracy deficits’ of the Turkish political system. In the article, the Turkish Courts illiberal approach to party prohibition cases, especially those involving the protection of the national and territorial integrity of the state and of the principle of secularism, is compared with the much more liberal criteria developed by the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.