Eric A. Verhoogen
Columbia University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Eric A. Verhoogen.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | 2003
Stephen V. Burks; Jeffrey P. Carpenter; Eric A. Verhoogen
This paper examines the effect of subjects playing both roles in a trust game. We compare two information treatments to our replication of the single-role trust game. The treatments alter the point at which participants are told they will play both roles. We find that playing both roles reduces both trust and reciprocity. We also explore relationships between demographic and personality characteristics and decisions in the game. We find that a social-psychological measure of Machiavellian behavior predicts distrust but not a lack of trustworthiness, and that non-white participants trust less in a predominantly white environment, but are no less trustworthy.
Archive | 2008
Maurice Kugler; Eric A. Verhoogen
This paper uses uniquely rich and representative data on the unit values of “outputs” (products) and inputs of Colombian manufacturing plants to draw inferences about the extent of quality differentiation at the plant level. We extend the Melitz (2003) framework to include heterogeneity of inputs and a complementarity between plant productivity and input quality in producing output quality and we show that the resulting model carries distinctive implications for two simple reduced-form correlations – between output prices and plant size and between input prices and plant size – and for how those correlations vary across sectors. We then document three plant level facts: (1) output prices are positively correlated with plant size within industries, on average; (2) input prices are positively correlated with plant size within industries, on average; and (3) both correlations are more positive in industries with more scope for quality differentiation, as measured by the advertising and R&D intensity of U.S. firms. The correlations between export status and input and output prices are similar to those for plant size. These facts are consistent with our model of quality differentiation of both outputs and inputs, and difficult to reconcile with models that assume homogeneity or symmetry of either set of goods. Beyond recommending an amendment of the Melitz (2003) model, the results highlight shortcomings of standard methods of productivity estimation, generalize and provide an explanation for the well-known employer size-wage effect, and suggest new channels through which liberalization of trade in output markets may affect input markets and vice-versa.
National Bureau of Economic Research | 2015
David Atkin; Azam Chaudhry; Shamyla Chaudry; Amit K. Khandelwal; Eric A. Verhoogen
This paper studies technology adoption in a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot, Pakistan. We invented a new cutting technology that reduces waste of the primary raw material and gave the technology to a random subset of producers. Despite the arguably unambiguous net benefits of the technology for nearly all firms, after 15 months take-up remained puzzlingly low. We hypothesize that an important reason for the lack of adoption is a misalignment of incentives within firms: the key employees (cutters and printers) are typically paid piece rates, with no incentive to reduce waste, and the new technology slows them down, at least initially. Fearing reductions in their effective wage, employees resist adoption in various ways, including by misinforming owners about the value of the technology. To investigate this hypothesis, we implemented a second experiment among the firms that originally received the technology: we offered one cutter and one printer per firm a lump-sum payment, approximately equal to a monthly wage, conditional on them demonstrating competence in using the technology in the presence of the owner. This incentive payment, small from the point of view of the firm, had a significant positive effect on adoption. We interpret the results as supportive of the hypothesis that misalignment of incentives within firms is an important barrier to technology adoption in our setting.
Archive | 2012
Todd J. Kumler; Eric A. Verhoogen; Judith Frias
Non-compliance of rms with tax regulations is a major constraint on state capacity in developing countries. We focus on an arguably under-appreciated dimension of non-compliance: underreporting of wages by formal rms to evade payroll taxes. Comparing wage distributions for similar sets of workers in the administrative records of the Mexican social security agency and a household labor-force survey, we document extensive under-reporting of wages. We further argue that the 1997 Mexican pension reform had a dierential eect by age on the incentives of workers to ensure that their wages were reported accurately. Using a dierence-in-dier ences strategy, we present evidence that the increase in the incentive for workers to ensure accurate reports led to a signicant decline in under-reporting. The results suggest that enlisting workers in monitoring their employers is an eective way to increase payroll tax compliance.
Quarterly Journal of Economics | 2008
Eric A. Verhoogen
The Review of Economic Studies | 2012
Maurice Kugler; Eric A. Verhoogen
The American Economic Review | 2009
Miguel Urquiola; Eric A. Verhoogen
National Bureau of Economic Research | 2009
Maurice Kugler; Eric A. Verhoogen
The American Economic Review | 2009
Maurice Kugler; Eric A. Verhoogen
Economics Letters | 2005
Jeffrey P. Carpenter; Eric A. Verhoogen; Stephen V. Burks